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The purpose of this dissertation is to provide an account of the influence and impact of David
Hume, Adam Smith and Thomas Reid's depiction of language on their characterisation of the
origin, communication, and development of moral sentiments. These thinkers were well aware that
none of the arts, sciences, or institutions of man could have developed without language.
Furthermore, language was recognised by them as essential for the transmission of knowledge from
one individual to another. As a result, it will be argued that discussions of language and language
use by Hume, Smith and Reid played an important role illustrating, substantiating and corroborating
their theories generally, and more specifically, lend insight into their conclusions regarding the
development of human sociability and morality. Utilising published works, as well as unpublished
personal and student notes, this thesis traces both the role of language in the construction of the
individual theories ofHume, Smith and Reid as well as the theoretical tensions which arose between
these philosophers relating to their characterisation of language and language use in relation to
man's formation of a conception ofmorality.
Theorising on the origin and implication of language held an important place in the European
Enlightenment generally, with some of the greatest thinkers of the period contributing to the debate.
As a result, this thesis will first engage in a brief overview of the major discussions of the nature and
origin of language and its relation to morals in the time leading up to the period in question, as well
as the contemporary debate. This section aims to provide a conceptual framework from which to
explore Hume, Smith and Reid's concurrence or divergence from the contemporary debate
regarding the relationship between man's use of language as the central tool of interpersonal
communication, and how this fact relates to man's conception of virtue and vice.
The thesis next turns its attention to the work of David Hume. Aiming to construct a
comprehensive analysis of Hume's scattered linguistic references, it will be argued that the
relevance of examining Hume's characterisation of language relates directly to his claim that it is
custom and convention, rather than autonomous reason or innate sentiment, which are principle
means of shaping man's social and moral character. As a result, references to language and
language use by Hume served as a significant tool in illustrating and substantiating his more general
theoretical claims regarding man's social and moral character.
Building upon the analysis of Hume, the thesis next turns its attention to an exploration of the
influence of such linguistic assumptions on the moral theory of Adam Smith. While agreeing with
many of Hume's interpretations as to the character of language, it is clear that Smith did not share
Hume's faith in the ability of linguistic convention to serve as a reliable medium of moral guidance.
Maintaining that Smith's The Theory ofMoral Sentiments and writings on rhetoric are at the centre
of his thinking on language and language use, we will investigate how his characterisation of
language is reflected in, and exercised influence upon, his conception of man's morality and
sociability. Perhaps the best example of the multifarious implications of language and language use
in the presentation of man's sociable and moral character amongst the theorists being discussed,
Smith's references to language and language play a significant supportive role in the substantiation
and dissemination of his theory.
To highlight the influence of linguistic analysis on the period's characterisation of morals, the
final stage of the thesis explores the efforts of Thomas Reid to present a countervailing theory of
morals from that of both Hume and Smith. Drawing upon Reid's published works, private notes,
and student lecture notes; the closing section examines Reid's utilisation of a very different
interpretation of the nature and role of language in his effort to challenge the forces of scepticism
and moral relativism.
Introduction
The assertion that the works of David Hume, Adam Smith and Thomas Reid
utilised references to language in order to illustrate, corroborate and substantiate
their conclusions regarding the formation and maintenance of a system of morals
seems reasonable given the fact that at both a social and philosophical level there
existed in 18th Century Scotland a heightened awareness of language and language
use. On the social plane, the cultivation of moderation, manners, gentility and
politeness arising out of the urban culture of London during the early part of the
eighteenth century was to have a profound impact on Scotland. On the
philosophical front, the coming of the Enlightenment resulted in a re-evaluation of
the role of language played in the formation of man's nature and on its continuing
influence in the formation of man's social and moral character. This heightened
appreciation of language at both a social and intellectual level would to have a
profound effect on the characterisation of language's relation to man's sociability
and morality by the great Scottish philosophers under discussion. While presenting
distinct lines of reasoning as to how man comes to formulate and understand his
moral universe, these multifarious influences relating to language and language use
would come to play an important role in these philosopher's efforts to make their
conclusions about morals both accessible and persuasive.
This enthusiastic exploration of language and language use manifested itself
within the general Scottish society during the mid-18th Century, as the nation
became pre-occupied with participating actively in what was to become known as
'polite' society. This desire to become an active participant in the promotion of
'polite' society is significant because it necessarily entailed a heightened interest in
the mastery of effective interpersonal communication through 'polite' conversation.
The ideals of politeness first appeared in the British Isles during the Restoration in
the form of the 'Polite Whigs', who considered its promotion necessary in order to
adequately defend their urban life and politics. Challenging the Spartan virtues
patterned on the classical ideals of armed proprietors and landed classes, these
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advocates of 'polite society' hoped that the anachronistic idea of apolis made up of
armed citizens would give way to leisured taxpayers under a parliamentary
government. As a result, they hoped that the Spartan virtues patterned on the
classical ideals of armed proprietors would be replaced by the 'polite' virtues of
sociability and conversation.
This emerging notion of politeness soon came to be seen as an active civilising
agent. Through observation, conversation, and cultivation, the advocates of this
movement were convinced that the polite virtues would allow men to become
aware of their own needs as well as the needs of others. Through the medium of
polite conversation, it was held that man could shape himself and others into
positive agents of social advancement and harmony. As a result, politeness became
a serious practical means of propagating morality. Seen by its proponents as
offering the best possible method for man to engage in social interaction with his
fellow man, this new 'polite society' was cultivated throughout much of the
eighteenth century and deployed against Puritan, Tory, and Republican alike.
This cultural pre-occupation with 'polite society' was soon to reverberate
across the length and breadth of Britain, and was to have a particularly profound
influence on the Scots. Lacking a Tory landed interest and the heavily armoured
Calvinism of the late English Cromwellian period, the Whiggish emphasis on polite
conversation could more easily gain a hold in Scotland. As a result, we witness
emerging in Scotland during the first half of the eighteenth century a society
dedicated to the furtherance of sociability, conversation, and moral improvement.
The heightened interest in the cultivation of polite conversation also manifested
itself in a proliferation of clubs and debating societies in Edinburgh and Glasgow;
fraternal organisations which were not confined merely to the intellectuals and
students of the Scottish Universities, but became as well a focal point of the general
public attendance. For example, out of the famous Select Society there emerged in
1761 a club dedicated to 'Promoting the Reading and Speaking of the English
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Language in Scotland'.1 The functions of these clubs was in large part to provide a
forum in which to cultivate the skills necessary in mastering polite conversation,
particularly in clubs like Allan Ramsay's Easy Club and the Select Society. Yet
another example is the Belle Lettres Society, this Edinburgh club stressed the
ethical function of friendship in social life. This growing interest in the mastering
of correct language use led to a burgeoning number of both formal and informal
gatherings dedicated to the perfection of those means of proper social interaction
that would result in 'polite' conversation and the correct use of the English
language.
In addition to these formal gathering points, English periodicals dedicated to the
advancement of sociability and polite conversation began to gain in popularity well
beyond the confines of clubs and debating societies. As will be addressed in
Chapter I, the reading, oft times aloud, of the English periodical The Spectator
became a rage within the coffee houses of Aberdeen, Edinburgh and Glasgow. As
the century wore on, Scottish periodicals themselves began to pick up and develop
themes relating to polite society and conversation. The editor of the Caledonian
Mercury underlined the importance of sociable exchange by inserting such
selections as 'An Essay on Conversation', which described converse as a 'peculiar
blessing and advantage of mankind' and included models of polite conversation
taken from works of the abbe de Sellegarde (29 July and September 1765). This
emphasis on polite conversation, so characteristic of Scottish culture, proceeded
unabated to the end of the century and beyond. In the late eighteenth century, for
example, The Bee defined the 'distinctive character of the human species' as it's
'faculty of accumulating knowledge in the aggregate' and suggested that 'extensive
conversation' was the foundation of civilisation.
1 See Christopher Berry, Social Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1997) p. 17.
2 John Dwyer and Richard B. Sher, eds., Sociability and Society in Eighteenth Century Scotland
(Edinburgh: Mercat Press, 1993) pp. 8-9.
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All the above cited examples point to the heightened awareness of the
significance of language and language use within 18th Century Scotland. From the
intellectuals and Universities, to the coffeehouses and local periodicals, we witness
in Scotland during this period that interpersonal communication and conversation
were actively engaged in throughout Scottish society in order to promote personal
refinement. In order to improve their manners, the Scots held great credence in the
idea that it is necessary to converse with our fellow man in order to gain a rich and
varied perspective, and thus increase our natural taste. This effort thus not only
stressed the social pleasure but also the ethical value of conversation of everyday
life. As a result, the Scottish moralists sought to construct an understanding and
conception of ethics that bridged morality and politeness by finding the source of
both in fundamental social passions. The moral sentiments were seen as leading to
goodness as well as civility, and these two characteristics achieved a state of perfect
harmony in the 'man of feeling'; though moral sentiments were thought to be
natural to all, Scottish moralists were impressed by the degree to which they could
be cultivated through active and conscientious social engagement.
This heightened interest in language and language use can also partially be
attributed to the view of many 18th Century Scotsmen that their own version of
English, to put it in David Hume's words, was 'very corrupt'. This made them
very anxious to write in pervasive, elegant, and 'correct' English. Conscious of
being in some senses at the periphery of English culture and literature, the Scots
studied English rhetoric, style and verbiage in a way the English did not. As
Alexander Carlyle, one of the founders of the Moderate movement, remarked in his
autobiography, "[T]o every man bred in Scotland the English language was in some
respects a foreign tongue, the precise value and force ofwhose words and phrases
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he did not understand and therefore was continually endeavouring to word his
expressions by additional epithets or circumlocutions which made his writings
appear stiff and redundant".3
The fear of 'Scottism' haunted none more than David Hume, leading Lord
Monboddo to quip that Hume died not confessing his sins, but rather his
Scottisms.4 James Beattie, recognised as one of Hume's greatest detractors, none
the less shared his concern for the need to refine language use. In his pamphlet
Scottisms arranged in Alphabetical Order, designed to correct Improprieties of
Speech and Writing (1787), Beattie sets out to instruct young writers to avoid any
and all Scottism which might creep into their writings and importantly their speech
as well.
The heightened awareness of language and language use in Scotland was to
have a profound effect on every level of Scottish society. Edinburgh had a chair of
English a century and a half before Oxford and Cambridge. Lecturing in Latin was
gradually abandoned within the Scottish Universities, an effort advanced most
notably by Francis Hutchison, whose influence on Smith, as well as his general
writings, has led many to see him as the father of the Scottish Enlightenment. In
addition, among the writers of 18th Century Scotland rhetoric as a civic virtue rose
to its height during this period.5
Within this society increasingly focused on language and language use, the
intellectual currents of the Enlightenment also found its roots. Concomitant with
the developing interest in polite society and the eradication of 'Scottism', the
intellectual advancements of the Age of Enlightenment would come to play an
important role in these Scots' understanding of the nature of language and its
relation to man's moral disposition. Speculation as to the significance of language
3 See Berry pp. 16-17.
4
See Berry p. 16.
5 David Daiches, "Style Periodique and Style Coupe: Hugh Blair and the Scottish Rhetoric of American
Independence", in Richard B. Sher and Jeffrey Smitten (eds.), Scotland and America in the Age of
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was one of the emerging areas of inquiry that attracted the attention of
Enlightenment thinkers in Scotland.6 While Hume, Smith and Reid cannot be
considered full-time students of language, the fact that all of them discussed the
topic indicates their growing awareness of the important role language and the
nature of interpersonal communication played in the study of human nature.7
This increased interest in language was, in itself, not unique to Scotland.
Indeed, throughout early modern Europe there was a heightened interest in both the
origin and development of language. What remains to be seen, and is the central
focus of this thesis, is how the influence of language and language use came to
colour the theories of Hume, Smith and Reid. In what way did the growing
epistemological interest in language come to be infused into their theories? To
what degree did these epistemological assumptions regarding language come to
influence their characterisation of the attributes of polite society and conversation,
and in turn, how did both these areas of interest in language and language use come
to be incorporated into their efforts to substantiate their claims as to the
fundamentals ofman's sociability and his coming to an understanding ofmorality?
What made the works of Hume, Smith and Reid unique, and the central
contention of this thesis, was the way in which these Scottish Enlightenment
philosophers integrated accounts of language within their theories ofmorality and
sociability in order to illustrate, substantiate and validate their conclusions. Driven
on by an intellectual and popular culture pre-occupied with the discourse of polite
society as well as by a philosophical climate deeply concerned with
epistemological implications of language, these Scots initiated an amalgamation of
these two spheres of linguistic enquiry which would come to colour their
conceptions of virtue, sociability, and moral philosophy.
Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990) p. 210.
6
See, Isabel F. Knight, The Geometric Spirit: The Abbe de Condillac and the French Enlightenment.
(London: Yale University Press, 1968) p. 145.
7 Pierre Juliard. Philosophies of Language In Eighteenth-Century France (Paris: Mouton, 1970) p. 15.
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Hume, Reid and Smith were selected for discussion in this thesis because they
represent a group of scholars who seem to be keenly aware of the usefulness of
drawing upon references to language to illustrate and substantiate their theories of
sociability and morality. It will be maintained that these major figures of the
Enlightenment in Scotland were very much concerned with the language and
language use. This fact is revealed both in works explicitly dealing with language,
such as Smith's Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Language, as
well as in those where we find linguistic discussions imbedded within larger
theoretical contexts, such as Hume, Smith and Reid's attempt to find the source of
man's social and moral nature. While other Scottish theorists, most notably Lord
Monboddo, wrote on the topic of language, these discussions were not incorporated
into a larger discussion of the influence of language on man's sociable and moral
character. Therefore, these other works have been excluded from discussion in this
thesis.
Hume, Smith and Reid also represented a means by which to keep the
discussion of this topic relatively encapsulated. Hume is recognised as being a
leading pioneer in the creation of a 'science of man' that utilised empirically
grounded means by which to discover the driving forces behind both man's
sociability and how man came to an understanding ofmorality. In turn, Smith is
well recognised as having drawn upon Hume's works in creating his own theories
of morality and sociability, though coming to different conclusions. Lastly, Reid
offered pointed criticism of both of Smith's and Hume's conclusions regarding the
nature of man's sociability and morality, proffering an alternative theory that
contrasted greatly with the previous two theories being examined here. In all three
cases, however, we witness consistent references to language and language use in
relation to their articulation of their theories of sociability and morality. By
examining the role of language within the context of these three Scottish
philosophers, we are able to effectively examine the role of language within the
interrelated theories proffered by them regarding the character and nature of man's
sociability and morality.
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It is the contention of this thesis that, while building upon some of the major
contemporary themes of the period relating to the character and role of language, it
was the pragmatic references to language and language use to illustrate,
substantiate, and validate their moral theories that distinguishes the work of Hume,
Reid and Smith as a distinct branch of enquiry within the larger linguistic discourse
witnessed throughout Europe during the Eighteenth Century. Indeed, it will be
argued that in their efforts to create a comprehensive 'science of man' it was the
very unwillingness, or perhaps inability, of Hume, Smith and Reid to relate
language and language use to their epistemological assumptions and conclusions
about human morality that makes their efforts on this front worthy of investigation.
The result is an analysis of theoretical methodologies presented by these three
theorists that suggests a moral universe in which ethical feelings and moral
judgments were cultivated through communication and a proper understanding of
the attributes and limitations of language.
While these theorists differed dramatically in their ultimate conclusions, all
three do seem to come to agree on one fundamental point in relation to the topic at
hand: that the true essence of man's moral character is most readily demonstrated
and substantiated by references to language and language use. These Scots judged
man's creation and use of language, and his ability to formulate and act upon a
conception ofmorality, as mirroring each another, sustaining each other and, as a
result, inevitably coalescing in man's constitution. Language itself came to be
regarded within their theories as the means and medium by which an individual
comes to understand and refine moral sentiments. Having utilised language as a
tool to validate their conclusions about the nature and character of man's morality,
they go on to maintain that a mastery of language was a vital tool in moral
refinement. Given these suppositions, the investigation of morality was greatly
aided by a concurrent exploration of language and language use.
14
As is the case with so many intellectual developments, the stories of these
Scots' characterisations of language have their roots in earlier theoretical
investigation. Chapter I, therefore, attempts to briefly explore the theoretical
developments taking place during the early modem period from which our main
protagonists themselves gain much of their formative understanding of language
and the insight it offers into man's character. The theories of language proffered by
such philosophers as Locke, Hobbes, Pufendorf, Shaftesbury, Addison, Mandeville,
and Hutcheson served as the springboards of Hume, Smith and Reid's theories of
the relationship between language, thought and social mores. For the undermining
of the existing Christian paradigm during the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries
precipitated new lines of enquiry into the origin, nature, and influence of language.
In relation to the nature and limitations ofman's mind, we find that debate between
the rationalist and empiricist schools came to have a profound effect on the
epistemology of the period. Each school also championed a dramatically different
model of the origin and character of language. Questions as to the origin of
language, the degree to which language was dependent on reason and the ability of
language to accurately reflect thought all came to be points of contention. In turn,
the writings of Locke and the Port Royal scholars all came to have a lasting
influence in regards to how best to characterise the epistemological implications of
language in shaping man's constitution.
The subversion of the established Christian conception of man's nature also
resulted in an effort during this period to construct a new, secular-based
explanation of man's social and moral character. The question as to whether man
was by nature inherently selfish or altruistic came to play a central role in how best
to characterise the motivation behind man's willingness to enter into social
relations with his fellow man. Once again, a theory of the nature and influence of
language was used to help justify the competing positions relating to man's social
and moral character. But in this case, it was the centrality of the role of language
in facilitating social interaction, rather than as a tool of epistemological enquiry,
which came to play such a central role in the gaining an understanding of man's
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nature. How and why man engages his fellow man in conversation in a sociable
manner was deemed significant in discovering the intention behind such
interaction. As a result, the implications of language in influencing the formation
ofman's social and moral character came to hold a central place within the theories
of Pufendorf, Shaftesbury, Addison, Mandeville, and Hutcheson. By first
undertaking an exploration of the nature of the linguistic discourse taking place
during the period, it will be shown that the general premises being discussed about
language seem to have manifest themselves in a greater or lesser degree in the
thinking ofHume, Smith and Reid.
What make the endeavours by Hume, Smith and Reid noteworthy are their
efforts to merge the increasing epistemological and social concern with language
and language use into a means by which to illustrate, substantiate and corroborate
their conclusions relating to man's moral and social constitution. With the character
of both the mind and society representing perhaps the most pressing issues
developed and debated during the Enlightenment, language came to play an
important role in these Scots' efforts to construct a 'Science of Man'.
Acknowledged as the linchpin ofman's cognitive as well as social nature, it will be
argued here that Hume, Smith and Reid realised that linguistic assumptions were
significant in supporting their conclusions of human nature, and that it was
therefore constructive to intertwine an analysis of language, sociability, and
morality together in order to make their theories operable. Sometimes taking place
in isolation, but more often integrated into their general discussion, the way these
Scots coloured their characterisation of language ultimately dictated the outcome of
their social and moral theories.
In order to trace the development of this line of inquiry, Chapter II explores the
degree to which David Hume incorporated references to language into his moral
and social theory. Hume is recognised as one of the pre-eminent minds of the
Scottish Enlightenment, and as such, must be addressed in relation to the nexus
between language, sociability and morality in eighteenth-century Scotland. Seen as
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the very embodiment of the intellectual movement taking place during this period,
Hume's contribution to the development of a 'Science of Man' is rightly seen as
perhaps the high water mark of the Scottish Enlightenment. If a noteworthy
correlation between social, moral and language theory did take place within the
Scottish Enlightenment, Hume's involvement in, contribution to, or perhaps
ultimate abstention from, such an endeavour must be addressed.
It will be argued that due to Hume's emphasis on the role of custom and
convention in shaping man's social and moral character leads Hume to use
references to language to help substantiate and validate this claim. As a result of
this fact, it becomes apparent that Hume in fact did see language as playing an
influential role in the formation of man's social and moral character. This thesis
will explore the degree to which this effort on the part ofHume was a success, and
how his changing orientation toward language came to colour his writings on
morality throughout his career. It will also explore the implication of Hume's
contention that the existence of language is simply an historical fact and, having
already been constituted, the associated conclusion on the part of Hume that the
language of morals is a pre-existing socially constructed reality which the
individual must utilise in the formation of his or her own passions and moral
judgements. In addition, the central role of utility in the formation of this
conception of language will be examined, as will the accusations of scepticism and
relativism that were levelled against Hume in relation to his contention that
linguistic constructs are of central importance in shaping man's social and moral
character.
In light of these observations on Hume, Chapters III and IV will explore the role
the discussion of language had in the social and moral theory of Adam Smith. It
will be argued that, in a very real sense, Smith's theory of moral sentiments can
best be characterised a theory drawing inspiration from the contemporary premises
about the nature of language being proffered in the eighteenth century. His
presentation of the formation and dissemination of sentiments through his Spectator
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and Impartial Spectator model mirrors to a remarkable degree the basic linguistic
premises put forward by both English and French philosophers of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries relating to their discussion of the formation and
development of language use by mankind. This thesis seeks to explore both the
degree to which Smith's moral theory shadowed contemporary conceptions of the
origin and dissemination of language, as well as where his conception of language
parted ways with the ones presented by Hume and Reid.
On the one hand Smith maintained that man has an inherent desire to
communicate and receive sympathy from other people, and on the other, man is
faced with the inherent difficulty in clearly and accurately communicating these
feelings due to the amorphous nature of sentiments. It is this struggle to find an
acceptable neutral and communally recognisable conception of morality, while
maintaining the innately personal nature ofmorality that lies at the heart of Smith's
entire theory. We will therefore explore to what degree this effort on the part of
Smith was a success.
Lastly, in Chapter V we shall turn our attention to Thomas Reid's discussions
of linguistics and how his observations on this topic impacted his efforts to refute
what he saw as misguided moral theory arising from both the works of Hume and
Smith. Reid is offered as not only another example of the importance of language
in the development of moral theory within the Scottish Enlightenment, but perhaps
more importantly, as evidence of how central the role of language was in his efforts
to challenge the theories ofHume and Smith. By basing so much of his opposition
to both Hume and Smith on distinctly linguistic grounds, Reid highlights the
importance of the characterisation of language within the intellectual enterprise
undertaken by the Scottish Enlightenment. It will be argued that Reid realised that
there was no better way to undermine the intellectual foundations and moral
theories presented by Hume and Smith, than by discrediting their use and
conception of language. This chapter will explore linguistic tools utilised on the
part ofReid to substantiate his claims and turn the tide of scepticism.
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CHAPTER I
Epistemology, Sociability and Language: Seventeenth and Early
Eighteenth Century Theoretical Influences on the
Scottish Enlightenment
Before undertaking an analysis of Hume's, Smith's and Reid's characterisations of
language and its relationship to their conceptions of morality and sociability, it is
first necessary to briefly examine some of the dramatic changes taking place during
the early modern period that were to have a profound effect upon these three
theorists. Shaken to its very core by the subversion of the received truths of
Christendom in the wake of the Great Schism and Reformation, the established
epistemological and ethical systems of Western Europe faced doubts which
wrought asunder the very fabric of man's understanding of himself. With the
collapse of this established system of understanding, we witness a period of
exceptional intellectual and social change that came to undermine assumptions
relating to every level ofman's existence. This chapter focuses on those concepts
and individuals who are recognised as making important contributions to the
shaping of this new mode of human understanding and from which the Scots drew
inspiration in their own attempts to contribute to the reconstruction of this
intellectual and spiritual void.
More specifically, it is necessary here to examine the individual theories and
intellectual trends of the early modern period which provided the minds of the
Scottish Enlightenment with the intellectual framework on which they would come
to build their own unique understanding of the influence of language on every
element of man's character. For perhaps the most pressing requisite in this effort
to reconstruct man's understanding of himself was the need to address those
elements of human nature that made man so unique. The most obviously
distinguishable of these attributes was man's ability to communicate verbally, inter¬
act socially, and to regulate his personal actions morally. In each case, language
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was seen as playing an essential role. This being the case, it became increasingly
apparent that if a successful secular-based understanding of man's character was to
be proffered, it would be necessary to fully and adequately address the central
distinguishing trait ofman, namely, the use of language, as well as the limitations
and facilitation offered by that medium.
In order to address this growing awareness as to what language and language
use reveals about man's social and moral character, we will examine in this chapter
the growth of two essentially discreet lines of inquiry which attempted to address
this question. The first of these was an epistemological effort to construct a new
account of the origin and impact of language on the development of the human
mind, along with the attributes of mankind that emanated from this capacity. The
second focused on the fabrication of a new secular explanation of man's sociable
and moral nature in relation to his willing interaction with his fellow man. In both
cases, the nature and influence of language, in one form or another, became a
central issue of contention. This chapter addresses how these two essentially
distinct strands of enquiry into the nature of language developed during the early
modem period.
It is a central contention of this thesis that it is the deliberate coalescence of
these two primary lines of investigation within the Scottish Enlightenment which
resulted in the formulation of a 'Science ofMan' that drew upon consistent series
of references to language and language use in order to illustrate, substantiate, and
validate its conclusions. Due to these three theorists attempts to harmonise the
epistemological implications of language with the development of the human
character, as well as their recognition of the central role verbal discourse played in
the shaping of society and morality, Scottish moral theorists such as Hume, Smith
and Reid came to see language as a playing a central role in any adequate
explanation of man's unique moral character. For these Scots, the triumvirate of
epistemology, sociability, and morality critically came together through the
medium of language, thus making each theorist's conception of language an
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insightful tool in gaining an understanding of their conception of mankind in
general, and more specifically their conception ofmorality.
1. Linguistic Crossroads: Rationalism, Empiricism, and the Ascendancy of
Secular Language Theory
The epistemological investigations of the seventeenth and eighteenth century
were marked by a profuse number of treatises that drew attention to the phenomena
of language.1 Traditionally the providence of an insular group of medieval
grammarians, the discussion of the nature and impact of language became not only
of increasing interest among writers who might loosely be termed 'linguists', but
also, if not mainly, the concern of philosophers and scientists of the age. As a
result, in contrast to the severely practical and didactic investigation of language
pursued by the medieval grammarians, we witness the emergence in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of a methodology that recognised language as
one of the key factors in shaping the structure of human thought.
This proliferation of interest in language can be traced to a number of separate
but related tensions. Perhaps the most critical of these were the dramatic
theological changes which swept across Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. In aftermath of the Great Schism, the Christian community of Europe
was shaken to its very core. No longer could the irrefutable and immutable state of
man's nature be taken for granted. Likewise, the rise of Protestantism, and its
creed of direct personal understanding of the word of God, added a new uncertainty
to scriptural interpretation and undermined the faith in the Latin clavis universalis
that had for centuries held together man's understanding ofhis Creator and himself.
The deterioration of Latin as the catholic language of Christendom in turn led to
community breakdown and a growing realisation that the mass of humanity was
1 Giulio Lepschy (ed.), History of Linguistics: Vol. Ill: Renaissance and Early Modern Linguistics
(London: Longman, 1998).
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moving into a period in which they felt increasingly isolated from both God and
their fellow man. As a result, this religious anxiety and civil strife were to shatter
forever the naive security ofWestern Europe.
Amidst this general breakdown, we witness two events which are of particular
interest to us here. The first was the emergence of the vernacular to full
recognition in the wake of the undermining of Latin as the universal language of
Western Europe. While Latin continued to be used in some quarters, the rise in the
status of European vernaculars, coupled with the increase in secular learning,
resulted in the establishment of national languages as important mediums for
scholarly and scientific investigation. It was now within men's power to employ
the language of the 'vulgar', an ability that would inevitably prove to be as
dynamic as it was momentous.2
The second major casualty of this transition was the increased doubt regarding
the sanctity of the biblical explanation of the origin and history of language. Up to
the seventeenth century, scholars had maintained that Genesis presented
indisputable proof that God had infused the first language into Adam, who had
spoken a 'natural language' in which words delineated the nature of things
themselves. Since language was a gift from God, it also necessarily followed that
language was also perfect. This Adamic language was thought to have flourished
in post-deluvial ancient Hebrew, when the entire world spoke but one language. It
was only due to the hubris of Nimrod and the Tower of Babel that this divine and
universal language was lost to the mass ofhumanity.
Even in the wake of this unfortunate event, it was widely maintained that the
Lingua Humana had remained uncorrupted even after the Confusion of the
Tongues at Babel, and that the pure form of ancient Hebrew still existed and was
waiting to be re-discovered in some distant corner of the globe in all its divine
2 The language of the 'vulgar' will be ofparticular importance in the work of Thomas Reid, discussed in
Ch. VI of this thesis.
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purity. The only real area of controversy was where it was to be found, and how to
correctly trace its fate through the Old Testament in order for it to be located once
again. This Adamic explanation of language held sway in Western Europe well
into the seventeenth century, but grew weaker and weaker as the eighteenth century
approached. As with so much of the traditions and received knowledge of the
period, the collapse of catholic hegemony of the Roman Church marked a
corresponding collapse in the acceptance of this received Adamic explanation of
the origin and nature of language.
With the acceptance of the biblical explanation of the origins of language
increasingly being rejected, there arose not one, but two alternative schools of
thought. Proffering rival conceptions of the origins and implications of language
and language use, they would come to dominate the intellectual climate ofWestern
Europe, in one form or another, up to the present day. As we will see, the struggle
for the intellectual high ground between what would come to be known as the
rationalist and empiricist schools during the seventeenth and eighteenth century
would lead to two distinct, and dramatically different, methodologies for the
examination of human nature. As a result, the advocates of each school proffered
dramatically different explanations as to the origin of language as well as the
influence of language on man's constitution. It was from the ensuing debate
between these rival schools of thought that many writers of the Scottish
Enlightenment were to draw inspiration for their own construction of the influence
of language on the formation ofman's character.
The rationalist school traces its roots back to Plato's dialogue, Theaetetus, and
was later championed by Descartes and his followers. The central tenet of
rationalism is that it is the irrefutable truths of human reason, rather than the
impressions of the senses, which holds the key to the finding of the certainty of
knowledge.3 Descartes famous contention Cogito ergo sum encapsulates the idea
3 Pieter Seuren. Western Linguistics: An Historical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998) p.
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that though we may know our own thinking, and with it the realisation of our own
existence, there is nothing beyond this which can be known. Cartesian rationalism
thus contends that it is impossible to prove the reality of the outside world as well
as the reality of facts in general. In order, therefore, for man to have any
understanding, the rationalist perspective reduces the role of perception and of
empirical data in the characterisation of human knowledge in favour of
emphasising innate cognitive structures known as 'innate ideas'. These innate
ideas were then set into action by the stimulus of the otherwise unknowable outside
world, in order to make comprehensible the world around us. Thus, humans are
judged to gain knowledge through analytical, a priori, deduction.
Based on these general overarching premises, the rationalist of the early modern
period argued that thought was independent of language and language was nothing
but the rule governed expression of existing thought. Accordingly, man's
possession of innate ideas, as well as his ability to make varied sounds, naturally
and rapidly led to the existence of a spoken language. Language, in this view, is
itself an innate capacity, the necessary expression of man's innate reason. It was
not necessary, therefore, either to re-create the circumstances in which language
first occurred, or to suppose a long period of gradual development.
The rationalist perspective on language was enthusiastically endorsed in some
quarters during the seventeenth century, particularly in relation to grammar. The
Jansenist intellectuals of the Port Royal are one of the most notable examples.
Established in France as a religious and educational foundation in 1637, and
disbanded due to political and religious strife in 1661, the Port Royal's influence on
educational ideas lasted well into the early nineteenth century. In the wake of the
institutionalisation of scientific study throughout Europe, the Port Royal writers
began to pursue grammar as a distinct area of scientific enquiry. The most notable
works relating to language to emerge from this effort were Grammaire by Antoine
Arnauld and Claude Lancelot (1660), and the Logique by Pierre Nicole and
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Antoine Arnauld, (1662). These two works provide a lucid account of the
rationalist assumptions relating to language, and serve as an unparalleled archetype
of this school of thought.
The rationalist grammar that arose out of the Port Royal was in many ways a
successor to the medieval scholastic grammatical tradition. For example, the Port
Royal wrote extensively on universal grammar and explored existing languages
such as Latin and French. Unlike the medievalists, however, the Port Royal
grammarians stressed the use of human reason over received authority, thus making
Descartes rather than Aristotle the basis of their system.4 Their goal was to reveal
the universal grammatical structures which underlie particular languages, and the
role these structures played in the communication of thought.
The main thrust of the Port Royal investigation of language focused on
determining the degree to which reason is reflected in language and how, in
contrast, in some ways language departed from reason. Given this objective,
language is seen as having a particular feature or characteristic because of the
rational demands that are placed on it. The primary function of speaking was
characterised as being the communication of thoughts. Since thought was seen as
independent of both language and experience, it followed that mankind had been
driven to invent verbal communication in order to signify their thoughts. The only
way speech could successfully perform this task was by actually mirroring the
structure of the thoughts being expressed by the speaker. As a result, the Port
Royal scholars presented a conception of linguistic rationalism in which the
structure of thought determines the structure of verbal expression.5 Drawing on a
universal pool of human thought which was immutably expressed through these
perceptual signs, man was able to communicate with his fellow man as part of his
general rational faculty.
4 R. H. Robins, A Short History of Linguistics (London: Longman, 1990) p. 123.
5
Roy Harris and Talbot J Taylor, Landmarks in Linguistic Thought: Western Tradition from Socrates to
Saussure (London: Routledge, 1989) pp. 99 - 100.
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Given this characterisation of language, grammar was defined by the Port
Royal scholars as the art of speaking which allowed thought to be expressed
clearly. In this sense, grammar was very much an activity, rather than a system of
rules, words, or sentences. It was also their contention that thoughts, regardless of
the linguistic medium chosen by the speaker, have the same properties, and thus are
inherent in the rationality of the human mind. If one is to master the art of
speaking, one must first endeavour to understand the structure of thoughts that they
intend to convey. This knowledge of thought would reveal the basic universal
categories and rules of all languages, which in turn could be used to facilitate the
mastery of the specific language in question.6
Therefore, the goal of the Port Royal scholars was to essentially separate the
wheat of the universals of pure reason from the chaff of individual linguistic
irregularities. The former were to be identified and developed into the arts of
speaking, while the latter, which evolve from custom and human agreement, were
to be neither explained nor justified. This distinction was substantiate by the
contention that usage could vary unpredictably from language to language and, as a
result, these variations could only be explained by grammar books tailored to those
specific linguistic idiosyncrasies that could not be clarified by an appeal to rational
principles of thought. In turn, rational grammar could not be used to explain these
differences, for they are learned by rote and therefore not reducible to the formation
of thought as are general grammatical principles. The resulting framework of the
Port Royal grammar was therefore kept in a state of tension by permanent conflict
between the needs of reason and the pressure of usage and human needs.7
Characteristically, the Port Royal rationalist did not offer any discussion
regarding the 'origin' or gradual development of language They assumed, based




Lepschy, p. 168 - 169. Another notable commentator on language emerging from the rationalist school
was Beauzee. More pragmatic that the Port Royal grammarians, Beauzee maintained that the grammar of a
particular language represented a merging of the universal grammatical structure as arising from the nature
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presumably perfect, rational thought, that language was conceived as the direct
reflex of the structure and process of thought. Only vocalisation was therefore
necessary in order to become a comprehensible form of speech. Consistent with
the rationalist paradigm generally, the origin of language was therefore explained
by the Port Royal scholars within the theory of language itself.
For many, however, the rationalist's need for a priori deduction proved to be
too sterile. In contrast to the rationalists, these theorists argued that there was a
need to hold a rationally unproved faith in our senses and of human experience
generally. As a result, in opposition to rationalism emerged, particularly in
Britain, a school of empirical thinking which maintained that human knowledge
derives from the experience of sensory data which reflected the world accurately
enough to enable man to function in it. Based on this premise, these empiricists, as
they would come to be known, emphasised the role of experience in learning and
attempted to minimise the role of innate ideas or other innate structures of the
human mind.
\
The empiricist school's interest in language can be traced to their more general
interest in the origin of human culture and what one scholar succinctly termed the
o
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'archaeology of human knowledge'. While the rationalist had a ready-made
explanation for the impulse to use language, the empiricists had to find an
alternative explanation grounded in man's experience. This alternative approach to
language required them to explain just how, based on man's needs and capacities,
language could have evolved as a functional tool. In order to accomplish this task,
the empiricist philosophers were forced to re-build linguistic theory from the
ground up. In so doing, they were forced to grapple with nearly every aspect of
human nature and development in order to explain how man could have created
language from non-existence as well as to trace its development into the keystone
of civilised society.




The most dramatic manifestation of the empiricist exploration of language was
the shift away from speculation about objects of thought toward speculation about
the mechanics of thought. This change of emphasis was to have a profound effect
on the entire philosophical approach to the study of the origin and development of
language during the 18th Century and beyond.9 For the eighteenth-century
empiricists, exploration of linguistics attempted to explain not only how the mind
operated, but also how and why man acquired knowledge.10 By adopting this
approach to language, the empiricists ushered in the idea of language as a natural
phenomenon.11 Empiricism also stressed the individual variations of particular
languages and the essential need to adjust categories based on observation. This
stood in contrast to the rationalists who focused on the universal sub-structures
present in all languages. Therefore, the empiricists offered a starkly contrasting
view of the nature of language, implying that language itself is one of the factors in
shaping thought. For the empiricists' abandonment of the Cartesian conception of
thought necessarily resulted in their rejection of the idea that language is 'merely'
an expression of that thought.
Another major outgrowth of this shift in focus manifested itself in various
naturalist speculations as to the origin of language. This was due to the fact that the
empiricists assumed that language must have arisen from some sort of pre-rational,
primitive need for communication and expression.12 It is in this search for a pre-
rational need or desire on the part of mankind to communicate with one another
that ushers in the empiricist school's emphasis on the relationship between
language and the expression of the passions. For many empiricists, the transition
from instinctive emotive connection to artificial controlled articulation of sounds
was seen as a decisive element in unlocking the nature ofman's constitution.13 As
9 William Knight, Lord Monboddo and Some ofHis Contemporaries (London: John Murray, Albemarle




See, William Knight pp. 146 - 148.
12
Seuren, p. 76.
13 It is also important to note that, while the rarified analysis of language proffered by the rationalists might
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a result, the degree to which language can be linked to an emotive, rather than
rational, need to make inter-personal communication was presented as a critical
area of investigation.
The struggle to provide just this sort of an empirically based explanation of
language began toward the end of the seventeenth century. Perhaps the most
influential early modern empirical investigation of language was formulated by
John Locke. Locke's influence on the philosophy and study of language was
immense during the eighteenth century, and this was recognised by nearly all those
who later wrote on the subject.14 Although Locke, in Essay Concerning Human
Understanding,15 did not address directly the problem of the origin of language, he
did devote a section of it, Book III, to what he called 'language and words in
general', thus placing the problem of language at the centre of his epistemology.16
It is interesting to note that it had not been a part of Locke's original plan to include
a chapter on language. As he had initially envisaged the Essay, he intended to
move straight from Book II to what is now Book IV; that is, from a discussion of
how the mind gets its materials to a discussion of how those materials make
knowledge. During the writing of Book I and II, however, he evidently realised the
close connection between words and ideas.17 Having spent so much time
explaining how we arrive at our ideas, he seemed to have considered it necessary to
devote some effort to explain the method by which they are expressed.18
very well have needed redressing, the alternative empiricist methodology championed during the period did
not lend itself to certain areas of linguistic analysis. The major stumbling block was that linguistics had no
empirical access to the history of language beyond the oldest written texts. Yet, the use of language was so
central to man's social nature that it could hardly be ignored in the construction of anything resembling a
truly comprehensive 'science of man'. What resulted from this conundrum was an eclectic mixture of
empirical analysis and fantastic speculation regarding the origin and nature of language that would came to
colour the works ofHume, Smith, and Reid in the eighteenth century.
14 Hans Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure. Essays on the Study of Language and Intellectual History
(London: The Athlone Press, 1983) p. 284.
15 John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London: William Tegg and Co., 1877).
16 Aarsleff p. 284.
17
Locke, II.XXXIII.19.
18 John Jenkins. Understanding Locke (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983) p. 155.
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Unlike the philosophers of the eighteenth century, Locke adhered to the
traditional theory of the origin of language, that is, he presumed that man was
intended by his Creator to live in society and was therefore endowed with
language, which Locke judged to be the common tie of society. Nevertheless,
Locke did not believe that man had been given a complete language by God at the
time of the Creation. Instead, he contended that, while man was physically
equipped to form articulated sounds, the mere combination of these sounds into
words was not sufficient to be considered a language. He argued that language
only arose once words were made to represent 'internal conceptions' of ideas.19
Initially, Locke maintained that there was indeed no reason for these articulated
sounds to be transformed into language, since man was perfectly capable of
reflecting and reasoning without it. He argued that all our ideas were independent
of words and that humans were able to understand the whole range of experience
and thought without language. For Locke, the primary form of discourse was
mental discourse which needs only to make use of ideas. Language was seen as
nothing more than the means whereby this discourse could be made public. Had
we no need to communicate, language would have never been invented; and its
invention makes no difference to the range of our thought.20
For Locke, the reason for the existence of language was to be explained by
man's social need to communicate and share his thoughts. It is by means of
language that the ideas of one mind are transferred to the mind of another. "Man",
he contended, "though he have great variety of Thoughts, and such, from which
others, as well as himself, might receive Profit and Delight; yet they are all within
his own Breast, invisible, and hidden from others, nor made to appear. The
Comfort, and Advantage of Society, not being to be had without Communication of
Thoughts, it was necessary, that Man should find out some external sensible Signs,
19
Locke, III.1.1 and III.II.8.
20 John Colman, John Locke's Moral Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983) p. 117.
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whereby those invisible Ideas, which his thoughts are made up of, might be made
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known to others." While not elaborated on by Locke, it is clear that in his view, it
was man's desire to share his inner feelings and derive comfort from others which
drove him to formulate language.
The process by which this takes place was presented by Locke as follows:
verbal communication is a matter of one individual uttering words (articulate
sounds) which that individual has affixed to the private idea making up a thought in
his or her mind, and other individuals hearing the words, and then translating them
into the appropriate correlating idea in their mind. It is obviously a precondition of
successful communication that the speaker affix the same words to the same ideas
as does the listener. In order for this to happen, public rules or conventions
governing the proper application of words to ideas must be created. These rules
governing the application of words to things also serve as constraints with respect
to the application of words to private ideas.22 "Words," maintained Locke, "being
no man's private possession, but the common measure of Commerce and
Communication, 'tis not for anyone, at pleasure, to change the Stamp they are
current in; nor alter the Ideas they are affixed to."23 In addition, Locke contended
that speakers always assume that their words are also signs of ideas in the mind of
their hearers. "For else they should talk in vain," he said, "and could not be
understood, if the Sounds they allied to one Idea, were such, as by the Hearer, were
applied to another, which is to speak two languages."24
Locke was aware of the important connection between words and things, and
of the role that observation of the objective world played in providing a checking
procedure for the correct use of language.25 To affix words to our ideas we must
first have acquired those ideas through experience. In order to gain control over
language, man observes those about him using words to refer to things ofwhich he
21
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has ideas. In this manner the word-idea connections established within the
individual's mind are correlated to the conventions governing word-thing
connection utilised by society at large. The presumption in linguistic
communication is that both the speaker and the hearer have followed this procedure
in affixing words to their ideas.26
Central to this entire process is a clear and accurate use of signs to mark
specific ideas in the speaker's mind. Locke holds the difference between intelligent
discourse and the mere utterance of words is that, in the first case, words are marks
which the speaker uses as signs of his ideas. If the speaker uses the words in the
various contexts in which it is appropriate to use them, and he does not use them in
inappropriate contexts, his discourse is meaningful. This was what Locke termed
the 'common acception' of words.27 Locke suggested that this grasp of the rules of
language use steadily grew in the individual over time. This progress was
demonstrated in a variety of ways, but was especially vivid in a child gaining
command of language. For instance, in book two of the Essay Locke notes:
"[W]hen children have, by repeated sensations, got ideas fixed in their memories,
they begin by degrees to learn the use of signs. And when they have got the skill to
apply the organs of speech to the framing of articulated sounds, they begin to make
use of words to signify their ideas to others."28 As we will see later, Smith drew a
similar parallel in regard to the development of a child and its growing mastery of
the communication ofmoral sentiments.
For the purposes of this dissertation, we must now concentrate our attention on
how Locke's system of linguistic rules related to the communication of the
passions and moral sentiments. In Book II, which dealt with the formation of ideas,
Locke discussed how we as individuals come to be aware of the passions. It was
his opinion that the passions revolved around the sensation, and reflection upon,
25 Jenkins p. 161.





pleasure and pain. This being the case, ideas of the passions can be formulated, "if
we reflect on ourselves, and observe how these, under various considerations,
operate in us - what modifications or tempers ofmind, what internal sensations (if I
may call them that) they produce in us, - we may thence form to ourselves the ideas
90
of our passions." Locke maintained that those passions derived solely from the
personal experience of either pleasure or pain - joy, sorrow, hope, and fear, for
example - are universal passions shared by all men. On the other hand, passions
such as anger and envy, which involved "the mixed consideration of ourselves and
others" necessitate a value judgement. These 'mixed passions' do not bring about
an immediate instinctive reaction, and are thus not universal.30 This was
considered by Locke to be an important distinction, and it is clear that he
maintained that the effort needed to form ideas about the latter was more complex.
It is also interesting to note that, while Locke included a section in Book II on
the formulation of ideas regarding the passions, in his discussion of language found
in Book III he did not explain the means by which such ideas are communicated.
He did, however, draw attention to the inherent difficulties in expressing abstract
ideas such as morals. Locke specifically characterised the concept of morals as a
'mixed mode', by which he means that morals are made up of a combination of
ideas which the mind puts together of its own choice.31 Since in Locke's theory
any given signifier has no logical connection to the idea being expressed, the idea
which one is trying to express must have been "learned and retained by those who
would exchange thoughts and hold intelligible discourse with others, in any
language".32
Locke observed that communication breakdown between individuals occurred
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not excite in the hearer the same idea which it stands for in the mind of the
speaker."34 In the case of mixed modes such as morals, the ability to express the
combination of ideas in one's head to another individual, who must necessarily
have the exact same combination of ideas in his head, makes the chances of
effective communication much more difficult. Locke further argued that this type
of communication breakdown most often occurs when the ideas are very complex,
have no settled standard, or have a standard that is hard to know, or when the
signification of the word and the real essence of the thing are not exactly the
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same. With regard to morals, all of these criteria are applicable. As a result,
Locke went on to acknowledge the fact that these factors contribute greatly to the
difficulty man experiences in communicating his ideas of morality: "Hence it
comes to pass, that men's names, of very compounded ideas, such as for the most
part are moral words, have seldom, in two different men, the same precise
signification; since one man's complex idea seldom agrees with anothers, and
often differs from his own, from that which he had yesterday or will have to¬
morrow."36
But regardless of all the difficulties which might stand in the way of the
effective communication of morals, Locke believed that there was a simple
solution: precise definitions. He maintained that no matter how difficult or
complex an idea concerning morals might be, there was always a way to establish a
precise definition that dictated its correct use. While there may be several ideas
which the mind has put together, "men may, if they please, exactly know the ideas
that go to each composition, and so use these words in a certain and undoubted
signification, and perfectly declare, when there is occasion, what they stand for."
He went on to say that this process could be expedited if those writing about moral









In order to support his claims, Locke presented the reader with what he sees as
a perfect example of this process in action: justice. He asserted that the general
feasibility of defining moral ideas was given credence by the successful
formulation of clear and precise definitions in relation to the virtue of justice. In all
its permutations, the idea of justice is readily accessible to communication and all
men know what it means to act justly and when they have been a victim of
injustice. Therefore justice, in Locke's opinion, was a perfect example of the
ability of man in the area of morals to create, by precise definition, a
comprehensive system made up of adequate signifiers to express complex moral
ideas.39 As we will see, the virtue of justice came to play a particularly important
role in the theories of both Hume and Smith. However, these latter theorists'
conclusions regarding justice's unique character, as well as its impact on the ability
to set fast rules in regard to the other virtues, were more nuanced and less
categorical than the conclusions drawn by Locke. In turn, the relationship between
language use and man's moral character would also come to be characterised
differently.
However, while these Scots might have come to different conclusions regarding
the relationship between language and morality, Locke's analysis of language and
language use contained many of the core ideas which were to be expanded upon
during the following century. For man's use of verbal communication as the
primary means of expressing ideas, particularly moral ideas, were of the greatest
importance to the Enlightenment authors being considered here. As we shall see,
Locke's rejection of innate notions' marked a fundamental break from both the
Adamic and rational doctrine, a fact that would come to play an important part in
the theories relating to this subject proffered by both Hume and Smith. Locke
language was neither divine nor innate, but rather was created by man for the
convenience of communicating his internal conceptions.40 This being the case,
38 Ibid., III.XI. 15 and 16.
39 As we will in Chapter IV, Smith maintained that justice was the only moral sentiment which lent itself to




language was characterised as a social institution that reflects the world of its
speakers. It was this fundamental philosophical conclusion that came to be a
keystone in the building of a new conception of man by these Scots in the
following century.
2. Secular Ethics and the Influence of 'Polite Society': The Importance of
Language as a Practical Tool of Socialisation
Having examined the changing face of linguistic epistemology during the early
modern period, we must now turn our attention to the concurrent developments
taking place in ethics. For this period's disillusionment with biblical infallibility
also precipitated what was to become the greatest revision of ethical principles
since the ascendancy of Christianity. As a result, a profusion of new theories on
state, law, and society burst forth, based not on divine authority, but rather on
premises derived from human nature. Once again, we witness that great emphasis
was placed on the impact of language and language use in creating and maintaining
these secular ethical theories.
As in early modern epistemology, in the wake of the destruction of the existing
biblically based conception ofman's unique temperament, we can distinguish two
competing visions of how best to characterise man's sociable and ethical nature.
On the one hand, as we will expand on below, we witness the development ofwhat
could be loosely termed the 'selfish' or 'ego-centric' school. Championed by the
likes of Hobbes and Mandeville, these individuals contended that man was, in the
end, a self-interested person who came into society only as a matter of self-
preservation. In opposition to this line of reasoning there arose the 'sociable' or
'altruistic' school of man's nature. Championed by the likes of Shaftesbury,
Addison and Hutcheson, these individuals presented an alternative vision of man,
one who was either born with a sense of social affinity or who, at the very least,
could learn social values and stick to them. By maintaining that man had a
benevolent feeling for the species as a whole, it followed that a man's actions were
not governed by selfishness or punishments, but rather by thinking about the social
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responsibility he felt as a natural part of his being. Based on this premise, man did
not come into society because he had to do so; man came into society because he
wanted to do so.
Perhaps not surprisingly, one outgrowth of this controversy over the proper
characterisation of man's sociability was an interest in language, since language is
the essential medium by which social relations are constructed. Importantly,
however, this new line of enquiry concentrated upon a different element of
language than we witnessed in the previous section regarding the
rationalist/empiricist debate. Rather than focusing on language as a cognitive
operation, both the 'selfish' school and the 'altruistic' school focused their attention
on language as the medium of social interaction, characterising language and
language use as a vehicle that enabled man to fulfil his inherent desires, be they
either selfish or altruistic. Thus, as in the emerging epistemological debate, we see
within the concurrent ethical debate's recognition of the importance of an
understanding of language and language use; in this case, its usefulness in gaining
an understanding ofman's moral character.
In order to understand the context of this discussion of language in the area of
ethics we must first look at the various individuals who associated with this area of
inquiry and of whom we know the Scots under discussion in this thesis were
familiar. As noted above, Thomas Hobbes is widely recognised as the father of
what might be termed the 'selfish theory of mankind'. Writing in the aftermath of
the English Civil Wars, this English philosopher is credited with the earliest self-
conscious attempt to construct a 'science' of civil society from first principles. In
his seminal work Leviathan (1651) Hobbes presented a theory of society based on
first principles derived from assumptions of what man would be like in a state of
nature devoid of all political, social and moral authority. In order to create this
vision of man's distant past, Hobbes employed deductive reasoning to discover
these first principles of man's nature. This was done in the hope of drawing a
distinction between the artificial, meaning that which was made by man, and the
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natural, meaning that which was to be found in the physical world. Hobbes
maintained that man could have certain knowledge only of what men had either
created or made. For example, Hobbes asserted that man could understand
geometric theorems because he himself had created them. In like manner, Hobbes
asserted that man could gain an understanding of civil society because man had
created it as well.
Hobbes is best remembered for his dictum positing that in a state of nature, all
men would be so pre-occupied with self-preservation that there would be nothing
but unmitigated strife. However, since man possessed reason, which allowed him
to know the causes of things, he was able to discover principles of conduct that
could be followed in order to secure his personal safety. Therefore, although
following these principles was done consciously, it is crucial to note that, it was not
done as a result of any sense of natural affinity or love for our fellow man, but
rather out of the necessity of self-preservation.
This image ofman's nature offered by Hobbes was a disturbing one, perhaps
made even more so because of the well reasoned argument he presented. Even in
our own day, the haunting presence of the Leviathan is inexorably associated with
the arch-type pf that side of our humanity which we would rather forget, or at least
would like to reason away. This was no less true for the Scots of the eighteenth
century. With the sounds of furious condemnation still ringing in their ears, and
perhaps lingering personal uncertainties in their minds, the shadow of the Hobbes'
Leviathan still loomed large over their thinking.
In contrast to the Hobbes, there was another line of theoretical enquiry that
developed in early modern Europe which presented an alternative explanation of
man's social character. In order to discuss this alternative theory, the most logical
place to begin is with the work of eminent jurist Samuel Pufendorf. A German
Protestant, Pufendorf devoted the first part of his career to the re-working of a
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sociably based construction of natural law ideology.41 Building upon the Jurassic
traditions of Hugo Grotius, Pufendorf attempted to present a comprehensive moral
philosophy based on natural law and suited to the conditions ofmodern Europe and
one which would gain consensus of all Europeans regardless of their confessional
differences.42 The impact of Pufendorf cannot be underestimated. He was widely
read and taught both on the continent as well as in Britain, with the theorists of the
Scottish Enlightenment particularly sensitive to his theoretical premises.
While Hobbes was writing during a period devastated by war and insecurity,
Pufendorf came onto the scene in wake of the Treaty of Westphalia. Writing
between 1658 and 1677, Pufendorf attempted to reconstruct the natural law
tradition within a secular context, thus shifting the focus of natural law
jurisprudence toward an interest in answering the question as to how one best
conduct oneself so as to become a useful member of society. His effort to clearly
and decisively isolate human behaviour for study distinguished his work from both
his mentor Hugo Grotius and Hobbes, as does his attempt to construct a social
theory which assured peace and order.
In order to develop his theory, Pufendorf appealed not to religion, but to
scientifically constructed universal principles. Building upon the works of Grotius,
Pufendorf initiated a move away from the traditional lines of Aristotelian and
Thomistic natural law as well as the separation of the ideas of natural law from its
religious context. Natural law had been equated by Grotius to a set of social
duties common to all mankind, rather than the legality of particular states or the
moral theology ofparticular sects ofChristianity. Grotius had also argued that the
existence of natural law could be demonstrated by the act of reasoning, rather than
from any secular or divine authority. By defining a 'state of nature' as an
empirically verifiable entity, this new line of enquiry freed itself from any charges
of relativism and also freed itself from being tied to any particular theological
41 Richard Tuck (ed.), Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) p. 156.
42 James Tully (intro.), Samual Pufendorf, On the Duty ofMan and Citizen According to Natural Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) pp. xiv, xviii.
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tradition. This accessing of man's character through a 'state of nature' further
necessitated theoretical abstraction and conjectural history on the part ofPufendorf,
an effort which was to have a significant impact on the development of social and
moral theory during the next century in Scotland.
The natural law school ofjurisprudence also maintained that the purpose behind
natural law was to render individual actions useful to other members of society as
well as to contain man's moral corruption and inclination toward self-love. This in
turn led to the transformation of natural law morality into a social theory which
focused on the need to channel the actions of self-loving men toward fulfilment of
their social duties, thus making them into functioning members of society.43
Narrowing its focus in order to avoid attack from jurists and theologians, this new
brand of natural law jurisprudence presented a theory of man's morality
independent from moral theology and centred on its own specific vocabulary
organised around the concept of sociality.44
This secular and social focus was to have a profound impact on Pufendorf s
characterisation of man's sociability. Pufendorf conceived of mankind as lacking
any innate disposition toward moral actions. Rather, morality was deemed to be an
extrinsic concept which was imposed onto mankind. He therefore shared Hobbes'
conclusion that man was pre-occupied with self-preservation and that since man is
a weak and wretched creature, he cannot gain this security on his own, but must
enter into social bonds with his fellow man. However, Pufendorf differed from
Hobbes in his contention that man's sociality was not strictly driven by self-love,
since this would simply lead to enmity. Nor, in the other extreme, was the coming
of man into society the result of natural sympathy for others, which Pufendorf
deemed too weak an impulse to drive men to such action.






"strategically other-regarding manner", in which individual's act so as not to give
any other member of society any reason to cause him harm, and as a result, actually
promote and preserve his advantages.45 Thus, in order to cultivate this sociability,
Pufendorf maintained that it was not enough simply to avoid harming others, as
Grotius and Hobbes had maintained. Rather, there was a need to positively affirm
other individuals' equality and dignity so as not to damage their self-esteem. As a
result, man must enter into contact and co-operation with others to reach this goal
even in the face of his own anti-social passions. In addition, a man in society must
be willing to reciprocate positive actions. The resulting benevolent acts emanating
from this interaction was seen by Pufendorf as playing a central role in maintaining
social cohesion within the society.
Having crucially opened up the possibility of a secular explanation for man's
willingness to enter into society, both Hobbes and Pufendorf established an
intellectual framework which was to shape the debate in the following century.
However, many assumptions held by these pioneers in social theory were to come
into contention. As the new century dawned, the assertion made by Hobbes and
Pufendorf, that man's willingness to enter into society should ultimately be dictated
by man's self-preservation instincts, came to be extremely divisive. A growing
number began to contend that the secularisation of society did not necessitate
assumptions of less than virtuous motivation for man's interaction with his fellow
man. Man could in fact be sociable, even altruistic, by nature without necessarily
falling back onto any divine reasoning to support this reality. It was left to these
individuals to formulate an alternative secular explanation for what they saw as
man's innate ethical and social nature.
This unwillingness to see man as being motivated by innate selfishness, or by
some sort of contrived sociability, was due in no small part to the fact that the quest
for a satisfactory answer to the 'sociability riddle' was fast becoming the concern




the nature and influence of man's social nature was also being scrutinised by a
public increasingly captivated by the ideals of 'polite society'. As a result, we
witness an era in which both the theoretical and popular culture became pre¬
occupied with matters of sociability, a fact that would come to have a profound
impact on the way language would come to be portrayed within the sociability
debate itself.
On the theoretical front, one of the most notable and influential theoretical
assertions that man's ability to act politely is an inherent characteristic, came from
the pen of Anthony Ashley Cooper, better known as the third earl of Shaftesbury.
In his influential work Characteristicks ofMen, Manners, Opinions, Times, which
first appeared in 1711, Shaftesbury opined that man was naturally sociable and
possessed an innate moral sense. Re-published throughout the course of the
eighteenth century,46 this work would come to represent the quintessential defence
of man's natural social propensities. As Herder was to comment at the end of the
century, "this virtuoso ofHumanity [Shaftesbury]... had had a marked influence on
the best minds of the century, on those who have striven with determination and
sincerity for the true, the beautiful, and the good."47 With Shaftesbury being
credited with founding the 'moral sense' school of ethics, this comment by Herder
seems particularly appropriate in relation to Hume, Reid, and Smith, for whom
Shaftesbury would prove to be both influential and problematic.
Focusing on the role of the affections rather than reason as the basis of the
'springs and actions' of man's behaviour, Shaftesbury established an emotional
basis for man's social conduct. This marked a significant shift from the
seventeenth century rationalist conception of emotion as a merely passive response.
The characterisation of the affections as the natural motivating force behind men's
actions also went against the egoistic position of the Hobbsian theory that man is
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motivated purely by self-interest. In contrast, Shaftesbury maintained that a
number of different social affections as well as impulses of 'self-affection' are to be
found within man's nature.
As a result of this methodology, Shaftesbury is credited as the first moral theorist
to use psychological experience as a key to understanding man's ethical nature. He
rejected Hobbes' contentions relating to man in a state of nature, arguing instead
that man is only in a 'natural' state when he has fulfilled his whole potential. In
order to realise what the natural state actually entails, Shaftsbury argued that it was
necessary to study man as a whole and in terms of his functioning as a social
agent.48 As the historian Lawrence Klein noted, "sociability was not just an
abstract idea for him [Shaftesbury] but a repeated figure, through which the self,
philosophy, moral behaviour, writing, and culture could be understood. Images of
refined sociability and its opposites - unsociability and distorted sociability - recur
in Shaftesbury's writings".49
Due to this pre-occupation with sociable interaction, Shaftesbury presented an
ethical system in which virtuous actions are distinguished as those which contribute
to the common good. Within Shaftesbury's theory, therefore, virtue was associated
with those affections which lead toward man becoming an active social agent, and
vice the product of the corruption of such affections. In order to propagate virtuous
affections, it is important to expose oneself to examples of virtuous interaction, so
as to cultivate one's innate orientation toward sociability to its full potential. As a
result, Shaftesbury asserted that, " '[t]is the height of sociableness to be thus
friendly and communicative".50 Part and parcel of this process is the ability to
control and shape the passions in accordance with the correct social reaction in a
given situation. In order to do this, it is necessary to know the facts about the
situation in which one becomes involved so that one may respond with the








appropriate affections.51 This line of reasoning was to become particularly
significant in the moral theory of Adam Smith.
A caveat, however, was offered by Shaftesbury in relation to the cultivation of
sociability, one that would come to be a sticking point for many of the scholars of
the Scottish Enlightenment, in particular Hume. Shaftesbury asserted that virtues
of sociability were governed by a universal standard of right and wrong conduct
that was "independent of opinion and above the world".52 For Shaftesbury the
greatest threat to virtuous behaviour was to "proceed only from the force of custom
and education in opposition to Nature, as may be noted in those countries where,
according to custom or politic institution, certain actions naturally run afoul and
odious are repeatedly viewed with applause, and honour ascribed to them".
While individuals may engage in actions which are considered virtuous within their
society, they nevertheless violate the rules of nature if their actions violate these
universal norms. Shaftesbury was confident that such actions diminish, though did
not ultimately eliminated, man's internal moral sense. This being the case, though
conversation with our fellow man may be one of the most accessible means for
cultivating our virtuous character, we are still capable through this social discourse
of being misguided "however polite and agreeable their characters man be with
whom we converse and correspond".54 For example, Shaftesbury warns
individuals to be careful to whom they listen and to what they read, for fear that our
"studies are ill chosen".55 As we will see in Chapter V, this concern on the part of
Shaftesbury will be reflected in Smith's worry regarding the potential dangers of
ill-chosen acquaintances on the refinement of an individual's moral sentiments, a
concern that would be advocated again by Adam Smith
51 Ibid., p. 87.
52
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One of the reasons for the contemporary popularity of Shaftesbury's work can
be traced to the concurrent interest in the cultivation of moderation, manners,
gentility and politeness arising out of the urban culture of London during the early
part of the eighteenth century. As mentioned in the introduction, through the
medium of polite conversation it was hoped that man could shape himself and
others into positive agents of social advancement and harmony. As a result,
politeness became perceived by its proponents as offering the best possible method
for man to engage in social interaction with his fellow man.
The ideological importance of this movement in secular culture, and the impetus
for much of its popularity, can be traced to the The Spectator magazine. This
periodical, published between March 1711 and December 1712, was created by
Joseph Addison and Richard Steele and began its run within weeks after the
publishing of Shaftesbury's Characteristicks 56 In the wake of the revocation of the
Licensing Act, which had required the acquisition of a government license to print,
there was a huge explosion in the amount of printed matter appearing across
Britain. With this proliferation ofpamphlets and periodicals also came a realisation
that this new liberty made the press an acceptable and effective means of
manipulating opinion and controlling ideas. Addison and Steele, realising the
power of this medium, attempted through The Spectator to override factious
politics in favour of the cultivation ofpoliteness and social cohesion.
The theme of The Spectator was heavily influenced by Shaftesbury, who
insisted that men were capable of both altruistic and egoistic behaviour. While the
latter were deemed by Addison and Steele to be destructive passions, the former
were judged to be those which held together families, societies, and states. As The
Spectator asserted, "good nature is generally born within us. Health, prosperity and
kind treatment from the world are great cherishers of it where they can find it, but
56 Lawrence E. Klein, Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness: Moral Discourse and Cultural Politics in
Early Eighteenth-Century England CCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. 2.
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nothing is capable of forcing it up, where it does not grow of it self. It is one of the
Blessings of a happy constitution which Education may improve but not
produce".57 Having a natural propensity toward goodness, it was left to the
individual only to cultivate that innate characteristic toward its full fruition.
The means by which The Spectator attempted to facilitate this was by
encouraging individuals to dislodge themselves from the narrow circle of associates
in which they found themselves, and to engage themselves in the larger society.
The aim of this social intercourse was to correct false notions of manners, morals
and taste, while at the same time cultivating polite learning and a decorous
society.58 Those in this new circle came from all different walks of life, and thus
they had nothing in common except conversation itself. Given the widely varying
background of the participants, the topics of discussion were not to involve the
divisive sectionalist issues of the day. Rather, they were to involve discussions of
such topics as manners and taste. This was all an affirmative effort to cultivate a
wide, as opposed to narrow, social experience by talking about matters in general.
It was hoped that the result of this carefully orchestrated social interaction it was
the tempering and ultimate modification of sectarian views and behaviour. By
presenting readers with an alternative group of associates within the fictitious club
in the pages of The Spectator itself, the periodical aimed to show, by example, how
best to cultivate the sort of politeness which would most effectively serve the
individual and society as a whole.
The goal of this type of social interaction was to transcend the divisive topics
of politics and religion, yet still affect public behaviour. For it must be must be
remembered that the cultivation of the skills needed to engage in convivial banter
was not done merely for its own sake, but rather was aimed at facilitating positive
social interaction. To be good citizens, it was necessary to learn good manners. It
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was also contended that by teaching people to become their real selves, a
psychological change from sectarianism to congenial social unity could ultimately
be cultivated through polite conversation. In so doing, man would not be twisting
his nature to create this polite society, but would in reality begin to behave
naturally. In other words, people had to be re-socialised by escaping the small
'cells' in which they had traditionally existed, and enter into a wider world of a true
society, and where, in the process, they would ultimately become their real selves.
In contrast to the Hobbes, Addison and Steele presented an alternative vision of
man: as someone who could acquire values, be resolute in their application, and
thus have some sense of social affinity. By maintaining that man had a benevolent
feeling for the species as a whole, it followed that man's actions were not governed
by punishment, but by feelings of social responsibility. Man did not come
begrudgingly into social relationship with his fellow men; rather, he willingly and
enthusiastically engaged in conversation with his fellow man in order to expand his
understanding of those around him, as well as ofhimself.
However, particularly among moral theorists, the debate as to the actual
motivation behind social interaction and the true reason behind an individual's
willingness to engage in 'polite' society raged on. One of the greatest detractors of
the assumptions being by the proponents of 'polite' society was that of Bernard
Mandeville. As infamous as he was famous, "Mandevil" (as Fielding and others
chose to spell it) challenged the fundamental premises underlying polite society and
rejected the Shaftesburian assumption of man's natural sociability.59 Though
approaching the topic by way of acerbic satire rather than a scholarly treatise on
sociability, Mandeville still managed to create a controversy that was to play a
seminal role in shaping the debate over the nature of both society and language
within the Scottish Enlightenment.
59 Irwin Primer (ed.), Mandeville Studies: New Explorations in the Art and Thought of Dr. Bernard
Mandeville (1670 - 1733") (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975) p. vi.
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While Mandeville's elaboration of his famous 'selfish system' spans over
twenty-seven years, the philosophical controversy surrounding his views on virtue
and sociability can be traced to the publication of The Fable of the Bees (1714), an
adaptation of an earlier work, The Grumbling Hive (1705).60 The Fable of the Bees
presented a devastating example of moral scepticism. Through an analogy to the
functioning of a beehive, Mandeville argued that all human behaviour can
ultimately be traced back to pride, flattery and gullibility. In addition, Mandeville
judged the need to turn private interests into public good as the central tenet of
social interaction. Politeness is in reality an act of hypocrisy, and as Mandeville
would have it, "Moral Virtues are the Political Offspring which Flattery begot upon
Pride".61
In order to refute the position of Shaftesbury,62 in The Fable of the Bees
Mandeville attempted to do what Shaftesbury had failed to do, namely, trace the
origin and growth of politeness. For if the origins of sociability were not genetic, it
was necessary to present a historical explanation that would trace the origin and
growth of politeness, and thus the motivation for it in the first place. To
accomplish this goal, Mandeville was forced to adopt a methodology in which the
philosopher becomes, at times, a historian in order search out the reasons for such
behaviour. As a result, Mandeville engaged in the extensive use of conjectural
history in an attempt to flesh-out the answer to this conundrum ofman's past.
As we will see in the forthcoming chapters, the use of such conjectural history
as a mode of analysis was eventually to have a profound affect on the writers of the
Scottish Enlightenment. While its major influence throughout the century was as a
subversive document, The Fable of the Bees still presented paradoxes that were to
60 The more general public controversy around the book can be traced to the date 1723, when Mandeville
added his controversal Essay on Charity and Charity-Schools to his Fable ofthe Bees. Due to the great
support the Charity Schools received from the Societies for the Reformation ofManners, the attack by
Mandeville resulted in the disdain of the Establishment of the day.
61 Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, 1723 ed., (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1927) p. 51.
62 While Mandeville makes no overt reference to Shaftesbury in print until 1720 in Free Thoughts on
Religion, the Church, and National Happiness, it seems unlikely that he had not yet encountered, directly
or indirectly, the central tenets of Shaftesbury's ethical system by 1714.
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be subject to serious theoretical exploration by these major figures of the Scottish
Enlightenment. As Irwin Primer notes, "The serious thinkers who grappled with
his paradoxes - Adam Smith, among others - came away often enough with an
indelible impression of the Mandevillean framework of ideas that would continue
to influence their own thinking even after they had formally rejected the 'errors' of
Mandeville".63 Although Mandeville was not, by his own admission, a systematic
writer who strove after coherence and consistency, it is clear that the impact of his
The Fable on the Bees was immense in the area of social and moral theory.
To round out our discussion of those theorists who were to have an impact on
the thinking ofHume, Smith, and Reid, it is only fitting to end the discussion with a
theorist who came to have an immediate and lasting influence on these Scots:
Francis Hutcheson. Professor of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow
from 1730 until his death in 1746, his Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of
Beauty and Virtue (1725) gave a critical impetus to the Scottish Enlightenment's
philosophy of morality and society.64 Credited with conveying the sentimentalist
basis of ethics and empiricism to the forefront of the Scottish Enlightenment, his
'moral sense' theory of morality served as an important touchstone to Hume's,
Smith's, and Reid's attempts to construct a cogent social and moral theory.
Hutcheson's theory repudiated the Hobbesian and Mandevillian egoistic model
by contending that human nature was dictated by God given features that qualified
man for a moral life. He argued that men have esteem and affection for others to a
degree far beyond what this sort of calculated reasoning would necessitate, and as a
result, for Hutcheson it was clear that man's actions are governed by natural
feelings of sociability. Society was not based on a society comprised of a weak
union of self-interested individuals, but rather upon inherent feelings of
interpersonal connection divinely intertwined into their very being.
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Maintaining the centrality of the natural sociability of man, Hutcheson
presented a complex and organic characterisation of society in which man attempts
to hone his innate sympathetic nature as manifest in his mutual and spontaneous
concern for others. This was accomplished by the refinement of our innate 'moral
sense'. This moral sense releases our natural faculty to judge and evaluate, a
mechanism which must be understood and channelled in order for us to be sociable.
As one becomes older and more experienced, this sense is marked by a gradual
progression from concern for intimate relations to a more general concern for
society. By asserting that ethical principles were ultimately based on a conception
of moral judgement as a natural faculty rather than based on God's law, Hutcheson
opened the way for classical conceptions of civic virtue.65 As a result, Hutcheson's
work presents a crucial humanistic theory in which ideas of sociability and
sentimentalism are allowed to flourish. Moral reasoning and sociability were not
however simply grounded in sentimental philosophy or a conception of 'moral
sense', but were rather constructed on the assumption that there is a 'shared world
of moral experience' in which moral standards could be cultivated through
communication in the same manner as taste.
In addition, Hutcheson, by maintaining that feelings rather than pure reason
were the basis ofmoral judgement, came to stress the importance of the shaping of
our natural affections. Humans are portrayed by him as benevolent and social
creatures who actively engage each other in the creation of a body of shared
judgements and ideals. Hutcheson's ideas of sentimentalism and civic virtue came
to have a profound impact on the discussion of morality and sociability in the
second half of the century. The philosophy of Hutcheson also provided a humanist
basis upon which cultural themes of sociability and sentiment would be
developed. 6 Lastly, Hutcheson's emphasis on the significance of communication
for the establishment of group norms he initiated an approach, followed up on by
65 Susan Purviance, "Intersubjectivity and Sociable Relations in the Philosophy of Francis Hutcheson", in
John Dwyer and Richard B. Sher, Sociability and Society in Eighteenth Century Scotland (Edinburgh:




the likes of Hume, Smith and Reid, which located this sharing process in spoken
language. For Hutcheson and those who followed him, the importance of everyday
conversation in cementing social bonds and the refinement ofmoral norms.
3. Conversation and Community: The Role of Language in the Emerging
Sociability Debate
Throughout the early modern debate regarding the nature of man's sociability,
language was recognised as being an essential characteristic of man that played a
significant role in the dispersion of social and moral ideals. For whatever the
motivation behind man's interaction with his fellow man, the ability to
communicate via language was a necessary precursor. It was clear that without
meaningful verbal interaction, there could be no societal cohesion, regardless of
whether that communication was ultimately motivated by selfish or altruistic
intentions. It was crucial, therefore, to discover the motivation for this inter¬
personal verbal communication, an act which was such an integral part of the
socialisation process. As a result, the motivation behind the use of language, the
intention behind the verbal act, became of great concern. Likewise, language's
potential for facilitating human interaction, its limitations, as well as the scope of
its potential manipulation for good or ill, were all seen as central issues relating to
the nature of language that must be resolved if any true understanding of man's
sociable nature was to be gained.
The resulting theoretical discussion of language produced within this debate
focused its attention predominantly on the impact of language on discourse. While
acknowledging the importance of language as a defining feature of mankind,
sociability theorists of the seventeenth and early eighteenth century did not tend to
incorporate extensive epistemological analysis of language into their theories. For
them, when it came to the influence of language in shaping man's character,
language in action within the society itself was what mattered. As one might
predict, the interpretation of how this 'language in action' manifested itself varied
greatly from theorist to theorists.
51
Despite these differences, two general trends do appear to be discernable. On
the one side, we have the Hobbesian and Machiavellian 'selfish' scenario's
perspective on the origin and subsequent development of language. Hobbes'
discussion of language focused on the essential role of language in the development
of society. He maintained that, without language, there would be "neither
commonwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, nor more than among lions,
bears and wolves."67 While acknowledging the fundamental importance of
language in the acquisition of knowledge, the civil function of language was pre¬
eminent to Hobbes, as it was seen as the medium of exchange which allowed us to
develop, share, and that knowledge and generally develop our abilities in such a
manner as would otherwise not exist without it. The end to which this was directed
was the creation of a form of social interaction that served to advance self-
protection through mutual defence.
Mandeville also recognised the importance of language in gaining an
understanding of the reason behind man's willingness to enter into society. As
noted above, rejecting the idea that man was innately drawn toward others in some
inherently benevolent way, Mandeville found it necessary to determine why social
behaviour would arise in the first place. Mandeville found his answer in the needs
ofman. Keeping in line with this premise, he maintained that man's interpersonal
communication arose from his desires and the ability to address those desires,
rather than through any form of inherent love or connection with his fellow man.
Therefore, critical in Mandeville's view was that these needs ofman could only be
satisfied through the medium of language.
In order to justify this position, Mandeville once again had to proffer a
conjectural history of mankind's acquisition of language. In order to facilitate his
need-based theory of language, Mandeville presented a bold refutation of the
67
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orthodox interpretation of the origin of language by presenting the idea of language
ZTO
development through a slow evolutionary process. In The Fable of the Bees,
Mandeville openly rejected the theological interpretation of the origins of language.
In cutting these ties from the Adamic tradition, he allowed for a secular explanation
more in keeping with the Enlightenment's effort to find a theory that would lend
itself to empirical analysis. The hypothesis that he presented as the alternative to
the biblical explanation, though brief, was to serve as the fundamental starting
point for almost all of the later eighteenth-century discussions of the origin of
language.
His theory of the origin of language revolved around a post-diluvian humanity
whose origin could be traced back not to Adam and Eve, but rather to a primordial
couple, the 'wild couple', who, according to Mandeville, was isolated from earliest
infancy from human society.69 Deprived of every help and example, Mandeville
presented a scenario in which this couple create, in isolation, the arts and
institutions of civil life by drawing solely on their human potentialities.70
Mandeville maintained that the starting point of the formation of language was to
be found in an innate connection that allowed each to understand the other.71 "I am
persuaded," asserted Mandeville, "that Nature has made all Animals of the same
kind, in their mutual Commerce, intelligible to one another, as far as is requisite for
the Preservation of themselves and their species: And as to my wild couple ... I
believe there would be a very good Understanding, before many Sounds past
between them."72
Mandeville maintained that an example of this rudimentary mutual
understanding was to be found in early man's ability, like other animals, to make
several distinct sounds to express different passions such as anger or great danger.
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Above and beyond these noises, however, man also had the ability to express
certain passions by gesture, such as grief, joy, wonder, and fear, which could not be
expressed by animals yet were recognised by "the generality of human
Creatures".73 These passions were expressed by "weeping, laughing, frowning,
sighing, exclaiming", which would invoke, by "the Language of the Eyes,"
compassion in man unique to his species.74 "[A]nd in that Language," quipped
Mandeville, "our wild Couple would at their first meeting intelligibly say more to
one another without guile, than any civilis'd Pair would dare to name without
blushing."75
Mandeville further contended that while spoken language was a characteristic
of our species, man was not born with it, and that it would take dozens of
generations before the first signs of anything which could be termed language
would develop.76 It was Mandeville's contention that a limited number of signs
and gestures made between two uncivilised individuals comprised the first
language. These signs and gestures eventually were able to stimulate in the mind
of the observer ideas corresponding to objects immediately at hand. After several
years this pair began to replace signs with sounds. The longer they lived together,
the more sounds they adopted. Each successive generation accelerated this
11 ' •
process. Because Mandeville imagines man's history to be extremely long, he
was able to posit that the qualities which we now associate with man were absent in
his early years. Reasoning, speaking, and associating with others may be potential
in early man, but they require long periods before experience and education
brought them to fruition. It was only as men learn, by experience over many years,
how to think and speak that they learned to live together. Mandeville also
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senses over the course of time. "Men," Mandeville concluded, are able to gain
knowledge only through "unwearied observation, judicious experience, and arguing
from facts a posteriori,"78
Mandeville opined that before man came into extended contact with other men
he had neither the ability nor the inclination to reflect upon himself or his state, be
it good or bad.79 As a result of this fact, Mandeville asserted that it would have
been impossible to develop communication, without extended contact with, and
observation of, others.80 His discussion of language in the Fourth Dialogue
merged directly into his discussion of society and the need for humans to be
o 1
brought up together in order to learn "Speech and Sociableness". If all were
• • • R?
"[SJtrangers to one another", the species could not have gained this ability. To
Mandeville, the formation of speech and living in society went hand-in-hand.
It is important to note, however, that Mandeville did not claim that man
developed language, "in order that their Thoughts may be known, and their
Sentiments laid open and seen by others."83 Language is purely a tool that an
individual uses to his own benefit, rather than a medium by which to share his
sentiments. "I am of the Opinion," Mandeville asserted, "that the first Design of
Speech was to persuade others, either to give Credit to what the speaking Person
would have them believe'; or else to act or suffer such Things, as he would compel
them to act or suffer, if they were in his Power".84 From earliest childhood,
language is used solely to express one's wants and one's will. Man was motivated
to speak simply because he learned that a natural gesture combined with speech
made his effort to persuade doubly effective. Driven by a desire to triumph over, as
78
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well as persuade others, Mandeville argued that man strove to present himself as
not driven by his passions, but by reason in order to win the favour of his fellow
man.
The Mandevillian perspective on language, therefore, did not focus its
attention on the limitations or influence of language on shaping man's mental
processes as was the case in the rationalist/empiricist debate on language. Rather,
language was characterised a necessary tool made available to man for gaining,
from social interaction, what he desires. It was language in action, not the
limitations of the humanmind reflected in language, which was his central concern.
In contrast to Mandeville and his selfish system, those theorists that assuming a
degree of natural sociability in man's character present a very different conception
of language. The use of language was portrayed by these theorists as both the
means by which man's inherent predisposition toward sociability was made a
reality, and the medium through which man could hope to perfect this most
essential of characteristics. Language was depicted as a cornerstone of mankind,
but only in as much as it is the conduit through which sociability is realised. As a
result, these theorists concerned themselves with the following questions: How did
the origin and development of language help to justify the contention that man was
innately as sociable creature? How could language be refined and perfected in
order to maximise the sociable nature of man? In what manner might veracity in
language use be cultivated in order to discourage any corruption of, or mistrust in,
the medium itself? These were the questions that concerned these advocates of
man's sociable nature in relation to language and language use, and they
determined that only through an understanding of language's unique advantages, as
well as its limitations, could such questions be given adequate answers.
The use of references to language and language use in confirming man's
natural sociability is perhaps first and best demonstrated by Pufendorf himself. In
Book I of On the Duty ofMan and Citizen According to Natural Law published in
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1673, Pufendorf devoted chapter ten, On the Duty ofMen in the Use of Language,
to the discussion of the impact of language on man's sociability. Pufendorf opened
this chapter by stating: "Everyone knows how useful, how simply necessary, an
instrument of human society language [sermo] is. Indeed, it has often been argued,
on the basis of this faculty alone, that man is intended by nature to live a social life.
The legitimate and profitable use of language for human society is based upon this
duty prescribed by natural law: no man should deceive another by language or by
other signs which have been established to express the sense of his mind [sensa
or
,
animi]. Pufendorf also stressed that language use created a double obligation on
the part of the participants. The first obligation was created through the tacit
agreement to use the same words for the same objects. The second obligation in
the use of language was, "that in speaking to someone one should disclose the
sense of one's mind to him in such a way that he may clearly know it".86 This is
necessary so that the listener may derive some benefit from knowing the sense of
the other person's mind. The other person, however, must have some sort of
perfect or imperfect right to hear it. If the person does not have such a right, then
the speaker does not have a binding obligation to speak truthfully. As Pufendorf
noted:
It is clear from this that we are not always telling a lie when we say,
and say deliberately, what does not exactly correspond either with
the facts or with our thoughts. Hence what we might call 'logical
truth', which consists in the congruence of words with things, does
not altogether coincide with 'moral truth'. A lie, on the other hand,
is when our language purposely makes out the sense of our mind to
be other than it really is, provided that the person to whom we are
talking has the right to know it and we have the obligation of
ensuring that he does know it.87
Lastly, Pufendorf made provisions for the occasional white lie, but only in cases
that ultimately furthered inter-personal relationships and connection. Thus, such
prevarications were permissible in order to "protect the innocent, placate the angry,
85 Samual Pufendorf, On the Duty ofMan and Citizen According to Natural Law. James Tully (ed.),




comfort the mourning, give courage to the fearful"88 Language as a means of
creating unity through social cohesion and bonding, therefore, was the pre-eminent
consideration in Pufendorfs discussion of language, even if that unity is
precipitated by acts which violate general social usage.
Similarly, in the case of Shaftesbury, Addison and Steele, the emphasis was
placed on the power of language to shape man and refine his interpersonal
connections. The aim of language was therefore to convey beliefs and habits, to
make people feel at ease with each other, and perhaps most importantly, as a tool to
mould virtuous social interaction. It was clear to them that by controlling language,
the whole of mankind could be changed. Through conversation in of 'polite
society', they hoped that mankind could make itself sociable via the correct use of
language. As a result the focus of the sociable school of theorists' understanding
of language's importance in moulding man's virtuous character was on
conversation and discourse.
Lastly, everyday conversation had an important role in forming ethical values
and cementing social bonds within the theory of Hutcheson. His sentimentalism
raised the questions as to whether or not individuals had the ability to distinguish
between subjective and objective validity. Because the moral sense was not
perfect, yet its existence still implied a communal pool of ethical sensitivity shared
by all individuals, there must be some neutral and universal standard ofmoral taste.
While our internal judgement was necessarily subjective, its concurrence with
others' judgement results in the objective validation of those judgements. This
concurrence, in turn, comes to define the nature of acceptable moral conduct. The
implicit assumption was that, since men come to these conclusions through
conversation with their fellow men, that the medium of language lends an objective
proof to the accuracy of our moral sense, thus removing the subjectivity question.
Hutcheson further implied that society was held together through the moral




verified and refined. As a result, Hutcheson emphasised the significance of inter¬
personal communication in the establishment of group norms, and this contributed
to a distinct tendency in the works of Scottish thinkers to locate this sharing process
in spoken language.89
Hutcheson did not, however, isolate and expand on these assumptions about
how one would come to verify the validity of the moral sense through extensive
references to language and language use. There are two possible explanations for
this fact. The first being that, although implicit in his theory, Hutcheson may not
have elaborated on the significance of the use of language as the medium for this
exchange because he appeared to assume that the use of language would almost
necessarily lead toward this confirmation. The second and perhaps more tenable
explanation for the lack of such an elaboration is that Hutcheson's hypothesis was
ultimately based on an innate moral sense, an innate facility that functions without
social refinement. Language, therefore, could only operate within the confines of,
and only relative to, the norm provided by the moral sense. Without this innate
motivation, the rest of his theory would fail. Thus, while language may be the
medium essential for the verification of this moral sense, and even a tool for its
refinement within set perimeters, language was, ultimately, neither necessary for its
existence nor for its functioning. Man had an innate capacity for experiencing
moral pleasure and displeasure, and language must ultimately conform itself to that
reality.
4. The Merging of the Epistemological and the Social Elements of Language
within the Scots' Efforts to Construct a 'Science of Man'
Having given a brief account of early modern speculation regarding the influence
of language on the shaping ofman's character, we must now turn to the theories of
Hume, Smith and Reid and assess the rationale and conclusions formulated by them






create an all encompassing 'Science ofMan' these theorists would draw inspiration
from the contemporary debate outlined above both in relation to the
epistemological implications of language as well as importance of language in
sociable discourse. As we will see in the following chapters, by drawing together
the hitherto disparate strands of language in relation to thought, and language in
relation to society, there discussions of language use shed light on the way in which
they characterised the conceptions ofmorality, virtue, and sociability.
To gain this full picture of man's true nature, it was necessary to reckon the
cognitive conclusions relating to language with the then current discussion as to the
true motivation and function of social discourse. Due to these Scottish theorists'
apparent conclusion that it was useful to both recognise the importance of
understanding language in order to determine the character of personal
development, coupled with their belief that conversation and discourse played an
important role in defining and shaping man's moral character, they utilised
references to language and language use to illustrate and substantiate their claims.
As a result, the following questions were addressed: Did man reveal his social
and moral character through language, or was that character dictated by language
itself? Was his ethical nature pre-destined, or could it be shaped by interaction and
conversation with his fellow man? Was the inherent limitation of language,
particularly its ambiguity in regards to moral concepts, so restricting that it did not
allow for us to ever fully express our sentiments, and thus connect fully with our
fellow man? Was the honest usage of language necessary for inter-personal
communication to take place at all? How did the origin and development of
language shed light on the true nature of man's sociability? Was language itself
natural or artificial? What were the implications of the conclusions necessarily
drawn regarding the natural/artificial question as it relates to morality and
sociability? By taking up these sorts of questions regarding the relationship
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between cognitive language assumptions and man's use of language within a social
context, it was hoped that they could help bolster their claims regarding how man
comes to an understanding of his societal and moral obligations
This being the case, it will be argued that, in order to gain a fuller understanding
of the 'Science ofMan' put forward by these Scots, it is valuable for historians to
take their characterisation of language and language use into account. What follows
is a discussion of the implications of such an approach to the moral and social
theories of Hume, Smith, and Reid. In each case, this thesis attempts to analyse the
way these individuals grapple with the issue of language, how they come to
connect the internal with the social element of language and language use, and,
ultimately, how their conclusions on these matters impacted their efforts to present
a coherent social and moral theory.
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CHAPTER II
David Hume and the Importance of
Linguistic Moral Convention
In the proceeding chapter we examined various Early Modern scholars' exploration
of the epistemological, sociological, and moral implications associated with man's
ability to utilise language in his social interactions. We will now turn our attention
to the relationship between morality, sociability and language within the writings of
David Hume. It is certainly clear that Hume was very much in tune with the
general intellectual trends of the period, and there is no doubt that references to
epistemology, sociability, morality and language consistently arise throughout his
works. What follows is an attempt to link together and analyse Hume's references
specifically to language, and relate their significance to Hume's more general
theory of morality and sociability. Approaching Hume in this manner, it will be
argued that while not discussing language in isolation, language does plays an
important role in Hume's conception of the means by which men come to
understand and function within their social and moral universe.
Given the general tenor of philosophical discussion concerned with language
presented by his contemporaries and immediate predecessors, the premise that
Hume concerned himself with language as a means by which to illustrate and
substantiate his conclusions regarding man's social and moral character may seem
from the very start questionable. For example, having examined at length the
general tenor of analysis of language during the Early Modern Period in the
previous chapter, one is struck by the conspicuous lack of discussion of natural
verses artificial language as well as any extended analysis the origin of language in
any of Hume's works, a process so common in nearly all discussions of language
during the Enlightenment. It would seem that this threshold issue must first be
addressed if any meaningful analysis of Hume's conception of language in relation
to his moral and social theory can be achieved.
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A close reading ofHume does reveal that he did refer in passing to natural signs,
and how they move others to action, much in line with Mandeville's assumptions
regarding this process.1 He stated, "[R]educe a person to solitude, and he loses all
enjoyment, except either of the sensual or speculative kind; and that because the
movements of his heart are not forwarded by correspondent movements in his
fellow-creatures. The signs of sorrow and mourning, though arbitrary, affect us
with melancholy; but the natural symptoms, tears and cries and groans, never fail to
infuse compassion and uneasiness".2 Hume also acknowledged that such natural
expressions are the basis for rudimentary inter-personal communication. He did
not, however, consider it necessary to elaborate on these fleeting references. Nor
did he consider it necessary to incorporate into his works any discussion of a
'savage couple' a la Mandeville.
Yet ifHume was indeed so concerned about the influence of language on man's
social and moral character, why did he not provide an elaborate discussion on the
origin of language? For, as we witnessed in the previous chapter, and will see
again particularly in the theories of Condillac, Rousseau, Smith and Reid, most
individuals who concerned themselves with the truths about human nature revealed
by language during this period argued that the origin and early development of
inter-personal communication were extremely important. For the discovery of the
motivation behind nascent language use by man was deemed by most
Enlightenment thinkers as particularly revealing in their quest to unlock mankind's
most elementary characteristics.
It does not seem, however, that the lack of such a discussion on the part of
Hume negates the argument that language played an important supporting role in
his theory. In fact, it would be more logical to argue that his lack of an extended or
isolated discussion of the origin of language reveals much more about Hume's
1 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles ofMorals. Tom L. Beauchamp (ed.), (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002) p. 109.
2
Hume, Enquiry, pp. 109 - 110.
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assumptions about language than would its inclusion. The absence of any sort of
discussion of a 'savage couple' merely clarifies exactly how Hume conceived of
language and man's social character. The most probable reason behind the lack of
such a discussion can be traced to Hume's general dismissal of the significance of
theorising about a state ofnature in the first place.
Hume argued that there is little or no use in theorising about 'pre-social' man in
any context, linguistic or otherwise. Be it characterised as a golden age ofmilk and
honey as Rousseau would come to maintain, or of "perpetual war of all against all"
as Hobbes had argued, it was of little matter to Hume. He asserted that "[W]hether
such a condition of human nature could ever exist, or if it did, could continue so
long as to merit appellation of a state, may justly be doubted. Men are necessarily
born in a family-society, at least; and are trained up by their parents to some rule of
conduct and behaviour".3 Given this assumption that man is always born into and
socialised in a rudimentary form via the family, if nothing more, the lack of a
discussion of some 'savage couple' is at least understandable. Hume did not
maintain, as did Mandeville, that we had to learn to live together, at least at this
most rudimentary level, for we were in fact by default necessarily born into a pre¬
existing social system.
/
Hume's characterisation of language, as well as morality, hinged upon the
assumption that these all were pre-existing institutions that are part and parcel of
the 'common life' he sought to explore. It was his goal to explain how these
human institutions functioned rather than came into being. In this sense, we will
see that Hume's discussion of language was merely in keeping with his general
goal to locate the locus of human nature in society as it exists, not in the hyperbole
of a theoretical past that never existed. Hume simply took for granted the existence
of language as the mechanism for regulating social intercourse. Given his general
dismissal of the usefulness of pre-social conjectures, the lack of a discussion on the
origin of language, so common during the period, does not negate Hume's potential
3
Hume, Enquiry , p. 88.
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contribution to the dialogue taking place at this time regarding the nature and
influence of language on man's social and moral character. It is merely that Hume
enters into the contemporary discourse regarding the nature and influence of
language at a later stage than many ofhis contemporaries.
In order to support this contention, we will first explore the distinct
methodology employed by Hume in his efforts to create a 'Science of Man', an
effort on the part ofHume to construct a means of systematic empirical analysis in
order to gain insight into man's social and moral character. By the utilisation and,
perhaps most critically, the adaptation of the pioneering efforts being made in the
natural sciences, Hume championed a new methodology for the investigation of
man's social and moral character. When the weight of Hume's methodological
assumptions are brought to bear upon his exploration of man's conceptions of
virtue and vice, the role of language within his theory becomes more and more
evident.
Through the methodology forged by Hume, the idea of custom, bias, and
convention all became foundational principles upon which were laid Hume's
conclusions as to the true essence of man's social and ethical nature. We will
explore the implications of these new guiding principles, and their impact on
Hume's ultimate rejection of the classical lines of debate being proffered by both
the rationalists and the sentimentalists. We will further explore the role language
and language use played in Hume's characterisation of the virtue of justice, a social
convention which unlocks the key for understanding all of man's conceptions of
virtue and vice.
It will be argued that the relevance of language in analysing Hume's theory of
man's social and moral character relates to the central role that conventions play in
his characterisation of how we come to an understanding of virtue and vice. The
fact that language is the convention upon which all other societal conventions
depend allows Hume to use language not merely as a convenient tool for making
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analogies, which he certainly does, but more importantly, as actual empirical
evidence of man's true character by highlighting and analyzing the implications of
language's role in establishing and enforcing communal understandings of social
mores in everyday life.
More specifically, it will be contended that the importance of an understanding
of Hume's characterisation of language within Hume's theory also relates directly
to Hume's contention "that reason and sentiment concur in almost all moral
determinations and conclusions."4 For at the root of Hume's theory ofmorality is
the idea that moral decision-making requires an ongoing interaction between reason
and feeling, the one motivating, the other qualifying and directing. The opposition
between feeling and reason is replicated in the process of social intercourse, where
self-interest and general communal standards meet. Hume maintained that
individuals could not share one another's moral sentiments were it not for general
language, which affords a common set of terms to describe both moral actions and
approbation. Yet those communally recognisable terms cannot supplant private
interests; they can only serve as a medium for bringing them into the arena of
common discourse, where a continual process of adjustment between the private
and the public takes place. What is important to Hume is the process itself, the
continuing dialogue between the self and others that goes into shaping their moral
character, a process made possible by the unconscious ties of community embodied
in language itself.5
Hume's Effort to Establish a 'Science of Man'
In order to come to an understanding of the nexus between language, sociability,
and morality within Hume's works, it is necessary first to explore the methodology
employed by Hume. For it is the methodological assumptions that Hume adopted
4
Hume, Enquiry. P. 75.
5 Sociability and Society in Eighteenth-Century Scotland. John Dwyer and Richard B. Sher (eds.), "Hume's
Diaogues concerning Natural Religion as Social Discourse", by Jeffrey R. Smitten (Edinburgh: The
Mercat Press, 1993) p. 54.
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in his attempt to create a 'science of man' that ultimately shaped his
characterisation of the role of language within his philosophical discourse on
morality and sociability.
Like many of his contemporaries, Hume is well known for having looked for
inspiration in his work to the burgeoning exploration being advanced in the natural
sciences. It is important to note, however, that his characterisation of what exactly
this scientific investigation entailed was a variation on the general Enlightenment
theme. In Book I of the Treatise, Hume advanced the notion that "all the sciences
have a relation greater or less, to human nature; and that however wide any of them
may seem to run from it still return back by one passage or another. Even
Mathematics, Natural Philosophy [i.e. natural science], and Natural Religion, are
in some measure dependent on the science of MAN; since truth lies under the
cognizance ofmen, and are judged of by their powers and faculties."6 Contrary to
Locke, then, for whom philosophy was understood as the under-labourer of natural
science, Hume maintained that the science of humanity is in fact logically prior to
any other science. Hume never lost sight of the fact that nature itself is only
grasped through human life and experience. Unlike Descartes, Malebranche, and
Berkeley, Hume wished to root philosophy in human experience and to do so in a
way that both acknowledged the limits of reason and eschewed metaphysical
powers. He aimed to produce a secular philosophy in the tradition of Newton,
Shaftsbury, Mandeville, and Hutcheson, attempting to bring the systematic
examination ofman's nature to the next level.
Given his contention that the pursuit of scientific knowledge is necessarily
rooted in man's life and experience, it seemed logical enough that the advances
witnessed in the natural sciences could be utilized as well in understanding human
nature itself. Hume characterised his philosophy as an attempt to develop a
'science of human nature', which means a systematic explanation of the human
mind, including moral sentiments. Hume maintained that the workings of the inner
6 David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature. Ernest C. Mossner (ed.), (New York: Penguin Putnam, 1985)
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mind and human behaviour are natural elements, and therefore a science ideally
should be able to explain both of them using methods like those it uses to explain
other events in nature. He hoped to develop a science of human nature by
examining the inner world of perception, desire, emotion, reasoning and inference
that he hoped would provide laws of psychology that are as well confirmed as laws
ofphysics.
The result of this approach would be a new 'science of man' based on the
evidence that could be gained through the examination of publicly observable
human behaviour. Hume in fact chose a title that included 'principles of morals'
because he was looking for general principles of human nature, as discovered in
common life and practice. In his exploration of moral philosophy, Hume therefore
began with moral phenomena, such as the ways in which we approve and
disapprove of various forms of human conduct. After closely analysing both his
own mental faculties and observing the behaviour of other people, he sought to
isolate the explanatory principles and causes that would elevate his observations to
the status of a science.
The application of the scientific method to his philosophical enquiry would
seem to have some other necessary consequences. In order for such philosophical
enquiry to avoid being tainted by theology, politics, or some other prejudice, it
would seem to require the philosopher to do all he can to separate himself from
such restraints and influences. The philosopher would seem to necessarily have to
adopt an Archimedean point outside the domain of common life as a whole, for the
prejudices of common life are presumed by this perspective to be guilty unless they
can be seen to comply with the purity of autonomous philosophical reasoning. It
follows that in order to achieve this perspective must consciously reject the domain
of received order ofhabit, custom and tradition and become a spectator to them.
p. 42.
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However, Hume disagree that this was either a necessary or advantageous goal.
On the contrary, he deemed such efforts both futile and undesirable. It is important
to remember that Hume's effort to adopt the scientific method did not mean that he
failed to see the vital need of adapting that method as well. Therefore, Hume
parted ways with the Enlightenment, in relation to at least this methodological
assumption regarding the nature of sound scientific investigation. For if Hume
taught that religion appears as 'sick men dreams' he also taught that men 'from
reasoning purely philosophical' have run into "as great extravagancies of conduct
as any Monk or Dervise that ever was in the World - capable of generating
absurdities the equal of any in religion". In Part IV of Book I of the Treatise, he
presents his argument against such an effort to stand outside of the society one is
attempting to understand. It takes the form of three stage philosophical Drama
where philosophical reflection emerges dialectically out of the prejudices of
common life, imagines itself the spectator and absolute arbiter of these prejudices,
then collapses into self alienation and incoherence; and through further reflection
returns back to a prejudice of common life from which it originated.7
Hume knows himself to be inexorably a participant in custom, and equally that
reason will not allow him to affirm this participation. Philosophical reflection
attains what Hume calls true philosophy only when one critically affirms the order
of prejudice as having original authority. Attempts to live and analyse human
nature in a vacuum must in Hume's opinion be abandoned. He pointed out that
'false philosophical consciousness' fails to properly take into account the
constitutive role that prejudice and custom play in human thought. Though
necessarily a participant in common life, the false philosopher in reality is totally
alienated from its authority by virtue of the unreformed autonomy of principle.
Hume opined that philosophical reflection which attempts to remove itself
completely from the entire domain of prejudice is empty. Philosophy must
therefore abandon the autonomous principle, and rather affirm the original
authority of the domain ofprejudice to command judgment.
7
Hume, Treatise, pp. 231 - 238.
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Hume thus maintained we must place restraints upon the concept of the
autonomy of reflection and instead adopt what one might term the 'autonomy of
custom' and affirm the authority of custom and prejudice to command judgment.
The false philosopher judged himself to be the spectator and sovereign arbiter of
whatever domain of custom he is reflecting upon. The true philosopher, by contrast
recognised that he is a critical participant in whatever domain of custom he is
examining. Whereas false philosophy had presumed custom to be false unless
certified by autonomous reflection, Hume argued that custom is presumed true
unless shown to be otherwise and where showing it to be otherwise, presupposes
the validity of custom as a whole.
Critically for our purposes is the fact that Hume's new principle, the autonomy
of custom points out a hitherto undiscovered mode of knowledge, namely,
knowledge, not through prepositional reflection, but through primordial
participation. As we shall see in the following section, custom, and not
autonomous reason, is judged by Hume to have a better title to rule, and custom is
always internal to a social order with requires deference to others. Given these
assumptions, Hume's methodology would have a profound impact on how he
would weigh in on the moral and sociological debate that characterised the period
as well as his characterisation of language's relation to man's sociability and
morality.
2. Hume's Attempt to Strike a New Course in the Rationalist vs.
Sentimentalist Debate
Having outlined Hume's innovative methodology, it remains to be seen how this
methodology impacted his efforts to find the true driving force behind human
morality. Re-enforcing his methodological assumptions in the area ofmorality, he
'promises to draw no conclusions but where...authorized by experience' and says
he will speak 'with contempt of hypothesis' unless they can be confirmed by
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experience. As noted in the previous chapter, the Rationalists maintained that
moral judgment is based on a rational apprehension of eternal standards of right
and wrong. The sentimentalists, on the other hand, held that judgment is founded
on an internal sense or set of sentiments distinct from reason. Hume acknowledged
this contemporary debate regarding whether morals are derived from reason or
from sentiments. Noting the fact that from ancient times, no truly adequate answer
had been presented, and that contemporary inquirers were no nearer to finding a
proper answer, he went on to challenge the two sides and concludes that both are
"susceptible of specious arguments".
As to the Rationalists' claims, Hume asserted that reason is excluded from
moral judgments and that, ultimately, ideas of virtue and vice revolve around the
sense of pleasure or pain we experience, either directly through the passions, or
indirectly through sympathy with others. Like his predecessor Locke, Hume
maintained that no idea and no awareness of matters of fact are discoverable by
pure reason. Locke referred to the mind's contents as ideas', Hume's parallel term
is perception, a category under which he distinguishes impressions and ideas.
Impressions are the items that come directly before the mind, such as colours,
sounds, shapes, and feelings. Like many philosophers of his time, Hume believed
that objects, events, other people, and the like are known to us only by perceptions.
All conceptions and beliefs derive from these perceptions. To have a solid basis,
each idea must have come originally from one or more impressions and must
adequately represent the original source or sources.
For Hume, the basis of exploration of man's sentiments rested in the passions,
the 'spring and motives' that cause man to respond to stimulus in a certain way.
These passions were portrayed as the root of individual motivation and were
divided by Hume between direct or indirect and, as a separate matter, calm or
violent. The direct passions, such as the feelings of joy, grief and fear, found their
origin either in natural instinct or in the desire to do good, which were associated
8
Hume, Enquiry, p. 24.
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by Hume with pleasure, or in the avoidance of evil, which was associated with
pain. The origin of the indirect passions, such as humility, pride and love, could be
traced to the combination of primitive motives with other factors that will be
discussed below. The second, and separate, distinction between violence and
calmness related to whether one acts instinctively and against one's own interest,
and thus exhibiting a violent passion, or whether one is influenced by the greatest
possible good to come from one's actions, thus exhibiting a calm passion.
Hume maintained that reason did not factor into the regulation of these
passions. Because Hume conceived of reason only as being concerned with the
discovery of truth or falsehood, he concluded that it can never be the motive for any
action of the will. Accordingly, Hume argued that, "[Rjeason is and ought to be
the slave to the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve
and obey them".9 Hume is particularly concerned to show that human rational
capacities are more limited than some of his predecessors had maintained. They
had maintained that reason is capable of grasping fundamental truths about the
natural, mental, and moral worlds in a manner analogous to the way in which
reason grasps mathematical truths. Hume categorically denied that reason has the
capacity to deliver such knowledge and ultimate truths in areas as had been
supposed by the Rationalist.
Hume also contended that reason does not play a controlling role in the
formation of moral judgment. Hume stated, "[Sjince morals ... have an influence
on the actions and affections, it follows that they cannot be deriv'd from reason,"
and thus, "the rules ofmorality are not the conclusions of our reason".10 Hume's
central contention that moral beliefs and judgments were tied to the sentiments was
based on his belief that they are, unlike reason, closely tied with action. It was
9
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Hume's conclusion that we are moved to act, not by reason, but by our passions.11
Hume insisted the most that reason can do was tell the individual what they 'ought'
to do.
Unlike the rationalist who disapproved of behaviour driven by the passions, and
viewed the passions as irrational and sometimes overpowering influences needing
the disciplined control of reason, Hume thought that passions need not be confused,
misleading, or censurable. In correlation with his methodological assumptions,
Hume maintained that the passions are on the contrary vital and worthy dimensions
of human nature. As noted in the methodological discussion earlier in this chapter,
Hume held that such advice will only distract persons from proper moral behaviour
and make them miserable. He contended that we should accept our nature rather
than fight it. Reason cannot move us to action and cannot liberate us from the
passions; reason can only be the faithful servant to the passions. Because Hume
elevated the importance of the passions and lowered expectations of reason, he is
sometimes regarded as an irrationalist who reduces human action to natural
instincts. However, this seems to be a mischaracterization, rather Hume wanted to
show that reason simply has sharp limits in philosophy and ordinary life.
In the opening paragraphs of Book II of the Treatise, Hume reiterated that
reason is excluded form moral judgments and that, ultimately, ideas or virtue and
vice revolve around the sense of pleasure or pain we experience, either directly
through the passions, or indirectly through sympathy with others. While reason was
excluded from moral evaluation, sympathy was characterised by Hume as playing a
crucial role in the formation of morality judgment. Hume saw both moral
sentiments and social virtues as arising out of our natural feelings of sympathy. By
finding that moral judgment is the basis for feeling, Hume asserted that the
'peculiar sentiment of morals' was common to all men and therefore a general
agreement existed in regards to the virtue/vice dichotomy.
11 Paul Crittenden, Learning to Be Moral: Philosophical Thoughts about Moral Development (London:
Humanities Press International, 1990) p. 210.
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Though Hume never defined sympathy, he did discuss its nature and origin. In
Book II of the Treatise sympathy is described as the process by which an 'idea' is
converted into an 'impression'. Experience proves that the 'idea' in our minds of
another person's passions is 'converted into the very impression' that those
passions represent. By this means we can feel what another person feels.
Similarly, our ability to form an idea of another's 'unease' is through the
sympathetic mechanism converted into our partaking in that unease as well.
Hume maintained that sympathy, at its most fundamental level, is a natural and
instinctive concern for others. It can be seen as the means by which we bridge the
gap between our own passions and those of another. Through sympathy, the
feelings of the individual gave rise to those same feelings in someone else. This
was because, "the minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations".12
The communication, both verbal and non-verbal, from one individual to another,
was characterised as a manifestation of their inner intent, something that only they
themselves could have direct access. It was from these external effects that the
observer inferred the character of the passion itself.13 Characterised as a universal
phenomenon by Hume, sympathy: a) was interpersonal, b) accommodated the
sharing of 'fellow feeling' (by this he meant the sharing of emotions and concern
for the welfare of others in such a manner that we can no longer be indifferent to
them), and c) dictated that at some level we must be able to put ourselves in
another's place and truly understand their feelings given the circumstances.
Presented as the causal mechanism by which the communication of the passions
take place, sympathy was described by Hume as being the foundation from which
opinions, beliefs, and attitudes were disseminated within a society. As a result, a
central doctrine of Hume's philosophy was that the possession of sympathetic
12
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reflex was a necessary precursor to moral judgement. Hume asserted, "nor can any
one be actuated by any affection, of which all others are not, in some degree,
susceptible. As in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates itself
to the rest; so all the affections readily pass from one person to another, and beget
correspondent movements in every human creature. When I see the effects of
passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind immediately passes from
these effects to their causes, and forms such a lively idea of the passion, as is
presently converted into the passion itself'.14
It is worth briefly noting that this interpretation of the exchange of the natural
signs parallels, to a remarkable degree, the ideas behind the description of natural
language that are highlighted by Mandeville in the previous chapter. While we will
see that their conclusions regarding the driving force behind human social
interaction were dramatically different, nevertheless, Hume's characterisation of
sympathy rested the same premises that were an accepted fact in regard to the
character of 'natural language'. As Mandeville had argued, human beings were
generally regarded by Hume as having an innate desire to communicate their
sentiments to each other, and by nature were given the means to make this a reality.
Because of their use of voice or gesture, individuals are attributed with the ability
to communicate the most fundamental and innate of their sentiments. Further, like
Mandeville, in Hume's theory there is an implicit assumption that the
communication of these sentiments from one to another must be via external signs
of these sentiments. In line with this necessity, Hume stated that, "[N]o passion of
another discovers itself immediately to the mind. We are only sensible of its causes
or effects. From these we infer the passion: And consequently these give rise to
our sympathy".15
14
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However, having outlined the existence of the desire for, and mechanism of, the
communication of sentiments between individuals, Hume was quick to
acknowledge the limitations of the passions and sympathy in serving as the sole
basis of a functioning of a workable moral system. Hume maintained in the
Enquiry that while we cannot hope to simply rely upon reason to guide our moral
judgments, it was equally specious to argue that all moral determinations are
derived from the sentiments. He acknowledged that sentiments dictate the way we
perceive in the first instance our impressions of virtue and vice. He also admitted
that reason was incapable of dictating in advance how such reaction will occur.
Critically, though, Hume maintained that simply being moved personally in one
way or another does not result in a moral decision. He contended that the "end of
all moral speculations is to teach us our duty; and, by proper representations of the
deformity of vice and beauty of virtue, beget corresponding habits, and engage us
to avoid the one, and embrace the other".16 He went on to say, "[tjhey
[sentiments] discover truths; but where the truths which they discover are
indifferent, and beget no desire or aversion, they can have no influence on conduct
or behaviour".17 Hume appeared to argue that without a structure placed upon
these emotions affecting our perceptions and social interaction, there does not exist
a moral system but rather simply men acting instinctively and individually.
Whatever the basis for concluding that the sentiments are the primary
motivating factors behind morals, ultimately, " 'tis absurd to imagine, that in every
particular instance, these sentiments are produc'd by an original quality and
primary constitution. For as the number of our duties is, in a manner, infinite, 'tis
impossible that our original instincts should extend to each of them, and form our
very first infancy impress on the human mind all that multitude of precepts, which
are constrain'd in the compleatest system of ethics".18 Hume went on to say that,
16
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"['T]is necessary, therefore, to abridge these primary impulses, and find some more
general principles, upon which all our notions ofmorals are founded".19
It seems implicit in this assertion by Hume that it is necessary to distinguish
between the individual's moral feeling and his sympathy. A moral feeling is not a
type of sympathy or sympathetic feeling; these necessarily diverge at a point where
• 20
the element of objectivity, which is essential for moral judgement, is introduced.
Thus, Hume was forced to find a method of tying his conception of morals to
sympathetic responses, while at the same time freeing it from the subjectivity
assumed by sympathy.
It is at this point that Hume seemed to realise the necessity of qualifying the role
of sympathy in the formation of societal conceptions of virtue and vice, moving
away from a discussion of the cognitive mechanism behind moral sentiments and
toward an account of a workable system ofmorality within a social context. As for
this transition, Hume judged it necessary first to address the classical distinction
between those attributes of man that are 'natural' and those that are, in contrast,
'artificial'. Hume contended that our sentiments are natural; in so much as they
are rooted in our constitution. As to whether virtue or vice is natural, Hume
maintained that both virtue and vice are artificial and outside of nature. This is due
to the fact that "actions themselves are artificial, and are perform'd with a certain
design and intention; otherwise they cou'd never be rank'd under any of these
• 91
denominations". He concluded that "['T]is impossible, therefore, that the
character of natural and unnatural can ever, in any sense, mark the boundaries of
vice and virtue".22 Hume therefore rejected the notion that one can create any
meaningful distinction between what is 'natural' and what is 'artificial' in relation
to morals.
19
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By blurring, if not indeed collapsing together the two concepts, Hume seemed
to hope that that he could now reconcile the seemingly contradictory elements of
sympathy and moral judgment. With the natural/artificial theoretical barrier
eliminated, Hume was free to explain how the passions, spurred on by sympathy,
could be tapped and moulded by a moral system that by necessity had to stand
distinct from them. Hume maintained that the question which must be addressed
was: "Why any action or sentiment upon the general view or survey, gives a
certain satisfaction or uneasiness?"23 In other words, the question Hume had to
answer was whether a neutral moral standard could be established that would still
induce an instinctive reaction of pleasure and pain which, in turn, would trigger our
judgment ofwhether an action was or was not virtuous.
In order to achieve this, Hume had to reconcile the subjectivity of sympathy
with the ethical neutrality and consistency necessitated by morality. Though the
use of sympathy may expand the horizons of our personal affections, thus allowing
for some modification of our self-centred sentiments, Hume realised that this does
not address the fact that sympathy itself is a source of self-regard, and thus stands
in need of correction. As outlined by Hume, the correction of the sentiments seems
to be extremely problematic given this model, for there is nothing inherent in the
'springs and motives' of .man's nature that could cause the correction at issue to
occur.24
While this clash between sympathetic subjectivity and moral neutrality is often
depicted as a fundamental flaw in Hume's characterisation ofmorals,25 the lack of a
correcting mechanism arising from the sympathy itself does not necessarily
undermine Hume's observations on the subject. Though the impetus for morality
might lie in sympathy, it does not seem logically to follow that the correcting
mechanism must likewise originate from that source. What we witness at this point
23
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is an effort by Hume to rectify his epistemological assumptions relating to the
nature of the moral awareness with a socially based means of regulating and
correcting it. Hume realised that at a certain point one must put theory aside and
turn one's attention to the everyday world in which one finds oneself.
What we see is Hume moving toward an extra-theoretical explanation of how
moral character is formed. To observe that our fundamental emotional wellsprings
are the passions and that some sort of connection with these passions is to be found
in our natural desire to sympathise with others seems obvious enough. Just as
obvious, it would seem, is the realisation that the establishment of a moral system
would necessarily entail some means of channelling that sympathetic reaction in a
way consistent with achieving a societal good. In fact, it would seem to necessarily
arise from outside the individual in order to establish the neutrality required by
moral judgment.
Hume critically asserted that a symbiotic relationship between moral judgment
and the passions might be the best means of discovering the nature ofmorality. In
apparent agreement with Hutcheson, Hume believed that it was the need to tap the
universal nature of the sentiments and transmit them into a communal social
context that lies at the heart ofmorality. Hume stated that, in the end, the nature of
morality: "Depends on some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made
universal in the whole species. For what else can have an influence of this nature?
But in order to pave the way for such a sentiment, and give a proper discernment of
its object, it is often necessary, we find, that much reasoning should precede, that
nice distinctions be made, just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed,
complicated relations examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained".26
However, the question still remained as to how this balance came to be struck. In
the end, Hume would find his answer in the virtue known as 'justice'.
3. The Virtue of Justice, Human Convention, and the Role of Language in
26
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Understanding the Principles ofMorality
Accepting at this point Hume's assertions that man's moral nature is not based
simply on reason or on the sympathy alone, we have seen that Hume deemed it
necessary to qualify both in light of his observations of the formation of moral
sentiments on those in society he observed around him. It is left to determine how
Hume did conceive of how an individual comes to an understanding of virtue and
vice. Hume achieved this goal by his analysis of the virtue of justice, which is
recognised as the cornerstone of his moral theory. His characterisation of this
virtue and his assumptions as to why and how we come to see justice as the pivotal
virtue, all point the way to an understanding of the role Hume saw language
playing in the formation of our social and moral character. What comes to the fore
is the fact that not only is language a social act, a convention for reflecting on
conventions, and as such it is internally connected to all other conventions that
spontaneously make up the human world. As a result of this fact, Hume found it
useful to illustrate and substantiate his conclusions regarding the virtue of justice,
and human morality generally, through extensive references to language and
language use.
Armed with a methodology base on observation, and indeed participation, of the
custom and prejudices of common life, we have seen that Hume had dismantled the
old lines of divisions between rationalist and sentimentalist thinking. In its place it
was necessary to present a new analysis of what made man a moral and social
being. The answer in Hume's opinion to this long vexing riddle was to be found in
the virtue of justice. The virtue of justice is the most esteemed of qualities; that of
injustice, the most detested. As a result of this line of reasoning, it was posited by
Hume that we cannot acquire an understanding of virtue until we have gained an
understanding ofjustice. For it is the ability ofman to gain an understanding of the
concept ofjustice which opens the door for the creation of a moral universe. Only
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with the acceptance of the dictates necessitated by justice that man can form a
personal and social conception of, as well as the means to perform, virtuous
conduct.
Hume substantiated this supposition by pointing out that on the face of it, we
would feel no 'natural' need to fulfil the requirements of performing the virtue we
call justice. He justified this contention by pointing out that we do note gain any
immediate satisfaction from acting in a just manner. For example, we have no
natural motive that compels us to repay a loan or recognise the sanctity of another's
property. Although someone in a civilised state and trained in accordance to "a
certain discipline and education" would recognise these as virtuous, an individual
in a more "rude and more natural condition" would not. 27 Thus, there must be a
state of virtuousness that can be created in a society that is, at the very least, cut off
from this primal and instinctive distinction between virtue and vice. It was
therefore imperative for Hume to discover how such sentiments could come into
existence.
Hume went on to discuss why the need for justice arose in the first place. He
suggested that if all people shared the exact same sentiments, their minds would be
"so replete with friendship and generosity, that every man has the utmost
tenderness for every man, and feels no more concern for his own interest than for
that of his fellows; it seems evident, that the use of justice would, in this case, be
suspended by such an extensive benevolence, nor would the divisions and barriers
of property and obligation have ever been thought of'.28 If this were the case,
there would be no reason for justice, since there would be no need to have a
contract with, or promise from, an individual who was always willingly do what
another wants. Hume stated, "[W]hy raise landmarks between my neighbour's
field and mine, when my heart has made no division between our interests; but
shares all his joys and sorrows with the same force and vivacity as if originally my
27
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own" [emphasis added]. It would seem that if our sentiments exactly matched up
with those of our neighbour and all the individuals in a community were a "second
self to another", then everyone would automatically do what was best for others,
even if it did them harm. In this situation, "the whole of humanity would form only
one family".29
Hume also proffered the opposite extreme in which society is one in which
there is such want and need that justice is pre-empted by personal necessity and
self-preservation. The same can be said of the need of defence if a man falls into a
"society of ruffians". Again, one is forced to turn toward "the dictates for self-
preservation alone".30 In this state, there could be no concept of justice, for the
requisite conditions for man living in society are wanting. In such a state he is not
afforded an opportunity to join in mutual connection with those around him. His
immediate bodily safety is his only interest.
However, Hume rejected the premise that a state of nature or a state of mutual
war and violence ever existed. He argued that pondering whether or not these
extremes ever did exist is neither here nor there, since men are "necessarily born in
a family-society, at least; and are trained up by their parents to some rule of
conduct and behaviour".31 In reality, "[T]he common situation of society," Hume
stated, "is a medium amidst all these extremes". We are quite understandably
guided by our own self-interest, yet also are capable of "learning the advantage of
more equitable conduct".32 To avoid destructive forms of competition, we institute
conventions of justice that establish rights for individuals and that protect the
common interest. These rules are not devised for completely rational, completely
sympathetic, or completely benevolent persons, but for typical members of society
who are limited in rationality, sympathy, and benevolence.
29
Hume, Enquiry, p. 84.
30
Hume, Enquiry, p. 86.
31
Hume, Enquiry, p. 88.
32
Hume, Enquiry, p. 87.
82
Hume thus maintained that the motivation behind justice, and all other artificial
virtues, does not come from self-love, or a regard for public interest, or private
benevolence, or any universal motive, but rather from education and human
convention. The ultimate reason for justice being deemed a moral virtue was
because it serves as a central good ofmankind. The same can be said of allegiance,
laws of nations, modesty, and good-manners. "All these," according to Hume, "are
mere human contrivances for the interest of society".33 In so doing, he had swept
aside the foundations of the selfish/altruistic debate at its most fundamental level,
looking to an entirely other basis for the motivation ofman's sociable nature.34
Hume argued that, while the motivation for virtues such as justice ultimately
traces its existence back to these innate sentiments, it remains distinctly artificial
and significant. Hume maintained the primacy of our idea of justice as being
central to man's social existence. Hume also contended that "public utility is the
sole origin of justice, and that reflections on the beneficial consequences of this
virtue are the sole foundation of its merit".35 Justice is essential, "[F]or what
stronger foundation can be desired or conceived for any duty, than to observe, that
human society, or even human nature, could not subsist without the establishment
of it".36
Since utility is the sole origin of justice for Hume, he is often interpreted as a
utilitarian, that is, as one who accepts the moral theory that we are obligated to
maximize human welfare and minimize harmful outcomes in all circumstances.
However, unlike classical Utilitarianism, Hume does not develop a normative
theory in which the principle of utility reigns as the supreme foundational principle.
His theory is a descriptive explaining ofmoral approval in terms of character traits
and social practices that have utility. Utility to Hume was deemed by him to be
whatever promotes the happiness of members of society or advances the public
33
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good. He does not develop a theory about maximum aggregate public good or
about whether one system of rules is, on balance, better than another system of
rules in producing utilitarian outcomes. His reflections are centred on the
comparative value of having a system of conventional rules rather than no rules at
all.
The reason why justice is presented as an artificial virtue is because the concept
of property and the meaning of legal terms generally, are infinitely too complicated
to be natural. Since justice did not simply appear out of thin air, it must have
evolved out of another natural instinct. This instinct is identified by Hume as the
necessity of human society, which in turn is shaped by reason and custom. As a
result of this, though the virtue of justice is universal, its manifestation varies from
culture to culture. In order to help the reader understand what is meant by this,
Hume drew an analogy to houses. Though the style of houses may vary from region
to region, they all necessarily require a roof, doors, windows, etc. Likewise, laws
vary from area to area just like the design of houses; but the undercurrent of their
purpose is universal and ultimately "point all to a like end".37 Thus, the duality of
universal characteristics and cultural variations are once again drawn together in
order to point out why similar sentiments can lead to diverse forms.
While there are a host of natural virtues that have a tendency to aid society, such
as generosity, moderation, equity, meekness, etc., Hume asserted that not all of
them can be simply attributed to this source. He pointed out that many
philosophers would lump all virtues under that of social utility, and this would
make man susceptible to the effect of artifice and education, and allow for adept
politicians to attempt to manipulate and control the society. Hume countered first
that there are virtues and vices which do not have a tendency toward public
advantage. Second, Hume maintained that "had not men a natural sentiment of
approbation and blame, it cou'd never be excited by politicians; nor wou'd the
words laudable and praise-worthy, blameable and odious, be any more intelligible,
37
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than if they were a language perfectly unknown to us". As a result of this, in a
vein similar to that of Hutcheson, Hume asserted that man is naturally judgmental
and that this turn reveals a fundamental element of man's ethical character.
The account of justice proffered by Hume is conventionalist. That is, moral
rules, institution and practices arise and gain acceptability through social
arrangement. Conventions in Hume's sense need not only involve explicit consent,
promise or social contract but rather are rules almost all members of society follow
in an almost all circumstances. In order for a conception of justice to arise, it
requires a background framework of publicly accepted rules that are inlaid in the
social mosaic of expected behaviours. Every person who follows the rules
understands that the interests of everyone in society are advanced by conformity to
these rules. People signal to others that they are willing to behave in certain ways
when they realise that everyone will benefit from those forms of conduct. As
stability, reciprocity, and trust grow, conventions are strengthened and their social
utility increase.
Hume appeared to have concluded that as we are all born of man and woman,
one comes into a pre-existing mini-society. Due to this fact, rules of mutual
interaction immediately must arise. As this family begins to join and interact with
other families, these rules enlarge themselves to encompass the scope of this new
interaction. And so the process continues in ever expanding circles of influence
and increasing reinforcement of those fundamental elements that make such inter¬
personal cohesion possible. As a consequence, "[Hjistory, experience, reason
sufficiently instruct us in this natural progress of human sentiments, and in the
gradual enlargement of our regards to justice, in proportion as we become
OQ
acquainted with the extensive utility of that virtue".
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It is in this manner, Hume crucially concludes, that our conceptions of all virtue
and vice come to be established. The longer this process continues, the more our
sense ofmorality is refined. Hume noted that, "the more we habituate ourselves to
an accurate scrutiny of morals, the more delicate feeling do we acquire of the most
minute distinctions between vice and virtue. Such frequent occasion, indeed, have
we, in common life, to pronounce all kinds of moral determinations, that no object
of this kind can be new or unusual to us; nor could any false views or
prepossessions maintain their ground against an experience, so common and
familiar".40 It is through experience that we acculturate ourselves to the moral
standards within the community. In so doing, we refine our ability to apply these
common standards to such an extent that they begin to accommodate the whole
range of societal norms. This occurs to such a degree, that our 'prepossessions',
namely, our internal sentiments, can be deemed justly subservient to these general
criteria.
What is evident here is Hume's insistence that we enter into a pre-existing
social universe from birth. Even at the level of family, fundamental concepts such
as justice, custom, common experience, and rules of language use are assumed to
pre-exist. By adopting this framework, the need to hypothesise about the possible
extremes of human experience is pointless. The individual need not try to theorise
his existence from these abstract principles, but rather can devote his energy and
reason toward integrating himself into the society which exists in reality around
him. In order effectively to do this, he simply must partake in social interaction.
Here again, then, we see Hume dismissing the selfish/altruistic debate as irrelevant
to the reality ofman in the here and now.
Hume opined that in society we first leam the advantages of moral conventions
and positive laws that secure rights in liberty and property. He portrayed these
conventions as being shared attitudes, not necessarily articulated or formalised, that
enable members of a society to complete common goals. We then abide by these
40
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conventions because they establish mutually beneficial arrangements. These
arrangements establish our expectations of others, and the failure to conform to
these expectations is grounds for disapprobation, condemnation, and blame.
Obligations are established by the rules of expected behaviour. In both the
Treatise and the Enquiry, Hume offered an analogy to multiple oarsmen who are
motivated by a commonly accepted convention to pull a boat efficiently without the
existence of any formal contact or promise, because doing so is in their mutual
interest. Once conventions are in place, obligations (to row, to act justly) exist and
must be discharged even if we find then inconvenient, arduous, or displeasing. A
person cannot escape the obligation to keep a promise merely by appealing to
personal desires, plans, interests, or beliefs. Such personal pursuits do not validly
override a promise. An obligation to keep the promise exists whenever the person
says 'I promise' and means it, because in this act of speech the person wills and
assumes the obligation. We can generalise this account of social obligation as
follows. Obligation ultimately derives from social expectations and conventions;
blame and disapproval follow from disappointments of social expectations and
violation of conventions. This is the origin of obligation and accounts for its
normative force.
In Hume's effort to illustrate how the conventions come to be formulated and
established, Hume ultised analogies to language. Hume asserted:
Nor is the rule concerning the stability of possession the less deriv'd
from human conventions, that it arises gradually, and acquires force
by a slow progression, and by our repeated experiences of the
inconveniences of transgressing it. On the contrary, this experience
assures us still more, that the sense of interest has become common
to all our fellows, and gives us a confidence of the future regularity
of their conduct: And 'tis only on the expectation of this, that our
moderation and abstinence are founded. In like manner are
language gradually establish'd by human convention without any
55 41
promise .
This example was once again referenced by Hume, who noted that vocal language
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was "gradually established by human conventions without any promise".42 These
references can, and were, utilised by Hume to help illustrate his premise and make
them readily accessible to the reader. The ability to make such an analogy to a
readily accessible convention experienced in everyday life is simple enough.
Language, being the primary medium of interpersonal communication between
individuals, particularly relating to 'higher' more complicated elements of man's
interaction with his fellow man. It is clear that Hume realised this, and utilised
language in order to illustrate this point.
However, the role of language as a tool within Hume's theory on the
development of man's moral and sociable nature does not simply end at simple
analogy. In Hume's efforts to come to an understanding of human nature, in line
with his methodological assumptions that held custom, prejudice and everyday
interaction as the key to unlocking these truths, Hume went on to use references to
language to support, illustrate, and justify his philosophical conclusions.
Expanding beyond mere analogy, a close reading of Hume's works reveal
multifarious efforts on his part to utilise language to illustrate the human truths that
lay behind our everyday assumptions and expectations when we interact within a
given society.
Hume argued that moral distinctions are not derived from nature, but rather
from artifice; an artifice, however, that is built upon man's natural ability to adopt
and develop such an artifice. Hume contended that, "nature provides a remedy in
the judgment and understanding, for what is irregular and incommodious in the
affections".43 The manifestation of this remedy, however, arises when men leam
via "their early education in society" and have become, "sensible of the infinite
advantages that result from it".44 Hume stated: "The shortest experience of society
discovers them to every mortal; and when each individual perceives the same sense
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of interest in all his fellows, he immediately performs his part of any contract, as
being asur'd that they will not be wanting in theirs. All of them, by concert, enter
into a scheme of actions, calculated for common benefit, and agree to be true to
their word; nor is there any thing requisite to form this concert or convention, but
that every one have a sense of interest in the faithful fulfilling of engagements, and
express that sense to other members of the society".45 Hume was quick to note that
this ability to follow their natural proclivity and to couple with it the utilitarian
artificial construct is closely associated with the need for the individual to "have
besides acquir'd a new affection to company and conversation".46
That the understanding of artificial virtue develops in association with language
seems to have been important to Hume, because both were judged by him to be
derived from human convention. Human convention, that is, which in turn taps
into the desire of individuals to communicate accurately their sentiments to others.
It is on this basis that the materials for the construction of both man's conception of
virtue and language itself took place. As with language, the process of learning to
communicate adequately the precepts of human virtues developed by trial and error
over time, through the 'inconveniences' of its transgression. The inconvenience
rests in the inability to partake accurately in the medium of exchange within the
larger community. As with the misuse or wrong interpretation ofwords, the misuse
or wrong interpretation of what is or is not virtuous causes one to become isolated
from those around him. So too, if one fails to maintain predictability in discourse
or fails in the requirement that correct signs be made as are necessary, one cannot
partake in the linguistic or moral universe of the community.
What is it then about the nature ofjustice and language that allows it to form the
groundwork upon which this utility argument is laid? It becomes clear within the
Enquiry that Hume was aware of the degree to which legal obligations mirror the
implicit agreement between members of a linguistic group regarding
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communication in general. It is his account of the fundamental relationship
between these two processes that we shall now explore. Closely coupled in
Hume's mind with this idea of social utility in relation to justice, is the
corresponding utility demonstrated in interpersonal interaction. Hume argued that
as the oppositions of interest and self-love can be constrained by the establishment
of a system ofjustice, in like manner the 'eternal contrarieties' ofmen in company
can be managed through the promotion of polite conversation and manners. Like
justice, the ultimate utility of the promotion of conversation for the betterment of
society is clear, though those who participate in it may not directly realize that they
are promoting social utility themselves. Lastly, not only is society at large served
by the institution of justice and polite conversation, but also those who participate,
the individuals who are seen to promote both, are judged by society at large to be
virtuous people. The clear correlation between the utility of justice and the utility
of polite conversation for making a functioning society is lucidly and concisely
spelled out in this passage, and it seems clear that the combination of both were
seen as central to a smoothly functioning social order. (See Appendix A)
The correlation between justice and language within Hume's writings took on
more legalistic forms as well. Hume asserted in a footnote that in order for a legal
obligation to be entered into, it must be expressed by words or signs.47 Though this
may seem self-evident, the use of language as the medium of legal obligation
carries along with it all the obligations of linguistic convention as well. In a very
real sense, the legal standards of contract simply mirror what is assumed in
everyday speech, that each party is acting honestly and that the nature of the item in
question is seen in the same way by both parties. Legal contractual language is
merely a formal expression of what we all implicitly assume in our daily
interaction. Hume seemed to have picked up on this point and developed it in his
discussion of justice.
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Hume stated that, "[T]he expression being once brought in as subservient to the
will, soon becomes the principle part of the promise; nor will a man be less bound
by his word, though he secretly give a different direction to his intention, and
withhold the assent of his mind".48 Here we see the fundamental premises of
linguistic convention spelled out in a legalistic form. Though the meeting of the
minds is the ideal, the only means by which an individual has for accessing
another's mind, and thus their intentions, is through language. Since the honesty
and sincerity of that statement must be assumed for any legal system, or linguistic
system, to have validity, the spoken word is held to be binding over the individual's
internal intent or assent. If this were not presumed, legal or verbal interaction
could not take place. Thus, the justification for this rather harsh penalty for
miscommunication is based upon the trust and reliance of the other party who
based his own decisions on the veracity of the individual whose intent is ultimately
wanting.
If the other party, however, in any way feels that the communication he or she
receives is somehow lacking in clear and honest intent, then there in no longer an
assumption that the statement made is binding. "But though the expression makes,
on most occasions, the whole of the promise," Hume proceeded, "yet it does not
always so; and one who should make use of any expression, of which he knows the
meaning, and which he uses without any sense of the consequences, would not be
bound ... it is necessary, that the words be a perfect expression of the will, without
any contrary signs".49 If for any reason the other party sees signs that there is a
lack of understanding between them, then he is put on notice that a
miscommunication might be occurring. In such an instance the other party is
effectively put on notice that the other individual is somehow failing to convey a
clear intent via his communication. In such a situation, the lack of a clear 'meeting
of the minds' is evident within the public realm. Since the binding obligation is
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meant to exist only through the sincere belief in the reliability of the spoken word
or actions, in such a case there is no obligation because this belief is not legitimate.
This does not extend, however, to situations where the individual is attempting
to deceive the other person. Hume cautioned, "[N]ay, even this we must not carry
so far as to imagine, that one, whom, by our quickness of understanding, we
conjecture, from certain signs, to have an intention of deceiving us, is not bound by
his expression or verbal promise, if we accept of it; but must limit this conclusion
to those cases where the signs are of a different nature from those of deceit". In the
case of deception, the goals of truth and honesty in the communication of intent are
clearly violated from the beginning. Again, both the entire system of law and
communication in general, are undermined if one party does not intend honestly to
enter into an understanding and agreement with another. In line with this, Hume
concluded by saying that, "empty words alone, without any meaning or intention in
the speaker, can never be attended with any effect".50
Thus, the 'rules' of legal engagement are generally the same as those of social
engagement. Both are dependent on language and signs to convey intent, and both
rely on clear interpretation and honest intent on the part of all parties. The
importance of justice merely reflects the centrality of honest communication more
generally. If the utility of justice was seen by Hume as the very foundation of
society, this was in no small part due to the fact that the law embodies the more
general conventions reflecting social norms which are assumed by him to be
present in all language use.
Given this framework, it becomes apparent that Hume's discussion of justice in
the Enquiry builds on the assumptions first put forward in the Treatise. Hume
depicted Justice as the archetypal example of a social virtue. Created out of man's
needs, and designed to ensure that the bonds of the community can be strengthened,
justice is the very embodiment ofman's social nature. In order to achieve this lofty
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position, though, the virtue of justice is dependent on the medium of language and
assumptions embodied in it. Language is not simply the medium by which law and
justice are carried out. The necessity of truthfulness and the correlation of
sentiments sanctified in law are requisite in all inter-personal communication.
Since these characteristics are implicit in language use, the law is simply an
articulation of that assumed fact. This being the case, the central importance of the
virtue ofjustice to Hume appeared to revolve around the reality that it was the most
clear example of the force of linguistic convention in action.
Words and moral sentiments are both dependent upon our understanding of
them. The object signified by a sign in a given language must be understandable to
another individual, who must in turn, transform that sign into an internal
signification in a like manner to that of the first individual. If a moral system is not
likewise grounded in a standardised set of 'signifying' signs relating to specific
sentiments, it would lack any ability to conceive of virtue or vice. It therefore
appears that Hume too assumed at this point the implicit connection drawn by
Hutcheson between the use of language and the confirmation of a universal ethical
nature.
While the natural inclination to exchange sentiments with others must exist, it
served as merely the impetus of such an interchange. Ultimately, it is the accurate
communication and interpretation of the external signs that dictate this process.
Hume states, "I say, first, that a promise is not intelligible naturally, nor antecedent
to human conventions; and that a man, unacquainted with society, could never
enter into any engagements with another, even tho' they could perceive each
other's thoughts by intuition. If I promise to be natural and intelligible, there must
be some act of the mind attending these words, I promise', and on this act of the
mind must the obligation depend".51 If an individual makes a promise, the speech
act follows certain conventions that normally arouse an expectation in the audience
that the individual will perform the promised act. That it does so makes the
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individual's speech act a promise, even if that person means to break it. Likewise,
since certain conventions normally convey attitudes, evaluative expressions are
among these conventional vehicles of communication. Because these represent
conventions of the language, the audience normally understands the individual to
52
have the corresponding attitudes, regardless of whether he actually does so or not.
Hume supported this contention with the following analogy, "the external form of
words, being mere sound, require an intention to make them have any efficacy; and
that this intention being once consider'd as a requisite circumstance, its absence
must equally prevent the effect, whether avow'd or conceal'd, whether sincere or
deceitful".53
What becomes evident is that Hume saw language itself as serving the same
utilitarian role as his primary virtue, justice. While Hume admitted that "it is
certain, that, wherever we go, whatever we reflect on or converse about, everything
still presents us with the view of human happiness or misery, and excites in our
breasts a sympathetic movement of pleasure or uneasiness54 Hume did not try to
deny that we react in such a manner, nor that such reactions are part of what makes
us human, but what he did argue was that we must have a societal concern beyond
these immediate instinctive responses, and only in this manner can we enter into
the realm of morality. For general principles of humanity, "must, at all times, have
some authority over our sentiments, and give us a general approbation of what is
useful to society, and blame of what is dangerous and pernicious. The degrees of
these sentiments may be the subject of controversy, but the reality of their
existence, one should think, must be admitted in every theory and system."55
Not denying the influence, or indeed human importance, of the sympathetic
mechanism, he nevertheless came to stress how and why we live as social and
moral beings. He stated, "[Sjympathy, we must allow, is much fainter than our
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concern for ourselves, and sympathy with persons remote from us much fainter
than that with persons near or contiguous; but for this very reason it is necessary for
us, in our calm judgements and discourse concerning the character of men, to
neglect all differences, and render our sentiments more public and social".56 For
Hume, to be moral was to be social, and to be social was to be moral. As a result,
he moved to centre stage social utility and convention as the foundation of all
moral sentiments, and in so doing could assert that "we are always inclined, from
our natural philanthropy, to give preference to the happiness of society, and
consequently to virtue above the opposite."57
Hume's placing of societal utility and convention at the centre of his moral
theory, necessarily requires that one distance himself from an immediate
sympathetic or purely self-interested act and, instead, engages in a common
medium of accepted social standards. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to
stand back and make a judgement as to what "corrects the inequalities of our
internal emotions and perceptions".58 The reason why this is so important is that:
[wjithout such a correction of appearances, both in internal and
external sentiment, men could never think or talk steadily on any
subject; while their fluctuating situations produce a continual
variation on objects, and throw them into such different and contrary
light and positions, [new paragraph] The more we converse with
mankind, and the greater social intercourse we maintain, the more
shall we be familiarised to these general preferences and
distinctions, without which our conversation and discourse could
scarcely be rendered intelligible to each other. Every man's interest
is peculiar to himself, and the aversions and desires, which result
from it, cannot be supposed to affect others in a like degree.
General language, therefore, being formed for general use, must be
moulded on some more general views, and must affix the epithets of
praise or blame, in conformity to sentiments, which arise from the
general interest of the community.59
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Here we see evidenced the role of language and language use within Hume's
theory, the means by which one comes to understand, transmit and modify
communal moral conventions.
Hume did not go so far as to eliminate the idea of innate sentiments and their
associated reactions. Rather, he attempted to distinguish them from the socialised
conception of what is deemed virtuous. These virtues are identifiable by, and
through, the medium of linguistic conventions. "But tho' this self-interested
commerce of men begins to take place, and to predominate in society," Hume
argued, "it does not entirely abolish the more generous and noble intercourse of
friendship and good offices. I may still do services to such persons as I love, and
am more particularly acquainted with, without any prospect of advantage; and they
may make me a return in the same manner, without any view but that of
recompensing my past services." In order, therefore, to distinguish these two
different sorts of commerce, the interested and the disinterested, Hume goes on to
immediately point out that there is "a certain form of words invented for the
former, by which we bind ourselves to the performance of any action. This form of
words constitutes what we call a promise, which is the sanction of the interested
commerce ofmankind".60
This being the case, it is at this point in Hume's theory that he points out that the
signs themselves can take on qualities that are very much independent of the
underlying sentiments. "They are the conventions of men," Hume asserted,
"which create a new motive, when experience has taught us, that human affairs
wou'd be conducted much more for mutual advantage, were there certain symbols
or signs instituted, by which we might give each other security of our conduct in
any particular incident. After the meaning of these signs become widely
recognised, whomever uses them is immediately bound by his interests to execute
his engagements, and must never expect to be trusted any more, if he refuses to
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perform what he promis'd".61 It is the need to build this atmosphere of trust and
reliability that necessitates the curbing of the natural sentiments in line with these
expectations. As a result, Hume at this point reiterated that a promise must be
expressed in "words or signs, in order to impose a tye upon any man".62 Due to the
binding and mutual obligation of the contractual relationship, even if the
individual's internal intention differs from the expressed; he is still bound by his
word as long as the original intent to be bound was present in the first place.
At the conclusion of his discussion of the artificial virtues, Hume summarised
his findings that justice and the other artificial virtues are ultimately shaped by,
"[P]ublic interest, education, and the artifice ofpoliticians".62 While we may feel
no instinctive moral obligation toward such matters, we do have the capacity either
to "surmount or elude" these qualms. In order to do this we "feign a new act of the
mind, which we call the willing an obligation; and on this we suppose the morality
to depend. But we have prov'd already, that there is no such act of the mind, and
consequently that promises imposed no natural obligation". In the end, Hume
still maintained that the two key elements of binding moral intercourse must be
met, namely, the correlation of internal intent and the external expression of that
intent. Yet with creation of the conception of what is or not virtuous through
linguistic convention, the necessity of this dual relation between the thing signified
and the signifier is quite remote from its initial characterisation.
In order to avoid claims of scepticism, Hume once again presented his
recurring assertion that moral conventions are ultimately founded on innate
characteristics inherent in all men. He accomplished this once again through a
discussion of linguistic convention. In order to do so, Hume must first avoid the
sceptical argument which dictates that moral distinctions simply arise from
education rather than from an innate sense of utility, and were thus invented
61
Hume, Treatise, p. 575.
62
Hume, Treatise, p. 575.
63
Hume, Treatise, p. 575.
64
Hume, Treatise, p. 575.
97
afterward through being encouraged, "by the art of politicians, in order to render
men tractable, and subdue their natural ferocity and selfishness, which incapacitates
them for society"65 Hume was willing to admit that education has a very powerful
influence not only on shaping the sentiments, but also in the creation of new
sentiments. "But that all moral affection or dislike arises from this origin," asserted
Hume, "will never surely be allowed by any judicious enquirer. Had nature made
no such distinction, found on the original constitution of the mind, the words,
honourable and shameful, lovely and odious, noble and despicable, had never had a
place in any language; nor could politicians, had they invented these terms, ever
have been able to render them intelligible, or make them convey an idea to the
audience".66 Hume argued that there must always remain an underlying connection
to the innate sentiments, a 'natural beauty and amiableness' in relation to the social
virtues which are felt even among 'uninstructed mankind'. If this were not the
case, then man would have no motivation to express them in language, let alone
adapt and manipulate them.
Significantly, the reality revealed by linguistic convention strikes the balance
between the theoretical dilemma faced by Hume regarding the relationship between
reason and the sentiments. As this relates to the immediacy associated with
sentiments, Hume maintained that his familiarity with language allows an
individual to recognise instantly both 'estimable and blameable' qualities. This
ability to make judgements almost immediately, and to determine merit and
demerit, is seen as essential if moral judgements are truly going to touch human
nature. Thus, an individual 'without any reasoning' is able to determine instantly
the moral nature of an act. The instinctive ability to use language, and the
associated recognized meaning - in this case moral, further ensures that these
judgments are easily accessible.
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For an act cannot qualify as virtuous unless they had already been widely
approved, creating a 'general opinion' in society. To deem that someone has acted
virtuously requires a social history through which the character traits we
denominate virtues have been distinguished from other character traits. To
ascertain whether we have appropriate moral responses in particular cases, Hume
says we must place our sentiments, our approvals, preferences, recommendations
and the like, into the public arena to see if impartial persons concur. Only then can
we reliably discover whether we 'touch a string, to which all mankind have an
accord'. Whereas virtue requires a history ofpublic approbation, the mere property
of being truthful does not. Hume's thesis is that character traits such as honesty
cannot qualify as virtues unless there has been a history of approbation by impartial
observers; but once that history is in place, it is irrelevant whether observers
actually notice that a person is virtuous.
To guarantee that this is not simply a relativistic individual determination, which
would negate the essential public nature of morality, Hume pointed out the simple
fact that language is communal and uniform within a given society. Drawing
correlations to linguistic convention instantly ensures Hume's conception of
morality is more predictable, definite and fixed, thus freeing it from the
intractability of individual experiences and sentiments. By drawing a nexus to
language use, Hume places moral judgement not so much in the hands of the
experiences of single individuals, but rather in the shared experiences of the society
in which they live. It also allows them to have an independent standard of
judgement, fixed in linguistic usage, by which to judge their own personal moral
actions.
Through Hume's use of linguistic convention, morality is depicted as a public
rather than a private matter, free of any claims of moral scepticism or individual
introspection occurring in isolation from the communal standards which exist
around them. It would seem impossible, given Hume's assumptions, that one could
even participate in the act of speaking without making judgments based upon these
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standards. On a grander scale, language itself could not exist, according to this
premise, without the mass of humanity having a large degree of conforming
sentiments from which distinctions are made. Freed from the shackles of moral
scepticism, language can be seen as the antithesis of this problem, a social
phenomenon that is both predictable and immediately accessible. The moral
standards of a given society are founded not by the experience of any one
individual, but instead by the communal experience of sentiments. This communal
conception in turn provides a sounding board for the individual in making his or
her moral judgements.
How is this judgment to be made? In Hume's opinion, it could be most easily
accomplished by utilising the existing moral norms discoverable in the linguistic
conventions of the society in which individuals find themselves. Hume stated that:
"The very nature of language guides us almost infallibly in forming a judgement of this
nature; and as every tongue possesses one set of words which are taken in a good sense,
and another in the opposite, the least acquaintance with the idiom suffices, without any
reasoning, to direct us in collecting and arranging the estimable or blameable qualities of
men. The only object of reasoning is to discover the circumstances on both sides, which
are common to these qualities; to observe that particular in which the estimable qualities
agree on the one hand, and the blameable on the other; and thence to reach the foundation
of ethics, and find those universal principles, from which all censure or approbation is
ultimately derived".67 Hume therefore recognised that man participates in a society in
which a linguistic framework already exists. This existing pattern of language use
allows anyone who is familiar with that language to participate instantly in the
existing moral universe.
However, though man may very well come into a world in which pre-existing
moral and social norms are enshrined and embodied in linguistic convention, it still
remains to be explained why these norms exist in the first place. Hume therefore
turned to his attention to why social and moral norms take the form they do. It is at
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this juncture that Hume made the crucial connection between the utility of these
norms within a given society and the role of linguistic convention in supporting this
process.
As we have seen, Hume was anxious to ensure that his explanation of human
morality still retained the idea that actual sentiments are exchanged between
individuals. Though our judgment of others ultimately rests on what we can take in
by external signs, Hume at this point still maintained, much in keeping with his
previous discussion of the passions and sympathy, that there must be an accurate
correlation between these signs and the sentiment which lies behind them, if their
interpretation by another was deemed to be legitimate: "Tis evident that when we
praise any actions, we regard only the motives that produced them, and consider the
action as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper. The
external performance has no merit. We must look within to find the moral quality.
This we cannot do directly; and therefore fix our attention on actions, as on external
signs. But these actions are still considered as signs; and the ultimate object of our
praise and approbation is the motive, that produc'd them".68
It was Hume's contention that virtuous motives are always necessary to make an
action virtuous. "In short," Hume stated, "it may be establish'd as an undoubted
maxim, that no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human
nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality".69 It is
also clear that Hume was anxious to keep his idea rooted in man's innate character.
This was perhaps an effort to avoid accusations of moral scepticism when he
ultimately introduced his correcting mechanism. This grounding in man's nature is
judged by Hume to be essential in the formation ofman's character, and he rebuffs
any claim that these fundamental characteristics can be fundamentally altered by
man, and rather quips that only 'omnipotence' could ever 'new-mould the human
mind' away from this set course. But while these 'inherent principles and passions
of human nature' cannot be made anew, Hume recognises almost in the same
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breath that those that do exist can be moulded by man to take various courses. For
example, Hume argued that it would be impossible for 'moralist or politicians' to
ever make any ground in changing the 'fundamental articles' of man toward the
public interest. What is open to them, however, is to bend those existing human
characteristics as they find them into a 'new direction' and teach how we can
satisfy our needs by shaping them in a certain proscribed manner, convincing the
individual in question that it is in their best interest, and in the end, better for the
society as a whole.70 It is clear that Hume conceived of the individual's natural
sentiments as open to alteration, and that this fact opened the door for an
explanation as to how this alteration could be accomplished. In one motion, Hume
was able to stress the fact that the sentiments at the root of social interaction are
inherent and inalterable on the grand scale, but at the same time was able to push
home his contention that within the available spectrum of human temperament,
man is open to control and alteration of these sentiments in the hands of society
forces,
Having admitted that the natural sentiments were alterable, he next conceded
that for this to occur, an individual need not in all instances be moved by innate
sentiments. For example, an individual may perform an action not from a naturally
arising virtuous motive, but rather from a certain sense of duty, either to habituate
himself into such moral motivation, or at least "disguise to himself, as much as
possible, his want of it".7 Granting this concession, Hume was quick to tie this
notion to his conception of the innate effect that such an action still had, and to the
fact that though the sign did not actually represent the thing signified, the observer
still felt some moral approbation.
Hume also appeared to maintain that the simple fact that the individual's
attempting to act in a moral manner out of duty, in itself, has some sort of moral
beauty. He stated, "[AJctions are at first only consider'd as signs of motives: But
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'tis usual, in this case, as in all others, to fix our attention on the signs, and neglect,
in some measure, the thing signified. But tho', on some occasions, a person may
perform an action merely out of regard to its moral obligation, yet still this
supposes in human nature some distinct principles, which are capable of producing
the action, and whose moral beauty renders the action meritorious".7 Having
acknowledged that at times the sign used by an individual may not necessarily have
correlated with the actual passion the person felt, Hume maintained that this act
somehow tapped into other, more indirect, sentiments.
With the introduction of the ability to signify to another in a manner that only
indirectly triggers feelings of virtuousness, Hume went on to "apply all this to the
73 •
present case". Having not only introduced the idea that one can separate
signification from the sentiments an individual immediately holds, but also that this
process can still be deemed virtuous, he went on to argue that the development of
conception of virtue would be completely unintelligible if our judgment of virtue
revolved around a simple innate sympathy mechanism. Having established the
legitimacy of this contention, Hume still had to demonstrate the way in which we
come to habituate ourselves into this pattern of action in the formation and
legitimisation of the artificial virtues.
Hume does not seem to mean that we must actually experience feelings of
approbation or disapprobation whenever we make a moral judgement about a
person's virtue. He apparently means that the actions and character traits that we
call virtuous would not qualify as virtuous unless they had already been widely
approved, creating a 'general opinion' in society. To designate someone as having
a virtue requires a social history through which the character traits we denominate
virtues have been distinguished from other character traits, such as ingenuity and
endurance.
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4. Hume on the Formation of Moral Standards
Given this, Hume proffered an explanation as to how we go about adjusting our
moral sentiments in order to avoid our natural tendency to act prejudicial and
sympathise more with those closest to us. He stated that this ability is "the easiest
matter in the world to account for", and was demonstrated by the fact that the
closeness or remoteness of sympathetic connection is in constant flux. Hume held
that all sentiments of praise and blame vary according to the particulars of a given
situation. One's nearness or remoteness to the object being judged affects our
passions in such a manner as if "we remained in one point of view".74 But in
judging these situations, we cannot use a fixed point of view as a basis for moral
judgement. A fixed point of view is by its very nature a biased point of view, and it
is Hume's fundamental dilemma to explain how we transform our reactions from
such a fixed, prejudiced and individual point of view into such a form as to
effectively make a moral judgement. This necessitates the existence of a neutral,
social, and recognised medium of judgment to overcome not only the inability of
communication of the sentiment without such a medium, but also the inability to
make a legitimate moral judgement.
This dilemma is not only true of sympathy, but of every other interaction
between an individual and the world around him. It is in man's general ability to
make these corrections in everyday life via language that Hume found the useful in
illustrating and substantiating his claims about the way the correction of the
sentiments takes place. The fact that an individual in every aspect of his life
constantly has to adjust his unique perspective to make sense of the world means
that the adjustment of the sentiments takes place in a similar manner. Hume stated,
"[Bjesides, every particular man has a peculiar position with regard to others; and
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'tis impossible we cou'd ever converse together on any reasonable terms, were each
of us to consider characters and persons, only as they appear from his peculiar point
of view".75
Here again we see the connection made by Hume between language and
morals. It seems clear that Hume was not merely claiming that the development of
moral character was analogous to language, but rather that, without the medium of
language, we could not create the moral universe in the first place. If we were not
able to remove ourselves and actively participate in the larger world, via language,
no neutral human interaction could take place. Hume's theory not only depended
on the simple fact that human beings communicate through speech, but that the
creation of a language through the faculty of speech enshrines within it the
neutrality, predictability, and communal acceptance so necessary to a working
system of morals. Thus, his theory not only adopts the use, but also the essential
qualities of language, "[I]n order, therefore, to prevent those continual
contradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of things," Hume stated, "we
fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place
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ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation".
The need for the introduction of such a corrective mechanism brought Hume's
discussion of language to the fore. For example, we see in the final pages of the
Treatise's examination ofmorals a closely strung series of references to language.77
It appears in these closing stages of this work that Hume came to realise the
importance of language as a means by which any commonly held medium of
exchange would necessarily have to take on the structure of linguistic convention.
For Hume, the role of language in relation to the progression of moral sense
extended far beyond mere analogy. For without the ability of interpersonal
communication through a common medium, two individuals could never be sure
whether or not they were talking about the same perception of virtue.
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In addition, for this communication of the sentiments to take place, there must
be some agreement as to what shall be held to be true. Thus, trust is necessary for
the possibility of communication.78 That an individual can expect others to use
terms as he or she uses them requires that these terms have the same reference for
all the speakers of a language. This means that the same criteria must be used for
identifying the same reference and also that there will be agreement that if a term
applies correctly to an item, then that item must satisfy the criteria. Not only must
there be agreement in this belief, but there must also be a determination to retain
this belief even in the face of apparent conflicts with the passions. This
determination is at least partly grounded in the realisation that it is necessary to
retain the mutual trust and expectation that others will use expressions as we do.
The ability of some individual's to relate to each other in such a manner assumes
that there is some tacit agreement to accept as true a statement when and only when
that specific sign is used. In other words, if the sign is to stand for anything, there
is a necessity for a conventional acceptance of certain beliefs within the society in
which it is used.
Based on these conditions, Hume critically went on to assert, "[Experience
soon teaches us this method of correcting our sentiments, or at least, of correcting
our language, where the sentiments are more stubborn and inalterable".79 At this
point, it would seem that Hume had turned his fundamental premise as to the
correlation between the passions, sympathy and morals on its head. Having
defended for so long the necessary correlation between the actual sentiment being
felt and the true signification of that sentiment, it would seem that he now
maintained that it is the words themselves which carry the moral approbation. The
use of the words 'stubborn' and 'inalterable' would seem to imply that the natural
reaction is, if not wrong, somehow lacking in legitimacy in relation to socially
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might merely pay lip service to communal moral standards. A moral determination
could not be made in such a situation. What appears to be implied by this
statement is that during the course of socialisation, one will at times have to act in a
manner that conforms to the societal rules of morality, without necessarily
correlating with one's own sentiments.
Hume continued, "[S]uch corrections are common with regard to all the senses;
and indeed 'twere impossible we cou'd ever make use of language, or communicate
our sentiments to one another, did we not correct the momentary appearances of
things, and overlook our present situation".80 Here Hume acknowledged the fact
that it is necessary for individuals to use signs in the same way, for otherwise, it
would be impossible for anyone to understand how that sign was being used. Ifwe
break away from this commonly recognised medium, it would have serious
repercussions upon our ability to understand what others are talking about.
This procedure crucially does not require that any speaker actually has the
attitude in question, but only that this would be the attitude conveyed. According
to conventions of the language, he would be taken as intending others to understand
him to have this attitude. If he does not in fact have these sentiments, he may very
well be violating his own passions; nevertheless, by uttering the sentence he did in
the given circumstances, he used the conventions of language to instil in the other
person a belief that he did indeed have that attitude, even if he in fact did not. Due
to the nature of the conventions of language, the audience understands the speaker
to have the corresponding attitudes, whether or not the individual actually does.
Hume maintained that, in the end, while the internal modification of our
sentiments might not be possible, this inability does not affect the medium ofmoral
exchange itself. He stated that the "passions do not always follow our corrections;
but these corrections serve sufficiently to regulate our abstract notions, and are
alone regarded, when we pronounce in general concerning the degrees of vice and
80
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virtue". The next sentence immediately continued:
'Tis observ'd by critics, that all words or sentences, which are
difficult to the pronunciation, are disagreeable to the ear. There is
no difference, whether a man hear them pronounc'd or read them
silently to himself. When I run over a book with my eye, I imagine I
hear it all; and also, by the force of imagination, enter into the
uneasiness, which the delivery of it wou'd give the speaker. The
uneasiness is not real; but as such a composition of words has a
natural tendency to produce it, this is sufficient to affect the mind
with a painful sentiment, and render the discourse harsh and
disagreeable. 'Tis a similar case, where any real quality is, by
accidental circumstances, render'd impotent, and is depriv'd of its
natural influence on society.82
The utilisation of this analogy to language to illustrate and substantiate his claim
regarding how we see the nature of virtue and vice playing out in the society is a
good example of what Hume appears to be doing with reference to his moral
theory. Words and language are presented in this situation as a useful and easily
accessible means of validating his contentions regarding how the sentiments of the
individual are moved. Going beyond this, it seems that there is room to argue that
the realm of language and the realm of morals were both so tied to human
convention, that the structure and limitations of the former shed light onto the
structure and limitations of the latter.
Hume seemingly was confident that ultimately we engage in what amounts to a
societal 'language' ofmoral discourse, even though at times our internal sentiments
may contradict it. He noted: "The seeming tendencies of objects affect the mind:
And the emotions they excite are of a like species with those, which proceed from
the real consequences of objects, but their feeling is different. Nay, these emotions
are so different in their feeling, that they may often be contrary, without destroying
each other. ... The imagination adheres to the general views of things, and
distinguishes the feelings they produce, from those which arise from our particular
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and momentary situation".83 Thus, Hume came to the realisation that if individuals
are to be able to communicate with each other, they must agree on the truthful use
of the medium of personal exchange. Otherwise, without such fixed points of
agreement, they could not be sure if they were speaking of the same objects.
The ultimate establishment of the legitimacy of this moral language as the
guiding principle of personal conduct within society is openly acknowledged.
Reiterating that " 'tis impossible men cou'd ever agree in their sentiments and
judgments, unless they chose some common point of view, from which they might
survey their object, and which might cause it to appear the same to them all," Hume
once again stressed the need for a common medium of moral language. The
individual is ultimately willing to curb the instinctive sympathetic response in
favour of the security and predictability offered by such a medium. "And tho' such
interests and pleasures touch us more faintly than our own," Hume noted, "yet
being more constant and universal, they counterbalance the latter even in practice,
and are alone admitted in speculation as the standard of virtue and morality. They
alone produce that particular feeling or sentiment, on which moral distinctions
depend".84
Hume appeared to have recognised that one can justify particular moral
judgments only by means of moral principles to which one is also committed, and
obedience to which the individual would prescribe for all persons including him or
herself. As long as members of a society are committed to the same principles,
their moral beliefs can also be brought into agreement. If they do not share
common principles, however, then agreement as to moral standards could never be
reached. As Mary Gore Forrester notes in her book Moral Language, "[T]o claim
that there are truth conditions for the employment of an expression, yet deny that
these are reflected in the way that we use the expression, makes no sense. If there
are any fundamental criteria for moral tightness, the mature speakers of a given
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language will use terms for moral rightness in accordance with those criteria". 5
Hume appreciated the fundamental truth of this assertion, and judged it important
in his efforts to describe the formation and operation of the moral sense. Though
the origin and motivation behind the various forms of virtue may vary, the means
by which the essential neutral and social aspects of morality are instilled into an
individual's conception of 'virtuous behaviour' depends on his or her moral sense
conforming to generally recognized and neutral society standards, as reflected in
linguistic convention. These being the case, references to language on the part of
Hume were oft times analogies, but analogies which derived much of their validity
from the fact that moral and linguistic conventions, being conventions, largely were
constructed in a similar matter and in the end played off each other in creating
societal norms ofbehaviour.
5. The Individual's Development of Moral Consciousness
Having discussed the means by which Hume utilised references to linguistic
convention to help demonstrate how general societal standards or morality come to
be established within a social context, it remains to be seen how the individuals
themselves become socialised to accept and respond to these standards. In his
efforts to explain this process, we once again witness on the part of Hume the
utilisation of reference to conventions of language and language use. In the
Enquiry, Hume presented the fundamental steps that lead one from individual
isolation to acceptance and involvement in the wider moral community. The way
this is illustrated by Hume is through, first, the acceptance of the need for adopting
linguistic convention in order to convey the sentiments, and, second, the use of
linguistic convention to modify these sentiments. These references were the most
readily accessible means available to Hume in order to guide his reader into an
understanding of how, and by what process, an understanding of societal moral




The initial stage of this process involved the necessity of a neutral perspective
in order to communicate generally, and to transmit our sentiments more
particularly. As Hume noted, "[bjesides, that we ourselves often change our
situation in this particular, we everyday meet with persons who are in a situation
different from us, and who could never converse with us were we to remain
constantly in that position and point of view, which is particular to ourselves".86
Approaching the world from a unique and private perspective necessarily results in
the individual being isolated from his or her fellow beings. Due to the fact that
each individual's experiences, associations, and perceived sentiments are different,
one must seek out a common perspective in order to have a shared medium of
communication which allows the sentiments to be shared.
In order to accommodate this need for a common medium for exchange of
sentiment, language was enlisted by Hume to expedite the process. "The
distinction, therefore," Hume stated, "between these species of sentiments being so
great and evident, language must soon be moulded upon it, and must invent a
peculiar set of terms, in order to express those universal sentiments of censure or
approbation, which arise from humanity. ... Virtue and vice become then known;
morals are recognized; certain general ideas are framed of human conduct and
behaviour ... and by such universal principles are the particular sentiments of self-
love frequently controlled and limited".87 Hume maintained that, "[T]he intercourse
of sentiments, therefore, in society and conversation, makes us form some general
unalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of characters and
manners".88 Only through such a fixed societal standard can communication
between individuals take place and society be formed. Such a common medium of
exchange is enshrined in the linguistic conventions of that society. By allowing for
the ability to praise or blame, yet in a way relative to some sort of standardised
object of judgment, the association of moral sense with linguistic convention
results in predictable patterns of approval and disapproval. Significantly, this
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pattern of usage also accommodates the development of principles of judgment
with which to gauge personal reactions.
As evidenced in the closing pages of the Treatise, the modification of one's
individual sentiments done in order to partake in this common medium of exchange
is seen as imperative in the Enquiry. As Hume noted, "[A]nd, indeed, without such
correction of appearances, both in internal and external sentiments, men could
never even think or talk steadily on any subject".89 Only if individuals have a
common sentimental disposition can language itself be comprehensible. In order to
achieve this, individuals must do one of two things. The first option open to the
individual is willing modification their internal sentiments to match those they
judge to be in line with the dictates of linguistic convention. Alternatively, they
must be willing to resist the urging of their internal sentiments and communicate a
modification of those sentiments in order to communicate them to another in a way
consistent with linguistic convention. In either case, the individuals must make
compromises regarding their sentiments in order to participate socially with those
around them.90
Through the medium of language, and the construction of linguistic
conventions around the sentiments, man was depicted by Hume as being able to
break free of his own individual perspective and enter into a dialogue with others.
This dialogue can take place because the individuals now have a common frame of
reference. By this system, standards can be created and individual sentiments
compared to the criteria enshrined in linguistic convention and the more selfish
leanings of individual sentiments can be restrained. Thus, with the connection of
sentiments to language, there is a spontaneous and almost instant creation of a
moral universe within any society that begins to dictate individual behaviour.
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Hume, having described why it is necessary to have a medium of common
communication, and why we yield to linguistic convention in order to participate in
that medium, went on to explain how the medium itself comes to shape and refine
our moral sentiments. In order to accurately master and wholly participate in the
exchange of moral sentiments, it is necessary to engage as much as possible in the
medium of linguistic conventions within a given society. "[T]he more we
converse with mankind," Hume noted, "and the greater social intercourse we
maintain, the more shall we be familiarised to these general preferences and
distinctions, without which our conversation and discourse could scarcely be
rendered intelligible to each other".91 It is through engaging in such linguistic
discourse that we come to learn the rules of linguistic convention and, in turn, the
rules which guide the morality of a given society. Only in this way can we refine
our moral sense and adequately transmit through conversation our refined
sentiments of virtue and vice to others. Thus, the very act of speaking refines one's
ethics. In this manner participation leads to refinement, and refinement accentuates
• • • 92 •
participation. Once we engage in language use, we are immediately caught up in
the insular nature of this process ofmoral refinement.
The impact of this process in establishing social norms, as enshrined in the
linguistic conventions of that society, is profound. The homogenising affect that
this operation creates a moral universe in which general societal standards come to
take precedence over individual sentiments. Hume stated that as benevolent
concern for others is shared by all men, at least to a certain degree, "it occurs more
frequently in discourse, is cherished by society and conversation, and the blame
and approbation, consequent on it, are thereby roused from the lethargy in which
they are probably lulled, in solitary and uncultivated nature. Other passions,
though perhaps originally stronger, yet being selfish and private, are often
overpowered by its force, and yield the dominion of our breast to those social and
91
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public principles".93 Through the shaping forces of the linguistic conventions, the
moral sense of all the individuals within the society becomes not only more
uniform, but also enlivened. This is due perhaps to the fact that these efforts arouse
man's innate social character and thus quicken those instincts which otherwise lie
dormant in human beings isolated from social intercourse through conversation.
Also significant is Hume's contention that even strong personal sentiments will
usually come to heel when confronted with societal norms. Though they may be
stronger than are our more general social sentiments, they are inevitably private and
particular. Yet Hume maintained that even these sentiments are generally
overpowered by our own internal desire to conform to the general mores of the
society around us. Hume contended that even in the face of these strong and
personal sentiments, our 'own breasts' dictate that the societal and public
sentiments should hold sway. In this case, the individual is portrayed on the one
hand as falling under the influence of his personal sentiments, yet on the other as
drawing on the internalised societal sentiments, which is the ultimate basis for
repressing the former. It is the internalisation of the societal sentiments to such a
degree that they generally trump our other more innate sentiments that Hume saw
as the end result of engaging in social discourse.
This is perhaps why Hume was so keen to stress, in the main body of his work,
that with regard to the vast majority of sentiments, the communal standards
enshrined in linguistic conventions command our public selves. In line with this,
Hume noted, "[A]nd though the heart takes not part entirely with those general
notions, nor regulates all its love and hatred by the universal abstract differences of
vice and virtue, without regard to self, or the persons with whom we are more
intimately connected; yet have these moral differences a considerable influence,
and being sufficient, at least for discourse, serve all our purposes in company, in
the pulpit, on the theatre and in the schools".94 Therefore, while we may not be
generally.
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capable of completely subjugating our private sentiments, in the public realm we
must submit to the standards of the society at large. In every aspect of our common
life, we are forced to engage in a discourse with assumed standards and
expectations. It is this standard which we must work toward refining and
developing through our daily involvement in the society around us.
Though the dominance of the societal over the personal is seen as crucial in
Hume's characterisation ofmorals, as the above quote demonstrates, Hume always
allowed room for some degree of individual variation. He pointed out in a footnote
that it is natural that private connections to our fellow man should usually prevail
over our more general connection to society at large, otherwise "our affections and
actions would be dissipated and lost". Yet still, we know even in such situations
that it is often necessary to "correct these inequalities by reflection, and retain a
general standard of vice and virtue, founded chiefly on general usefulness.95 Hume
recognised here not only our own human failings in following conventional moral
rules, but also the fact that the occasional indulgence in prejudicial sentiments is a
positive thing. By giving into these feelings, we nurture not only our most personal
sentiments such as love and approbation, but also keep alive the primal sentimental
instincts upon which the social virtues are constructed. These sentiments are
naturally closer to us, and their small universal affect, which has great impact on
our own lives, are thus viewed as preferential to the general moral rules by which
we usually abide. Nevertheless, Hume cautions us not to become caught up in
them, but to maintain the prudence of following the more public standards of virtue
at times when these more immediate ones do not hold such sway.
At a more general level, however, this ability to opt out of the general moral
standards can be seen as assuring the dynamic nature necessary for moral
judgments, accounts for the idea of universal standards, while also making
concessions for the individual's free will. Since the moral universe is tied to the
society, it is, by necessary implication, not a fixed or static set of standards.
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Although one must tap into this core to partake in any meaningful moral
evaluation, this action does not necessarily prevent the forming of differences of
opinion and changing interpretations. If a true moral judgement is to be made,
there must be some degree of individual choice, no matter how slight. By tying
morality to the shared core of beliefs as evidenced in linguistic convention, Hume
left some breathing room for individual variations in interpretation. This
employment of repeated allusions to language in examining the realm ofmorals not
only help explained the dynamic nature of moral standards within a society over
time but also crucially preserved the necessity of the use of free will in moral
interpretation.
6. Potential Pitfalls of Linguistic Convention in Relation to Morals: Appendix
IV: OfSome Verbal Disputes
Though the inclusion of language in his discourse facilitated Hume's efforts to
illustrate and substantiate the formation of a moral sense, it also brought with it
some inherent difficulties. As noted in the introductory chapter, the attempt to tie
the sentiments to language was complicated by some problems inherent in the
medium of language itself. These quandaries were addressed by Hume in
Appendix IV of the Enquiry, a tract entitled: Of Some Verbal Disputes. It is here
that Hume distanced himself from the likes of the Port Royal rationalist
grammarians, and pointed out the necessity of theorising about language's relation
to morals in a much more conventionalist manner, thus highlighting Hume's
apparent effort to address the role and character of language in relation to morals.
It also represents, as we will see in Chapter VI, a tract that Thomas Reid would
take great issue.
Early in this piece Hume noted that "[NJothing is more usual than for
philosophers to encroach upon the province of grammarians; and to engage in
disputes of words, while they imagine that they are handling controversies of the
deepest importance and concern. It was in order to avoid altercations, so frivolous
and endless, that I endeavoured to state with the utmost caution the object of the
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present enquiry".96 Due to this fact, Hume was hesitant to create catalogue of
standards which attempted to apply the term virtue and vice to characteristics of
man because "some of those qualities, which I [Hume] classed among the objects
of praise, receive, in the English language, the appellation of talents, rather than of
virtues; some of the blamable or censurable qualities are often called defects, rather
than vices".97 Hume was also eager to remind the reader that the Enquiry was
neither an attempt to draw exact lines between virtue and vice nor an attempt to
explain the reasons and exact origin of such distinctions in relation to any particular
words. Hume stated, "is there any reason for being so extremely scrupulous about
• • ... QO
a word, or disputing whether they be entitled to the denomination of virtues?"
For this effort would, "prove only a grammatical enquiry,"99 something he clearly
did not see himself engaging in, nor did he consider such an effort useful.
Hume then proceeded to explain why he believes that such an undertaking was
unnecessary. First, he pointed out that in no language are the distinctions between
virtue and vice clearly drawn. Hume described how it is impossible to find one
fixed category of virtue and vice without necessarily excluding other qualities
which, given the right circumstances and perspective, are also worthy of that claim.
For example, if we say that virtue is in reality social virtue, in that the
characteristics of virtue aid society, by the very name 'social virtue', we imply that
there are other virtues outside this category. If, on the other hand, we make a
distinction between 'the heart and the head', giving more credit to the former due to
the fact that 'genuine virtue' is moved more immediately, we instantly conflict with
the worthiness of industry, frugality, temperance, etc., which are seen as virtues,
but do not move us immediately. With regard to such distinctions, Hume stated
that, "the question, being merely verbal, cannot possibly be of any importance. A
moral, philosophical discourse needs not enter into all the caprices of language,
96
Hume, Enquiry, p. 176.
97
Hume, Enquiry, p. 176.
98
Hume, Enquiry, p. 179.
99
Hume, Enquiry, p. 176.
117
which are so variable in different dialects, and in different principles".100 This
statement should not be taken as some sort of caveat in relation to the centrality of
linguistic convention in his discussion ofmorality. Rather, Hume seems to caution
that we should avoid becoming pedantic by attempting to draw strict distinctions
when it comes to virtue, nor should such distinctions be used to discredit a theory
ofmorals which lacks conformity with such rigid grammatical standards.
What Hume appeared to advocate on this front was an abandonment of an attempt
to categorise in a strict fashion what was, or was not, a virtue. Rejecting Locke's
epistemological conclusion that moral standards could and should be strictly
categorised, Hume stated that, "the ancient moralists, the best models, made no
material distinction among the different species of mental endowments and defects,
but treated all alike under the appellation of virtue and vices, and made them
indiscriminately the object of their moral reasonings".101 This statement reflects
Hume's concern with avoiding the pedagogic approach to morals, and stresses the
need to tap into the general attributes of our sentimental constitution. The key is to
focus on the general character of those things we deem virtuous. In this way "even
the moderns, where they speak naturally, hold the same language with the
• 102 • •ancients". This 'language' does not revolve around the minutia of distinctions
and categorisations, but rather around tapping into the general and universal moral
sentiments found in all men in all ages.
Hume then pointed out that the reason modern philosophers so often do not
agree with the ancients is mainly due to the negative influence of theology.
Theology, by gaining a stranglehold in ethics, has impacted on the interpretation of
virtue as it "bends every branch of knowledge to its own purpose, without much
regard to the phenomena of nature".103 As a result of this, "reasoning, and even
language, have been warped from their natural course, and distinctions have been
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endeavoured to be established where the difference of objects was, in a manner,
imperceptible" (emphasis added).104 It was Hume's contention, that the goals of
his efforts as a natural philosopher were to correct this imbalance and to return to
the more rudimentary precepts of virtue which were accurately understood by the
ancients.105
Hume next addressed what he saw as a more serious problem with the character
of language, namely, the fact that language seems incapable in the end of ever
capturing completely the subtleties of the sentiments that man wishes to convey.
As with Locke, this inherent flaw in language use presented great difficulties to
Hume. We should also note at this time, that it is on the crucial point of language
ambiguity that Adam Smith's theory of moral sentiments began to founder as well.
Hume addressed this problem quite directly by noting that, "it is no wonder that
language should not be very precise in marking the boundaries between virtues and
talents, vices and defects, since there is so little distinction in our internal
estimation of them".106
It is the difficulty in actually expressing the nuance and transient nature of our
sentiments that was seen by the Scots as presenting one of the most formidable
problems faced by those attempting to draw a correlation between language and the
expression of our internal sentiments. It is the ability to correlate the cognitive
processing ofmoral sentiments with the reality of a functional moral system within
a finite number of signifying categories that could be recognised by other
individuals handicapped by the same obstacle. Hume was obviously aware of the
problems that arose in this area, and also seemed to be at a loss to explain how our
whole range of sentiments could ever be expressed in language. For example, in
reviewing our internal sentiment of 'conscious worth', Hume stated, "this
sentiment, which, though most common of all others, has no proper name in our
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language".107 It is interesting to note, however that, in regard to this particular
\
sentiment, its very nature does not permit it to enter into, or become expressed by,
the linguistic conventions of the society. The form of reflection depicted here by
Hume is internal. For example, Hume noted that acts of foolishness, "[s]till haunt
his solitary hours, damp his most aspiring thoughts, and show him, even to himself,
in the most contemptible and most odious colours imaginable".108 Because this
sentiment never has the opportunity of entering into the public forum, and thus
having its character explained by the examination of linguistic convention, it seems
to be significant that such feelings are so difficult to translate into words. They are
not intended to be conveyed to others, but rather are internalised. As a result, we
do not have a felt need or desire to communicate them to others. Due to this fact,
they have never entered into the public domain, and thus elude attempts to
categorise them in that forum.
More generally, this point about the failings of language to express all the
nuances of the internal sentiments to the outside world is also significant. Based on
Hume's examples in this section it would seem that, though the structure is there to
be exploited in the effort to express sentiments, the individual has no option but to
utilise the system as it stands in order to form and express his sentiments.
Ultimately, Hume acknowledged the fact that the system cannot adequately provide
for the expression of all the nuances and all of the sentiments one may feel.
Hume went to some lengths to point out that, though there may be a pool of
moral understanding from which communal moral standards are drawn, the
manifestation and necessary categorisation of these sentiments will necessarily
appear at times to be rigid and unaccommodating. As we noted in the case of the
general linguistic climate of the period, Hume's linguistic link with morals left
open the idea of conflict and, ultimately, allows the individual to opt out of the
societal norm. Hume maintained that the individual takes the passion he feels into
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the marketplace of linguistic usage and this necessarily implies that the object to be
judged by the communal standard need not necessarily always, or accurately,
correspond with the general moral climate as embodied in linguistic usage. Rather,
it is an easily accessible tool by which to judge these standards. Though one can
refine the mastery of the general social mores through observation and education,
ultimately there always must be the possibility, however refined, that our personal
sentiments will not be able to be expressed.
But does this observation conflict with the general conclusions thus far drawn
between linguistic convention and Hume's utilisation of it to substantiate how man
forms moral standards? This apparent conflict might be reconciled by drawing a
distinction between sentiments and moral judgements. As described above,
sentiments are portrayed as unable to enter into the communal realm. They are
kept at the status of mere sentiments due to the fact that they are not neutral, but
prejudiced and individualistic. In order to rise to the level of moral judgements,
they would necessarily have to become neutral and unprejudiced. For this to occur,
though, given Hume's methodology, these sentiments would of necessity have to
enter into the communal realm of discourse, and their processing into general
standards would be evidenced in linguistic convention. For it is this process which
shapes our moral sense. Thus, though we may at times have sentiments that are in
conflict with our moral sense, that moral sense is still entirely reliant on the moral
system as evidenced in the linguistic conventions of the community.
7. A Dialogue: The Linguistic Convention ofMorals in Action
The contention that the medium of linguistic convention was used to illustrate and
substantiate Hume's claims about the nature of human morality is further
strengthened if one looks at Hume's other works relating directly or indirectly to
the exploration of human moral sentiment. No example is perhaps more
noteworthy than that of Hume's A Dialogue, originally published with the first
edition of the Enquiry in 1751. Hume apparently had been rethinking the revisions
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of Book III for several years, but he wrote the bulk of the Enquiry between the
summer of 1749 and late 1750. He published it in 1751 together with A Dialogue,
which has always been published as if it were a final appendix to Enquiry.
Language is portrayed in A Dialogue as being the medium by which morals can be
mastered and integrated into one's own understanding. It also offers one of
Hume's clearest portrayals of the human understanding of virtue as an artificial and
socially constructed concept relative to time and place.
The Dialogue opens with a description by the author of the tale of his friend
Palamedes' travels in a country called Fourli. In this fictitious land, "inhabitants
have ways of thinking, in many things, particularly in morals, diametrically
opposite to ours".109 Having briefly set the scene, Hume immediately pointed out
that an understanding of the moral character of these people rests upon gaining
knowledge of their language. "When I came among them," states Palamedes, "I
found that I must submit to double pains; first to learn the meaning of the terms in
their language, and then to know the import of those terms, and the praise and
blame attached to them".110 Thus, the first step in understanding a given moral
system was portrayed by Hume as the need to gain an understanding of the medium
by which that moral system is transmitted within the society. Due to this fact, an
individual must first learn the signifiers used within a society; and second, must be
able to attach socially specific meanings to that verbiage. The knowledge of
language is therefore depicted as essential for any understanding ofmorality itself.
Significantly, the above quotation also implies that knowledge of the language,
per se, is but the first step. It is also necessary to put that language in line with the
linguistic conventions enshrined in that society. Therefore, the culturally
determined moral context is crucial to this latter step. For example, merely
knowing the words for 'bravery' or 'cowardice' in a foreign tongue is not enough;
one must also necessarily come to understand in what context those terms are
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attributed to a given action. Only then does one come to know the parameters
within which these terms can be applied and have validity. The non-native speaker
must learn when and how these terms are applied, or else he or she cannot
accurately connect them with a person or a deed. Until this is achieved, the ability
to accurately understand the context of the word is impossible because the essential
meaning which these words are intended to convey is not comprehended. Before
one can engage individuals within that society, one must understand the standards
by which they have been acculturated. Until such time, the correct selection of
words cannot be accomplished, nor the associated ideas of virtue or vice
understood, until the application of the terms specific to that society and their
associated norms are mastered. For this to occur, the moral context embodied in
linguistic convention must be fully comprehended.
As the Dialogue continues it becomes apparent that Palamedes' efforts on this
front prove extremely frustrating. This is because he succeeded in the first step,
namely, learning the meaning of the words in the Fourlian language, but failed to
fulfil the second necessary step, learning the praise and blame associated with these
specific words in that culture. He therefore comes to understand the words of the
language, but does not experience the underlying sentiments that these words
should otherwise arouse within this particular society. Without this second crucial
element not only can he not truly communicate with those around him, for he lacks
the knowledge as to which sentiments this particular moral language is attached,
but since he lacks the necessarily intemalisation of principles and dispositions of
the society at large.
Palamedes, realising this, proceeds to actively engage the inhabitants of
Fourli in conversation. "After a word had been explained to me, and the character,
which it expressed, had been described," Palamedes would attempt to engage other
inhabitants in conversation. Yet while the author attempted to understand the
meaning and sentiments behind words, he found that at every turn his attempts to
use these words in the correct context proved futile. What to him were vile epithets
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were taken as estimable remarks, and what appears to be high praise, even when
they are repeated word for word and when he thought he had "remembered and
understood them perfectly", were taken as mortal affronts.111 What follows is a
series of misunderstandings on the part of Palamedes, as he consistently
misinterprets what are acts ofvirtue or vice within Fourli society.
In the end, Palamedes is quite perplexed by the seeming lack of correlation
between the words others used and the moral approbation or disapprobation he
would assume would have proceeded from that understanding. It would appear that
either the signs Palamedes is using are simply being confused by the Fourlites, or
that the signs are in some way universal, but that the underlying sentiments which
Palamedes is attempting to express are in fact different. The question is then,
which does Hume see as the correct characterisation of the situation?
It would stand to reason that if the language naturally touched our moral
sentiment, then one would merely have to learn the unique string of letters used in
that society to express that sentiment. Though the signs would vary and the vowels
and consonants strung together to express those moral sentiments would be
different from our own, once these words and the correct pronunciation were
mastered, the universal moral connection would be made. Hume, however, does
not maintain that this is all that is required. It is not simply a matter of learning the
correct sign, for Hume portrayed Palamedes as having, "remembered and
understood them perfectly". Rather, the underlying sentiment itself is portrayed as
being different. The moral character of a given act was portrayed as being
differently understood in the strange and morally inverted universe Palamedes has
entered. What is therefore being portrayed here by Hume is not simply a
misunderstanding of the language, but rather of the moral universe which that
language is used to map.
But, as with Hume's portrayal of morals in his other works, he was quick to
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dismiss the notion that custom is the sole basis of all moral determination. There
are "universal, established principles of morals" it would seem, but they embody
themselves in very distinct ways. Hume stated, "the principles upon which men
reason in morals are always the same; though the conclusions which they draw are
often very different".112 But what does this mean? Can the manifestation of these
universal principles vary so dramatically as to bring about moral systems that are
seemingly so contradictory as to be diametrically opposed?
To help answer these questions, the reader is introduced to a Fourlian named
Alcheic, who, in the end, is portrayed as "incestuous, a parricide, an assassin,
ungrateful, perjured traitor, and something else too abominable to be named [a
113
homosexual]". Yet within Fourli society he is held in the highest esteem.
Palamedes is understandably confused by this reaction. Though daunted by these
discrepancies; Palamedes still is driven to explore why this apparent conflict exists.
In order to do this, Palamedes attempts to adopt the sentiments of those around
him, so as to gain an understanding of the Florlian's ideas of virtue and vice.
Confronted with the news that his new associate Alcheic is guilty of what seems to
be the unjustified murder of his friend Usbek, Palamedes still "pretended to join in
the general voice of acclamation, and only asked, by way of curiosity, as a
stranger, which of all his noble actions was most highly applauded; and soon found
that all sentiments were united in giving preference to the assassination of Usbek
[emphasis added]".114 Here we see the point raised both in the Treatise and in the
Enquiry regarding the way linguistic convention comes to reflect what is
considered virtuous within a society. Those who were a part of the Fourli society
had adopted those linguistic conventions, and all that the mastery of such linguistic
conventions entail, and were thus united in voice and sentiment in regard to these
actions. Palamedes, however, stood outside of these conventions, and thus felt
himself isolated as a stranger from the sentiments being expressed. It is also
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interesting to note here that Hume, once again, pointed out the desire to conform
even when one's sentiments are in such discord in relation to the mass of society.
The felt need of Palamedes to feign that his sentiments matched those which
seemed to be universally voiced by those around him is very interesting. This felt
need of acceptance illustrates the powerful influence that social mores, enshrined in
linguistic convention, have in shaping those who do not otherwise conform to these
standards.
As Palamedes continues to struggle to understand the principles by which virtue
and vice are being applied in this strange land, Hume once again refers to
Palamedes' attempt to understand and utilise the "general voice of the people,"1 5
in his attempt to understand how virtue and vice are being used within Fourli
society. It is this general voice that is his only means by which to gain
understanding, and it is this voice that ultimately dictates what is perceived in
Fourli as virtue or vice. By a continual analysis of the morals in action via the
linguistic convention of its inhabitants, Palamedes is seen as slowly but surely
coming to an understanding, however alien, of the moral system by which this
other society abides.
Hume admitted in the closing paragraph of the Dialogue that in the end one is
free to strike out on one's own moral course and "depart from the maxims of
common reason".116 This is possible, but it comes at a cost, for they are "in a
different element from the rest ofmankind; and the natural principles of their mind
play not with the same regularity".117 It is the same decision as one can make in
adopting a private language as articulated by Locke. It is possible, but to do so cuts
one off from the main goal behind the use of language in the first place, the
regulation and dissemination of the sentiments, morality, and sociability.
This is not to assume, however, that Palamedes is able ultimately to understand
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these sentiments or that he joins in the 'voice of the people'. The reason for this,
however, is not simply because the actions outlined as taking place among the
Fourlites were a display of "[s]uch barbarous and savage manners" that they "are
not only incompatible with a civilized, intelligent people ... but scarcely compatible
with human nature".118 For Hume revealed that he had adopted the story of the
land of Fourli from the classic writer Xenophon. In reality, the seemingly alien and
repugnant sentiments encountered by Palamedes on his journey was in fact the
moral system adhered to in ancient Greece and the actions of Alcheic mirror those
of "an Athenian man of merit".119 Why then, are the actions of the Greeks
universally admired, yet these very same actions as mirrored in the mores ofFourli
universally deplored? How can this paradox be explained?
Hume attempted to answer this question through a dialogue between Palamedes
and the author. While "fashion, vogue, custom, and law, [are] the chief
foundations of all moral determinations,"120 these factors vary dramatically
between societies and over time. Because of this, though the morals of ancient
Greece would seem perverse to the modern eye, modern morals would be
considered as indicative of an 'inferior, servile species' by the ancient Greeks.121
Clearly, the manifestation of what exactly is or is not to be considered a virtuous
act was portrayed by Hume as being culturally relative.
What is not culturally relative, however, is the wellspring of the sentiments
themselves. Taking the analysis "a little higher, and examining first principles,"
Hume presents the following analogy: "The Rhine flows north, the Rhone south;
yet both spring from the same mountain, and are also actuated, in their opposite
directions, by the same principle of gravity. The different inclinations of the
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ground, on which they run, cause all the differences of their courses". Here
Hume portrayed those things that are held to be universally virtuous as tapping into
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the innate sentiments from which every variation, in the form of distinct moral
systems, arises. It is this innate predisposition to distinguish between virtue and
vice which is channelled by the societal institutions which create variations. As
Hume stated, "the principles upon which men reason in morals are always the
19"}
same; though the conclusions which they draw are often very different". Thus,
while Hume seemed willing to admit to an underlying universal sense of virtue and
vice, he rejected Shaftesbury's contention that these necessarily manifest
themselves in the same way in all societies and in all times.
It is this innate wellspring which is drawn upon when an individual is able to
recognise that there are such things as virtue and vice, but not how they will
manifest themselves within a given society. Virtue and moral excellence are
ultimately determined, according to Hume in the Dialogue, by the characteristic
action "being useful, or agreeable to a man himself, or to others. For what other
reason can ever be assigned for praise or approbation? Or where would be the
sense in extolling a good character or action, which, at the same time, is allowed to
be good for nothing? All the differences, therefore, in morals, may be reduced to
this one general foundation, and may be accounted for by the different views,
which people take of these circumstances".124 The differences in how this 'good'
embodies itself in a given society vary because, "[Sjometimes men differ in their
judgment about the usefulness of any habit or action: Sometimes also the peculiar
circumstances of things render one moral quality more useful than others, and give
• 1 9 S
it a peculiar preference". Therefore, from this appeal to utility arise the reasons
for the distinct, and sometimes conflicting, conceptions of virtue and vice of
different societies over the ages.
Though they may be altered by cultural determinations of utility, original
principles of censure or blame were still stressed by Hume at this point in the
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Dialogue as being uniform and universal throughout the course of human history.
While over this time "many changes have arrived in religion, language, laws, and
custom; none of these revolutions has ever produced any considerable innovation in
the primary sentiments of morals, more than in those of external beauty".126 By
listing the artificial social constructs which are at the centre of Hume's discussion
of the formation of virtue within society, this statement should not be taken to
imply that moral sentiments are somehow beyond the realm of these constructs.
Rather, Hume merely reiterated here that the vague and innate notion of 'the good'
exists beyond the particulars of such specific social constructs. He did not seem to
dismiss the fact that these artificial constructs are the channels by which the
fundamental distinctions between virtue and vice enter into social standards. As
with Hume's effort to relate morality to beauty, as we shall see later in our section
on taste, he was simply attempting to assert that the spectrum of actions deemed as
either good or bad is part and parcel of the nature of the sentiments, and that the
characterisation of these innate sentiments are determined by society. Once again,
at the end of the Dialogue, Hume stressed the central import ofmorality as a social
construct and the primacy of its ability to shape the individual's moral sense.
Hume also seemed to assert that there was no conflict between these innate
principles and those of the social constructs of a given system. Be it ancient
Greece or Eighteenth Century Scotland, the universal character of these intrinsic
perceptions of virtue and vice evidenced in all societies necessarily incorporate an
appreciation of such discernment into their system of morals. This explains why
we can view alien and distant actions as ultimately virtuous. All moral systems
incorporate at their base these same fundamental principles. Though they may
manifest themselves in an odd or contradictory way, the reason behind the
particular form, the search for the good, bridges these cultural gaps. In turn, each
culture will enshrine the same virtues at an abstract level, and thus will encourage
such a connection to be made. This is why it was clear to Hume that regardless of
the particular society, and the superficial differences in the actual language spoken,
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even the most foreign of cultures are still immediately comprehensible at the more
• • • 127fundamental level of emotions, purposes, and inclination.
In the conclusion to A Dialogue, Hume summarised the basic premises laid out
during the course of his discussion. Hume re-emphasised his contention that while
the concept of 'the good' was universal and uniform, "erroneous conclusions" in
regard to i't, "can be corrected by sounder reasoning and larger experience".128
Hume warned that we cannot place too much faith in our instincts on this manner
for "the precise point, where we are to stop, can scarcely be determined by natural
1 ?Q •
reason; and is therefore a very proper subject for municipal law or custom". This
reliance is not to be feared, however, for while "the customs of nations incline too
much, sometimes to the one side, sometimes to the other," the aims of all moral
systems are basically to do good. Thus, "[Experience and the practice of the world
readily correct any extravagance on either side".130 The individual who capitulates
to the "maxims of common life and ordinary conduct" can safely assume that he or
she is more or less ultimately in line with, and will follow the moral dictates of, the
universal sentiments of all mankind in relation to virtue and vice.131 This return to
the individual's reliance on the societal standards around them brings us back yet
again to the primary role of linguistic convention in shaping these opinions.
6. Ofthe Standard of Taste: The Relationship Between the Development of
Taste, Morality and Linguistic Convention
Of the Standard of Taste first appeared as part ofFour Dissertations published in
1757. Having briefly drawn a correlation between morals and taste in A Dialogue,
Hume used On the Standard of Taste to further expand his discussion of this
relationship. Hume's description of how one comes to develop a reliable standard
of taste parallels, to a remarkable degree, his basic assumptions in regard to the
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regulation of the moral sense. Once again we find that the role of linguistic
convention plays a commanding role in shaping our sentiments in regard to taste. It
is in this essay that Hume most clearly presented his assertion that language was
used as a communicative sign-posting mechanism for transmitting moral
approbation or disapprobation.
As was the case in the Dialogue, Hume began On the Standard of Taste by
immediately presenting language as a means of illuminating the nature of human
judgement. Building on the nature of linguistic convention, Hume stated, "[TJhere
are certain terms in every language, which import blame, and others praise; and all
men who use the same tongue, must agree in their application of them. Every voice
is united in applauding elegance, propriety, simplicity, spirit in writing; and in
blaming fustian, affectation, coldness, and a false brilliancy".132 Here, Hume lays
bare his assumptions relating to the usefulness of referencing language and
language use to support his theory of morals. The determination of approval or
disapproval that we make as members of society speaking the same language
guides us naturally toward a conception of virtue and vice. Significantly, there is
an implicit assumption agreed upon by the speakers of the language that all will
apply these words in like manner. Society is, therefore, united in its
characterisation of certain acts as worthy and others as wicked. In order to
participate in the language, this implicit agreement must be made, and the
corresponding uniformity of response must necessarily follow. A problem arises,
however, "when critics come to particulars, this seeming unanimity vanishes; and it
is found, that they had affixed a very different meaning to their expression....An
explanation of the terms commonly ends the controversy; and the disputants are
surprised to find, that they had been quarrelling, while at the bottom they agreed in
their judgment". Hume continued, "[Tjhose who found morality on sentiment,
more than on reason, are inclined to comprehend ethics under the former
observation, and to maintain, that, in all questions which regard conduct and
132 David Hume, Of the Standard of Taste, in Alasdair Maclntyre (ed.), Hume's Ethical Writings (London:
University ofNotre Dame Press, 1965) p. 275.
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manners, the difference among men is really greater than at first sight it
appears".133 This is particularly true for those who argue morality from the basis of
the sentiments, a perspective from which Hume by this point in his career seems to
have distanced himself.
As discussed in the Dialogue, Hume pointed out the basic agreement relating
to the fundamental precepts held as virtuous in all ages. He maintained this is due
partly to the influence of 'plain reason' which dictates that there are similar
sentiments in all men. Hume went on to stress, however, that "[S]o far as the
unanimity is real, this account may be admitted as satisfactory: But we must also
allow that some part of the seeming harmony in morals may be accounted for by
the very nature of language. The word virtue, with its equivalent in every tongue,
implies praise; as that of vice does blame: And no one, without the most obvious
and grossest impropriety, could affix reproach to a term, which in general
acceptation is understood in a good sense; or bestow applause, where the idiom
requires disapprobation".134 The 'idiom', as Hume termed it, is clearly a linguistic
convention in this context. Within the language itself are enshrined the basic
precepts of virtue and vice, and the correlating actions which warrant their
application. Upon these fundamental building blocks of 'general precepts', the
language itself constructs these categories and dictates by 'general acceptance'
what is or is not virtuous.
The reality of this situation led Hume to conclude that there was very little point
in trying to determine general and absolute principles ofmorality. This was due to
the simple fact that, "[W]hoever recommends any moral virtues, really does no
more than is implied in the terms themselves. That people, who invented the word
charity, and used it in a good sense, inculcated more clearly and much more
efficaciously, the precept, be charitable, than any pretended legislator or prophet,
who should insert such a maxim in his writings. Of all expressions, those, which,
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together vtdth their other meaning, imply a degree either ofblame or approbation, or
the least liable to be perverted or mistaken".135 Hume suggested here that the initial
establishment of the word, along with its correlated significance in relation to virtue
or vice, arise out of the utility it offers user. Enshrining a sentiment in a word
implicitly assumes acceptance by other language users of its necessity, usefulness,
and validity. In order for this to occur, the word must somehow create a utilitarian
link between sentiments and social context. With the enshrining of the word within
the linguistic conventions of the society, the particular sentimental response which
that word represents becomes more or less fixed, and only open to a degree of
manipulation afterwards. This is due to the fact that the foundation of these words,
having tapped into our base sentiments of praise and blame, are so profound as to
make them less likely to be altered.
This linguistic convention does not, however, lead to uniformity across cultures
and time in relation to these general precepts upon which they are built. In fact, it
is the adoption of linguistic conventions themselves which results in the great
disparity witnessed between individual societies with regard to morals. Hume
stated that, "it is to be supposed, that the ARABIC words, which correspond to the
ENGLISH, equity, justice, temperance, meekness, charity, were such as, from the
constant use of that tongue, must always be taken in a good sense; and it would
have argued the greatest ignorance, not of morals, but of language, to have
mentioned them with any epithets, besides those of applause and approbation".136
Here Hume appeared to acknowledge the centrality of linguistic convention in
relation to characterisation of morals. This comes to light through the fact that
Hume implied that the deeds deemed virtuous in Arab society are, upon closer
inspection, acts of "treachery, inhumanity, cruelty, revenge, bigotry," and thus,
"utterly incompatible with civilized society".137 The approval for these actions are
based on the simple fact that, "every action is blamed or praised, so far only as it is
Hume, Taste, p. 277.
136
Hume, Taste, p. 277.
137
Hume, Taste, p. 277.
133
beneficial or hurtful to the true believers".138 The utility of the acts to which
approbation or blame are attached is socially relative. It is due to this fact that the
conceptions of the society as embodied in linguistic convention come to play a
significant role in how morality is characterised within a given society.
Hume then proceeded to apply the type of analysis to the establishment of
'rules' of taste. While direct linguistic references become fleeting from this point
out, the general outline of his theory on the refinement of our taste parallels those
associated with morality. For example, though the principles of taste are portrayed
as universal, it does not follow that all men have good taste. This is due to the fact
that their internal sensations do not give them general guidelines on how to make
judgement with regard to matters of taste. This is further compounded by the fact
that all men must struggle to overcome their own prejudice, which tends to pervert
their natural sentiments.
Moreover, as with the case of morals, Hume warned against one of the great
stumbling blocks in the transmission of universal innate sensations, for "[t]he
organs of internal sensation are seldom so perfect as to allow the general principles
their full play, and produce a feeling correspondent to those principles".139 The
ability to translate our internal sentiments into a publicly accessible, and
acceptable, expression of those sentiments is extremely difficult. Adapting the
rules of taste to the nuance shades ofjudgment in regards to our internal affection is
likewise perplexing. These initial influences must remain to some degree
unsatisfied and isolated in order for one to partake in the communal exchange of
discerning taste.
To accomplish this, one must attempt to adopt a neutral perspective, aided by
experience and observation. This ability allows the individual to draw comparisons
between objects in order to determine their excellence and degree of proportion.
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"By comparison alone," stated Hume, "we fix the epithets of praise or blame, and
learn how to assign the due degree of each".140 One must also take into
consideration the varying views and prejudices of different ages and customs,
rather than rashly condemn them based on the manners of one's own age and
country. Likewise, when addressing a particular audience, an orator must "have a
regard to their particular genius, interests, opinions, passions, and prejudices;
otherwise he hopes in vain to govern their resolutions, and inflame their
affections".141 Upon reaching this state, one has in essence mastered the
'language' of taste, having gone through very much the same process as outlined
by Hume in the acquiring of ideas ofmorality through linguistic convention. If this
is achieved, then "[a] great inferiority of beauty gives pain to a person conversant
in the highest excellence of the kind, and is for that reason pronounced a
deformity" [emphasis added].142
Once again, we see in the area of taste the incorporation of language into
Hume's analysis. Linguistic conventions are not merely used as an object of
analogy by Hume, but as a means of explaining how 'in common life' language
actually affects the process by which an individual's sentiments are shaped within a
communal context. Characterised in the same manner as morals, language is seen
as crucial to the formation of the rules of taste both in an individual and a
communal context.
From Hume's commentary on the nature of taste, as well as in the other areas of
inquiry discussed in this chapter, it becomes clear that the demonstration of his
moral theory by reference to language is interwoven into his analysis throughout
his work. Hume appeared to have come to the conclusion that man, if he was to
successfully function in the social world he was born into, can only do so with the
help of language. Language offers a common medium of exchange, communal
standards of uniformity, explanations for moral differences between societies, the
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necessary flexibility to accommodate moral adaptation, and yet a level of ambiguity
that assures a realm of free will. As a result, Hume ultimately portrays linguistic
convention as the means and the medium of all social interactions, and as such,
plays a crucial role in his characterisation ofman's moral understanding.
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CHAPTER IV
Adam Smith and the Centrality of Language
in his Characterisation ofMoral Sentiments
Having examined Hume's references to linguistic convention in his effort to
illustrate and substantiate his theory of morals, we now turn our attention to the
utilisation of references to language and language use in the moral theory of Adam
Smith. That Smith was keenly interested in the developments taking place in the
Enlightenment's growing interest in language and language use should not come as
a surprise. His first published piece, in fact, was on a semantic subject.' He was
also active in Edinburgh's 'Select Society for Promoting the Reading and Speaking
of the English Language in Scotland', where theorising on language found an
interested public.2 In his professional life, Smith not only lectured on Rhetoric and
Belle Lettres throughout his career, but also dealt with language use in many of his
published works. Given the extent of his dealings with language and language use,
it should come as no surprise to discover that Smith's interest in language came to
colour his theoretical reasoning.
As was true with Hume, a close inspection reveals Smith's consistent references
to language in Smith's discussion of moral sentiments. The manifestation of the
relationship between sociability, morality and language is, however, dramatically
different from that which we witnessed in Hume. Whereas Hume viewed language
as reflecting the moral universe of a given society in the form of linguistic
convention, Smith was much more dubious about language's ability to take on such
a role. This change in emphasis resulted in the marginalisation of Hume's social
1 For the first issue of the Edinburgh Review in 1755, Smith reviewed Johnson's Dictionary and focused
his analysis on the semantic distinction and arrangement ofwords. See, Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric and
Belle Lettres, J.C. Bryce (ed.), (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985) p. 23.
2 Lieve Jooken, 'Lord Monboddo and Adam Smith on the Origin and Progress of Language', Bibliotheque
des cahiers de l'institut de linguistigue de Lovain (Louvain-al-neuve: Peters, 1994) p. 264.
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utility model, and required Smith to construct an ethical model in which man's
morality was not simply able to be understood through references to its
manifestation in linguistic convention. This is not to say that, for Smith, societal
norms as mediated through the medium of language were excluded from playing an
important role in the formation of moral sentiments. Rather, Smith envisioned the
pool of moral sentiments embodied in existing language as illustrative models of
individual moral consciousness.
What emerges from Smith's theory is a moral theory that looks to societal
norms as guiding principles, but which ultimately rests on individual moral
autonomy as enshrined in the 'impartial spectator'. Distancing himself from the
social utility model as reflected in linguistic convention proffered by Hume, Smith
presents a theory which deems the judgement of the 'impartial spectator' to be a
reflection of more than simple social utility and human convention. It is this
attempt by Smith to find a private, rather than social convention dependent,
capacity for the formation ofmoral sentiments that comes to play a central role in
his moral theory.
The question addressed in this chapter is whether, given this divergence in their
theories, the distinctions made within Smith's characterisation of language and
language use inevitably lead him to a different conclusion than Hume in relation to
the correct characterisation of moral sentiments.3 While it is difficult, if not
impossible, to establish such a direct causal relationship, particularly when it comes
to the enigmatic theories of the Enlightenment, it does appear to be fair to argue
that Smith's characterisation of language and, in particular, language's inherent
limitations, played a notable role in shaping the parameters of his conclusions
regarding the nature of the formation of moral sentiments. As with Hume, Smith's
theory presents a conception of morality in which the formation of moral
3 The evidence points to the conclusion that Smith had read Hume's Treatise while at Oxford. As Nicholas
Phillipson points out, the Treatise was published in 1739 and 1740 while he was still at Glasgow or had
read it at least by the time he prepared his lectures on rhetoric and belle lettres in 1746 - 1747. (Cited from
draft of "Language, Sociability and History: Some Reflections on the foundation of Adam Smith's Science
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sentiments and language are linked, with the characterisation of the latter being
used to illustrate and substantiate the conclusions about the former.
This disparate characterisation of the role of language and language use is due
in large part to the emphasis Smith's moral theory places on the need for each
individual to acquire the skills necessary to manipulate language in order to gain
sympathy and, through this process, gain command over his or her own moral
sentiments. Therefore, while still working firmly within the linguistic assumptions
of the period, Smith shifted his characterisation of moral reasoning away from
Hume's conception of a communal pool of moral understanding that is evidenced
by linguistic conventions, and towards an understanding of morality that, while
drawing on societal influences, stressed to a greater extent than Hume the
affirmative efforts of the individual in mastering the moral sentiments.
1. Contemporary Developments in the Theory of Language: Condillac,
Rousseau and the Origin of Language.
As noted earlier, some of the most distinguished scholars of the Enlightenment
engaged in the study of language in an effort to unlock the secrets of human nature.
The following section will explore the work of Etienne Bonnot De Condillac and
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Publishing major tracts on language subsequent to those
of Hume, these two theorists' discussions of the origin of language, its progress,
and its impact on the development of human understanding, are known to have
been read and highly regarded by Smith. It is therefore important to explore the
premises and ramifications of Condillac and Rousseau's theories of language,
paying particular attention to the implications of their theories in relation to social
and moral theory.
Investigating the contemporary debate regarding the nature of language will
allow us to gain some understanding of the general tenor of the discourse on
language as Enlightenment progressed. It will also highlight the fact that most of
ofMan", by Nicholas Phillipson, circa 1999.
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the period's theorists were extremely hesitant to take their observations on
language into the realm of morals. As we will see, though the specific reasons for
avoiding this were quite varied, all reflected a general concern that a theory of
language could not adequately explain man's compulsion to act morality. By
exploring the reasoning behind this trepidation, it is hoped that the difficult task
taken on by the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, in particular Smith, to
utilize references to language and language use can be better appreciated.
We will begin this process by first looking at the analysis of language
proffered by Etienne Bonnot De Condillac. Condillac is arguably the most
important figure in eighteenth-century linguistic study, both because of his own
theoretical work and because of his extensive influence on other theorists of the
period.4 He was concerned throughout his life with the problem of language and
with human expression in general. An esteemed intellectual figure in Paris from
1750 until his death in 1780, Condillac wrote several pieces that dealt either
directly or indirectly with the origin and development of language. While well
known for his contributions to Diderot's Encyclopedie, it is the publication of
Condillac's Essai sur Vorigine des connaissances humaines (Essay on the Origin of
Human Knowledge) in 1746 that he presented the bulk of his theory on the origin
of language.5 Although subtitled in French as, "a work in which all that concerns
the human understanding is reduced to a single principle". The English translation
had the subtitle "a supplement to Mr. Locke's Essay on the human understanding".6
This latter attribution is very apt, and no reader should fail to see Condillac's
dependence on Locke, a relationship he often and fully acknowledged. In contrast
to Descartes and the Port Royal, Condillac was an empiricist, maintaining that all
4 Franklin Phillip (ed. & trans.), Philosophical Writings ofEtienne Bonnot. Abbe de Condillac (Hillsdale,
N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., 1982) p. 1: See also Aarsleff. From Locke to Saussure, p. 107.
5 Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, An Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge (1756, Facsimile
Reproduction by Robert G. Weyant. Gainsville, Florida: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1971).
6
Ibid., See title page.
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knowledge is derived from the senses and that thought, rather than being the main
detriment in the organisation of knowledge, is in reality shaped by and dependent
upon language.
Condillac admired Locke, but he also believed that Locke's theory of language
had not gone far enough. In concord with Locke, Condillac maintained that
language was a gradual outgrowth of experience, even of "those sublime Thoughts,
which tower above the Clouds, and reach as high as Heaven itself'.8 However,
according to Condillac language was not, as Locke was content to maintain, merely
the necessary means of communication and an aid to memory. Rather, for
Condillac, thinking could neither begin nor continue without it. He further
maintained that, in all but its most primitive form, the connection of ideas depended
on the use of signs. Thus, Condillac saw the progress of mind and knowledge as
going hand-in-hand with the progress of language. The function of language is not
merely to communicate thought, but to direct its steps. - The two are mutually
dependent.9 In order to substantiate this claim, Condillac first had to show how
man, beginning as the passive object of changing sensations, could in time take
control ofhis mental processes and become master of them.10 He claimed that man
accomplished this by the invention of language.
As was the case with Mandeville, Condillac assumes that as long as man lived
apart from mankind he "would have no occasion to connect his ideas with arbitrary
signs".11 While humans in the earliest stages of human history did occasionally
come into contact with each other, these encounters were so brief that they did not
allow for sufficient interaction to initiate the need for language.12 In order to
embark upon the discussion of what did spark the need for language, Condillac
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sex, lost in the desert after the deluge.13 Separated from society before they had
learned to speak, these children, acting according to basic instincts, developed signs
with which they could request and provide mutual help.14 It was his task then to
reconstruct, on the basis of his conjectural history, the manner in which they would
have formed a language.
Unlike Adam and Eve, who from the beginning were able to reflect and
communicate their thoughts, these children had only the use of the elementary
faculties of perception, awareness, attention, involuntary reminiscence and a very
limited imagination, as long as they lived apart. They would, however, have an
innate and instinctive capacity for expression. Like animals, man can, even after
complete isolation, respond by way of spontaneous cries and movements to certain
feelings such as fear, joy, pain, grief, etc..15 These natural cries, formed by man "as
soon as he feels the passions to which they belong", were instinctive responses to
immediate situations.16 They consisted of spontaneous expressions of momentary
passions, rather than arising out of a desire to communicate feelings.
By living together, however, human beings were able to recognise the
association between the spontaneous cry and the accompanying physical gesture, or
'natural signs'. This combination of cries and physical gestures, Condillac termed
'language of action'. For example, in an attempt to satisfy the pressing needs of his
body, an individual would utter cries and move his head, arms, and other parts of
his body. Another individual, sympathetic to his companion's suffering, would
become anxious to relieve it, and would obey this impulse to the extent that he
could.17 Man was thus seen to be moved to cry out by needs and passions that lie
below the level of rationality. But the universality of those passions, the result of
the single human nature shared by all men, gives such blind, inarticulate cries
12 Ibid., p. 171.
13 This fiction, as with Mandeville, allowed Condillac to sidestep the theological problems invoved in
discussing the first origins of language.






meaning to other men. As Condillac noted, "perceiving some inward emotions
which he was not yet able to account for, he suffered in seeing his companion
suffer. From that very instant he felt himself inclined to relieve him, and he
1 8
followed this impression to the utmost of his powers". He argued that this
common human nature, which provoked each man to recognise himself in all other
men, was the source of mutual identification and sympathy, and that it was this
spontaneous emotional response that was the pre-condition for making rational
communication out of mere instinctive expression. Thus, each individual
instinctively expressed the same feeling or responded to the same situation with the
same cry or action.19 Condillac maintained that, "in the process of time he might
use this sort of cries, to revive at pleasure the passions they express".20 By such
repetition, early humans would in time gain the power of recall over a certain range
of such gestures at will and would thus also be able to reproduce them as signs
recognised others, and hence, be able to communicate.21
By becoming more familiar with these signs, men were more readily able to
recall them at will. Thus, they gradually began to do deliberately what they had
thus far had done only instinctively. First, through these signs they would come to
recognise each other's feelings. Then as they grew "more familiar with those signs,
the more they were in a capacity of reviving them at pleasure".22 Next, they began
to use them intentionally in order to communicate feelings that they themselves
were experiencing. At this critical juncture, these expressions are no longer
considered by Condillac to be natural signs, but are rather termed 'institutional
signs' which can be recalled at will.23 The more men used these institutional signs,
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and made their use more familiar. Once this connection is established, the use of
arbitrary signs and the capacity for reflection mutually played off each other and
allowed man to gain ever-increasing levels of intellectual control.24
Arbitrary or conventional signs were thus invented, as the need arose, by
analogy with natural cries and gestures, which were instinctive.25 It is ultimately
through the use of this internalised stock of signs that all knowledge and its
progress depends. For these innate natural signs open the way to the exercise of
reflection, which results in the deliberate and productive control over thought and
the materials of past experience through artificial language. Thus, by this process
over a period of time, those initial "natural cries served them for a pattern, to frame
a new language". From these admittedly small beginnings, the progress of
language and knowledge is made possible.
As to the role of the passions after the initial stages of linguistic development, it
is Condillac's opinion that they still play an important part in language growth, in
order to stimulate imagination, contemplation, and memory, one must first
experience a sensation, he also envisioned situations in which a person experiences
strong emotion were especially helpful in expanding that person's range of speech
and understanding.27 Because of the strong feelings that the passions stir in us, we
are given extra incentive to analyse and understand these feelings. For example,
through the experience of such strong emotions as fear, delight, love, etc., the mind
is compelled to understand these sensations and transform them into a more
concrete form. In this sense, reflections on experiences regarding the passions
continue to play an important role in linguistic development.
It is important to note, however, that Condillac was very much of the opinion
that reflection on the passions is possible only after the fact, and not while they are
24
Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure, p. 287.
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in the process of being experienced. For example he stated that, "[W]e cannot
analyse enthusiasm when we feel it, because at that time we are not masters of our
reflection".28 Therefore, the passions are understood only after the fact, through
man's reflection on the effects of the passion after it has passed. Condillac claimed
this was due to the fact that "the passions throw us into violent agitations", and
"deprive us of the use of reflexion".29 Clearly, Condillac does not have great faith
in man's ability to communicate his passions in a controlled manner while still
under their influence.
Condillac was also aware that, regardless of the number of signs created during
this process, man would always have more perceptions than names that can
designate them.30 This is a particular problem when it comes to what Condillac
regarded as terms that "relate to the different action of men".31 The
characterisations of these actions are too varied and vague to have fixed sign rules
applied to their use. Instead, one can compile only general categories, what
Condillac calls 'Archetypes', of ideas associated with such concepts as honour,
courage, and virtue. The only other option, and one Condillac dismissed as
unworkable, was an individualistic judgement which "would vary according as
particular cases admitted of particular circumstances".32
Jean-Jacques Rousseau was the next major contributor to the discussion and
refinement of the linguistic premises being developed during the mid-eighteenth
century. Rousseau's discussion of language origin and development in Discours
sur I'origine de I'inegalite parmi les hommes (A Discourse on the Origin of
Inequality ofMan, 1755), generally paralleled Condillac's description of the origin
of language. In fact, Rousseau began his discussion of language by acknowledging
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commences with man in a state of nature and having only occasional and accidental
associations with others. In keeping with Condillac, he postulated that those
meetings that did occur were so fleeting that they never required the use of
language.34 While this explanation parallels that of Condillac, Rousseau rejected
necessity as the mother of language, stressing that man was capable of fulfilling all
his physical needs without the aid of any communication.
For Rousseau, as long as man remained in the state of nature, he could survive
perfectly well with no other language than what Rousseau called 'cries of nature.'
These cries were only used when a man found himself in danger, pain or in need of
help: "The first language of mankind, the most universal and vivid, in a word the
only language man needed, before he had occasion to exert his eloquence to
persuade assembled multitudes, was the simple cry of nature. But as this was
excited only by a sort of instinct on urgent occasions, to implore assistance in case
of danger, or relief in case of suffering, it could be of little use in the ordinary
course of life, in which more moderate feelings prevail".35 As society developed
and human interdependence increased, man's ideas became more numerous and
more complex. Only then did cries and gestures multiply and develop into a more
sophisticated form of language.36
Thus, while arguing that in a state of nature man did not need language,
Rousseau did recognise the presence of a universal connection that served as a
springboard for linguistic development. In arguing against Hobbes' conception of
man being innately self-centred, Rousseau maintained that "having been bestowed
on mankind, to moderate, on certain occasions, the impetuosity of amour-propre,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) p. 64. The disagreements between Condillac and Rousseau
revolved predominantly around whether man-could create language without having the ability to reason
already, and Rousseau's refusal to accept the notion of a spontaneous change from language d'action to
spoken language. Some have theorised that Rousseau perhaps was simply disagreeing with Condillac
solely for the sake of argument. See, Juliard, p. 48.
34 Rousseau does speak of the formation ofprivate languages, namely formed between children and their






or, before its birth, the desire of self-preservation, tempers the ardour with which he
pursues his own welfare by an innate repugnance at seeing a fellow-creature
suffer". 37 For Rousseau there was a universal sentiment, namely compassion,
which all men felt and which came before any reflection. He argued that this
instinctive reaction "puts us in the place of the sufferer, a feeling obscure yet lively
in a savage, developed yet feeble in civilised man. ... Compassion must, in fact, be
the stronger, the more the animal beholding any kind of distress identifies himself
with the animal that suffers".38
Rousseau went on to suggest that such passions were the true source of
language; for love, hate, anger, joy, etc. could initially be expressed only in
screams and groans.39 Language thus arose out ofman's desire to communicate; to
relate these emotions and feelings to his companions and to describe his
surroundings. Rousseau stated, "the progress of understanding has been exactly
proportionate to the wants which the peoples had received from nature ... and in
consequence to the passions that induce them to provide for those necessities".40
He believed that this yearning, limited to the communication of inner feelings or
emotions, was one of the first real desires experienced by man once he recognised
other men as being similar to him. "It is by the activity of the passions," he states,
"that our reason is improved; for we desire knowledge only because we wish to
enjoy; and it is impossible to conceive any reason why a person who has neither
fears nor desires should give himself the trouble of reasoning. The passions, again,
originate in our wants, and their progress depends on that of our knowledge; for we
cannot desire or fear anything, except from the idea we have of it, or from the
simple impulse of nature".41 Thus man's first language was entirely the result of
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Rousseau's 'natural language' was not unlike Condillac's 'language of action'.
The former, however, was considered by Rousseau to be a more precise language
than Condillac thought his to be.43 Rousseau, in criticism of Condillac in the
Essay, refused to accept the notion of a spontaneous change from 'language of
action' to spoken language. Such a change could only have been made by a
conscious common agreement among men, and would have been extremely
difficult to achieve. Rousseau saw no need for a change. His natural language
already consisted ofwords and gestures that simply continued to develop gradually.
Despite this disagreement, the description Rousseau gave of the slow formation of
language over time does not significantly differ from that ofCondillac: the passage
from the instinctive expression of the 'cries of nature' to the natural sign system of
gestures and then on to the use of institutional signs.44
Rousseau, however, was very explicit in his assertion that the refinement of
language had hindered man in the communication of the passions. This was the
result, in large part, of his faith in the advantages to man in the state of nature.
"Now, it is plain," Rousseau stated, "that such identification must have been much
more perfect in a state of nature than in a state of reason ... it is reason that turns
man's mind back upon itself, and divides him from everything that could disturb or
afflict him".45 He saw the unreflective state of man, before having the ability to
communicate, as preferable to man in society after having the ability to
communicate. For in this pre-social state, the inability to judge one's actions was
taken as a positive state of affairs. While man in such a state could not express
positive sentiments to others, he also did not have the ability to formulate and
cultivate negative ones. "They maintained no kind of intercourse with one another,"
Rousseau posited, "and were consequently strangers to vanity, deference, esteem,
and contempt; they had not the least idea of 'mine' and 'thine'".46
43
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In contrast to Mandeville and Condillac, Rousseau argued that, rather than
creating social bonds, language had in reality "done little to make them sociable".47
Rousseau reached this conclusion because he started with a number of assumptions.
First, he reasoned that one man, in a state of nature, did not stand in more or less
need than another man and thus had "nothing to fear or to hope from any one". In
contrast, man, "in society and endowed with speech," is "subjected to universal
dependence".49 Man in the latter case must rely on others to fulfil his needs, and
becomes dependent on others. Rousseau further maintained that man's character
was weakened when subjected to such dependence.50 Second, Rousseau assumed
that man in a state of nature was ignorant of vice as well as of virtue, and has only
his natural compassion to guide his actions. In contrast, man, armed with language,
was capable of reflection. With reflection, Rousseau argued, comes self-awareness
and as a result of this, self-love. This process "turns man's mind back upon itself,
and divides him from everything that could disturb or afflict him". This resulted in
the deadening of an individual's ability to put himself "in the place of the sufferer,
a feeling obscure but lively in a savage, developed yet feeble in civilised man".51
The ability to reason and reflect enables man to disregard his initial instinctive
reactions, thus enabling him to isolate himself from his fellow man. As Rousseau
noted, this allows man to say, "[a]t the sight of the misfortunes of others: 'Perish if
you will, I am secure.' .... [A] murder may with impunity be committed under his
window; he has only to put his hands to his ears and argue a little with himself, to
prevent nature, which is shocked within him, from identifying itself with the
unfortunate sufferer. Uncivilised man has not this admirable talent; and for want of
reason and wisdom, is always foolishly ready to obey the first promptings of
47
Ibid., p. 70. While Mandeville and Rousseau are making completely different assumptions about the
actual character ofman, premises around which they constructed their theories, it is interesting to note that
both would appear to contend that man was more 'honest' before the art of language, and the associated









humanity".52 This quote clearly illustrates how little faith Rousseau placed on the
use of reason and reflection to temper the passions for the individual's own
betterment or the betterment of others.
As we will see in this and the following chapter, Smith agreed with many of the
broadest conclusions made by Condillac and Rousseau regarding the primacy of the
communication of the sentiments as the basis for inter-personal communication.
Smith built a moral theory which rested upon their assumptions as to the nature of
man's constitution and the utilisation of articulated sounds to build a sense of an
inter-connection between individuals. The roots of this process in both the case of
moral and linguistic development was characterised by Smith as arising quite
inadvertently from man's natural reaction to either joy or pain, and from the
universality of that experience. As a result, the next step arose, the intentional
effort by man to make this connection on command. In order to do this, in both
cases it was postulated that a system of communication was necessary so that
people could interact. For this to be achieved, the ability to exchange thoughts
necessitated a common medium by which to communicate: that is, mutually
recognisable and acceptable signs relating to particular objects had to be created
within a given society. This in turn required individuals through experience to
learn the correct use of these signs, to recall the correct use of signs through
reflection, and to adjust those signs using reason. The following section will
develop this line of reasoning and explore both the adaptations and limitations of
these assumptions regarding the nature of interpersonal communication in relation
to Smith's theory ofmoral sentiments.
52 Ibid.
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2. The Contrast Between Smith's Considerations Concerning the First
Formation ofLanguages and His The Theory ofMoral Sentiments: The Origin
of Language and The Origin ofMoral Sentiments
It would seem that the most logical place to begin a search for Smith's
linguistic theory as it relates to the development of human inter-communication
would be in his Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Language,
published in 1761.53 Although published after the writing of the Theory ofMoral
Sentiments, this work was part of Smith's Edinburgh lectures on Rhetoric, which
were first delivered in 1748. Given this chronology, it seems clear that the ideas
laid out in Considerations pre-date the publication of The Theory of Moral
Sentiments.54 It is also important to note that the third through sixth editions of the
Theory ofMoral Sentiments included this essay at the end of each edition, and was
entitled Dissertation Upon the Origins ofLanguage.55
Within the first few sentences of the Considerations it becomes obvious that
Smith was very much aware of the contemporary views of, and conjectural
assumptions about, language. It is known that Smith had copies of Condillac's
Essai (1746), and of his Traite des sensations (1754), and thus was probably
familiar with Condillac's original discussion of the 'two savages', as well as
exposure between the lectures and the publication of Considerations to Rousseau's
adaptation of Condillac's theory in the Discours (1755). Considerations opens
with the by now familiar account of the two savages that had never been taught to
speak and had "been bred up remote from the societies of men".56 In a fashion
consistent with Mandeville, Condillac and Rousseau, Smith tied the impetus for the
development language to these two savages' "endeavour to make their mutual
wants intelligible to each other by uttering certain sounds, whenever they met to
53
Smith, Considerations Concerning the First Formation ofLanguage, reprinted in, Lecutures on Rhetoric
and Belle Lettres. pp. 204 - 226.
54 Considerations first appeared in The Philosophical Miscellany in 1761.
55
See, Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belle Lettres. p. 27.
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denote certain objects".57 Over time, these two savages would begin to assign
names to objects, signifying those things around them which were most familiar to
them, and, which they had most reason to signify. These first words were in theory
to have resulted from the need to express the essentials of personal existence, such
as cave, due to the shelter it could offer, tree, due to the fruit it bore; and fountain,
due to the thirst it could quench. Need would further drive mankind to associate
these specifically named items with other like items around them which fitted the
above classifications. This would in turn lead to the creation of plurals, such as
caves, trees, and fountains. The ability to extrapolate in such a manner is seen as
innate, with the correlation between objects being made naturally. As Smith noted,
"mankind are naturally disposed to give to one object the name of any other, which
nearly resembles it, and thus to denominate a multitude, by what originally was
intended to express an individual".58 These connections were set into memory, and
instantly recalled when like items were seen, and it was deemed necessary to "point
out to each other, any of the new objects".5
Smith also agreed that the development of language involved an uninterrupted,
gradual progression from primitive to more systematised languages. Over time,
mankind began to group these similar items together and to formulate what Smith
terms 'species' of like items based on 'proper' classes and assortments. After the
rise of such categorisation, "it was impossible that the greater part of that almost
infinite number of individuals, comprehended under each particular assortment or
species, could have any peculiar or proper names of their own, distinct from the
general names of the species".60 When it became necessary to name specific items,
it also became necessary to name and distinguish the individual item based on its
particular qualities, or on its relation to some other things. This resulted in a double










Smith, in Considerations demonstrated both the importance of language as a
means of expressing ideas, as well as the fact that man has an intellectual capacity
for imagination, abstraction and generalisation. Yet Smith's discussion of these
early stages of linguistic development is extremely fleeting and comprises no more
than a few paragraphs. In this respect, Smith's account of the origin of language is
critically different from other theorists of the age, in that his account does not
encompass the earliest stages of commutative development, something seen as
crucial in the discussions of Locke, Mandeville, Condillac, and Rousseau. For
these other theorists, the vast majority of their discussion concerning the origin of
language centred on those essential characteristics of man that influenced the
motivation, ability, and creation of communication. In contrast, within the first few
paragraphs of Considerations, speech, as well as rudimentary language skills, are
already assumed. While acknowledging that man had started from a mute and
brutish natural state, Smith quickly moved on to acknowledge that human beings,
at some point in their development, formed language. Accordingly, Smith's
discussion of the origins of language in the Considerations takes as given the
articulation of words as a means of communication and does so without any
thorough analysis of how man arrived at that stage. Dealing predominantly with
the phonic and grammar of early languages, the greater part of the Considerations
offers a strictly grammatical approach to the progress of language development.
Thus, while the Considerations does offer some insight into Smith's views on
language and demonstrates his obvious familiarity with the general trends and
assumptions of the period regarding linguistic development, this work does not
offer much insight into Smith's conception of the earliest evolution and dynamics
of communication, topics that were essential to earlier theorists in describing the
role of the expression of the sentiments in the development of language.
Such a discussion is to be found, however, in Smith's The Theory of Moral
Sentiments. In this work Smith presented, much in keeping with the contemporary
discussion of language, a discussion of the very origins of human communication
and the growing ability of individuals to connect with each other by expressing
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their sentiments through the medium of language. With its focus on the
transmission of the passions and sympathy, Smith uses The Theory of Moral
Sentiments to expand on that crucial time in man's development when innate cries
were transformed into controlled and calculated reactions. It is this latter work, it
will be argued, that offers the greatest insight into Smith's conception of how the
birth and growth of human inter-communication came to be manifest and, in turn,
came to influence the development ofman's moral and social character.
A close analysis reveals that The Theory ofMoral Sentiments represents both a
delineation of the concepts of communication which are at the very heart of the
eighteenth-century discussion of language, as well as an effort to address the
inherent problems in transmitting moral sentiments. On the one hand, Smith
maintained that man has an inherent desire to communicate with, and receive
sympathy from, other people; while on the other hand, man is faced with the
inherent difficulty in clearly and accurately communicating these feelings because
\
of the amorphous nature of sentiments and the inherent ambiguity of language. It is
this struggle to find a generally acceptable moral standard, yet maintain the innately
personal nature ofmoral development, which is a central tenet of Smith's theory of
moral sentiments.
A. The Origins of Communication
While Smith's discussion in The Theory ofMoral Sentiments admittedly does not
open with the classic model of two children lost in the desert, it does offer a
detailed scenario that mirrors this archetype of early human development. In this
regard, Smith is strikingly similar to both Rousseau and Hume, who contended that
there needs to be social interaction before the formation of any concept of moral
sentiments can occur. Smith stated, "[W]ere it possible that a human creature could
grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without communication with his own
species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of
his own sentiments and conduct. ... Bring him into society, and he is immediately
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provided with the mirror which he wanted before". 61 It is clear that Smith assumed
that any understanding by man of his moral universe, must occurred in the context
of society and must have been gained through the medium of interpersonal
communication.
Also, in keeping with Hume and fne general premises of the period, Smith
maintained in The Theory ofMoral Sentiments that a person in isolation could not
have an understanding of his or her sentiments without having others with whom to
share them. Smith stated, "[T]he passions themselves, the desires or aversions, the
joys or sorrows, which those objects excited, though of all things the most
immediately present to him, could scarce ever be the objects of his thoughts. The
idea of them could never interest him so much as to call upon his attentive
consideration. ... Bring him into society, and all his own passions will immediately
become the causes of new passions".62 A person, who had grown up without any
communication with society could thus perceive, but not judge as moral or
immoral, his experiences of sentiments, be they good or bad. For "even though
they should occur to him, they would by no means have the same effect on him,
antecedent to his connexion with society" for all "sentiments suppose the idea of
some other being".63 Therefore, in order for us to gain an understanding of how
man comes to understand his sentiments, rather than merely respond to them, Smith
argues that it is imperative for us to explore those sentiments within a social
context.
Furthermore, Smith traced the origins of this inter-personal communication to
man's instinctive reactions to the sentiments. Smith began The Theory ofMoral
Sentiments with a description of how we instinctively react to another's physical
and emotional response to pain or joy. Without any forethought, we immediately
identify ourselves with the passion being experienced by the other person, and try
61 Ibid., p. 119. For similar explanation see Hume, Enquiry, p. 67.
62
Smith, The Theory ofMoral Sentiments. D.D. Raphael & A.L. MacFie (eds.), (Indianapolis: Liberty
Fund, 1984)pp. 110-111.
63 Ibid., p. 193.
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to put ourselves in that other person's situation and to imagine what we would feel
if we were him or her. In fact, Smith characterised passions as, "original and
immediate instincts" on par with hunger and thirst.64 This reactive instinct is
mirrored in the basic premises presented by Mandeville, Condillac and Rousseau in
their description of the cries of nature, that result from man's innate identification
with the delight or anguish of our fellow beings.
Based on this, Smith maintained that these initial cries represent a fundamental
form of inter-personal connection. Smith developed this idea of universality when
he commented on our 'fellow-feeling'. He noted that "[t]he passions, upon some
occasions, may seem to be transfused from one man to another, instantaneously,
and antecedent to any acknowledge of what excited them in the person principally
concerned".65 This inter-connection was seen by Smith as the key to eventually
causing those individual expressions of emotions to become linked to a communal
understanding. For he presumed that "[W]hatever is the passion which arises from
any object in the person principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at
the thought of his situation, in the breast of every attentive spectator. ... In every
passion of which the mind of man is susceptible".66 Thus, while expressions of
certain passions such as grief, joy or a smiling face may be seen as being
communicated instantaneously and antecedent to any knowledge of what has
caused it, this does not hold true for the expression of all passions. Such emotions
occur at these times because the expression on the other individual's face
communicates the basic sentiments behind those expressions.
What we see emerging within these opening pages of the Theory of Moral
Sentiments is a representation of the primal elements of moral sentiments that uses
a conjectural model of history which is firmly rooted within the then contemporary
discourse regarding the origins of language. Unlike Considerations Concerning the
First Formation of Language, we find in The Theory of Moral Sentiments a
64






systematic and extensive discussion of how the first development of man's social
nature are tied to the expressions of his fellow human beings and the mutual
understanding of his fellow human beings' emotional state. Central to man's social
development are the cries of nature, a topic that was seen as central to the
contemporary assumptions surrounding primordial interpersonal communication of
the period. As we will see, Smith goes on to use these assumptions regarding the
fundamental elements of interpersonal communication, and eventual use of
articulated language, to help illustrate and substantiate his conclusions regarding
the manner in which man comes to an understanding of his moral nature.
B. The Movement from Natural Communication to Artificial Construct
As described in the previous section, human beings were deemed by Smith to have
an innate ability to comprehend, and identify with, another's emotional state.
Having established the foundation for the communication of the sentiments, it
remained necessary for Smith to elaborate on how this process can be controlled
and refined in order to maximise effective sympathetic communication; a goal
which lies at the heart of his concept ofmoral sentiments. In studying his effort to
do this, we witness once again Smith's apparent utilisation of contemporary
assumptions concerning the nature of language and language use to help
corroborate his conclusions regarding the nature of sympathy and its relation to the
refinement of our moral sentiments.
For Smith, sympathy at its most general level is "our fellow-feeling with any
• (\1 • • • • •
passion whatsoever". Smith noted that, though instantaneous, the instinctive
sympathetic reaction is "always extremely imperfect" until we are informed of the
z:o
actual cause. These original 'bodily' passions, "excite either no sympathy at all,
or such a degree of it, as is altogether disproportioned [sic] to the violence of what
is felt by the sufferer".69 Thus, though we are moved instinctively to react in such a
67
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manner, we are neither in control of that reaction nor certain as to the other
individual's exact circumstances. Because of this, Smith noted, the first question
we must ask when we meet someone with whom we want to sympathise is,
"[W]hat has befallen you? Till this is answered, though we are uneasy both from
the vague idea of his misfortune, and still more from torturing ourselves with
conjectures about what it may be, yet our fellow-feeling is not very considerable".70
It is necessary, therefore, that the innate physical response to our fellow man's
corporal signs of anguish or joy be conveyed more precisely, ifwe are to maximise
our understanding and connect with the other individual. In order to achieve this
goal, we must engage others in conversation and explore as precisely as possible
another individual's sentiments.
Smith contended that essential to this process of understanding is the
individual's ability to enter into, and actively engage in, social discourse. Smith
opined, "[Wjere it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in
some solitary place, without communication with his owns species, he could no
more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments
and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or
deformity of his own face."71 Smith proceeded to assert, in a statement very much
in keeping with Hume's discussion in Book II, Section III of the Treatise, "[BJring
him into society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted
before. It is placed in the countenance and behaviour of those he lives with, which
always mark when they enter into, and when they disapprove of his sentiments; and
it is here that he first views the propriety and impropriety of his own passions".
Smith went on to say that, if a man from birth was separated from society, he
would be pre-occupied with the immediate and instinctive push and pull of the
passions to such a degree that they "could scarce even be the objects of his
thoughts".72 However, once exposed to society, man is able to use these passions
as the foundation of new, more social, passions that are shaped by the approval and
70






disapproval of those around him.
This effort at continual refinement of this societal connection between
individuals is central to this premise. Smith contended throughout his exploration
of moral sentiments, that it is ultimately the need to establish equilibrium between
the innate ambiguity of our sentiments, and the need to establish standards ofmoral
judgements, that is central to the establishment of a working set of moral
sentiments. He maintained that the natural passions, as discussed in the previous
section, over time, gradually develop into reactions that the individual can control
and manipulate. But what would motivate such a change? In keeping with the
contemporary assumptions about the origin and development of language, this
crucial shift is initiated by a desire, first, to communicate the passions, and second,
to elicit others to give sympathy. Locke and Condillac, it should be remembered,
advanced the former motivation as the reason behind the development of language;
the latter, namely, the desire to persuade was advocated by Mandeville. Finally,
Rousseau argued that both aspects played a part in the formation of language.
As for the first element, Smith noted that "nothing pleases us more than to
observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast; nor
are we ever so much shocked as by the appearance of the contrary".73 In turn, as for
those men around us, "[W]e enter, in this case too, into the pain which his presence
must give to every mortal with whom he converses, to those especially with whom
we are most apt to sympathise, the unfortunate and the injured".74 Thus, in order to
maximise this exchange, there must exist some means by which an individual on
the one hand can effectively elicit sympathy, and to accurately gauge our reaction





other. Sympathy was thus judged by Smith to be not only the origin of man's
desire for inter-communication, but also the reason why he works to perfect this
communication.
Smith's notion that the sympathetic mechanism played an important role in the
development of morals was adopted from Hume. It should be noted, however, that
the two neither agree on the relationship between sympathy and moral sentiments,
nor on what actually constituted the appropriate object of a sympathetic response.
For example, Hume presented the idea that sympathy was a type of emotional
infection and as such did not require any practical concern for the other individual.
In contrast, Smith saw sympathy as arising from the ability to consciously view a
situation and to then enter into the other person's feelings. Sympathy was
portrayed by Smith not as a gut reaction, but rather an immediate attempt to make
an interpretation of the situation and to proffer a calculated and regulated response.
Smith also broadened and generalised the idea of sympathy, by characterising it as
the cement of human society and the basis for the formulation of social attitudes.
In contrast, Hume gravitated toward the idea of mutual dependence and utility,
rather than sympathy, as the fundamental bonds that make up society.
As a result of this difference in interpretation of the nature of sympathy, Smith
conceived of sympathy as the driving mechanism and desire behind the
development of moral sentiment. This desire to know another's sentiments is
portrayed by Smith as being a two-way process. We not only desire sympathy, but
also, in turn, can hardly resist entering into sympathetic connection with someone
else. In this sense, both our longing and benevolence are ingrained in our nature.
To better satisfy these desires, man must develop and refine the most accurate and
effective means by which this inter-change can take place.
Smith's goal in writing The Theory ofMoral Sentiments was, in large part, to
explain what man must do to create an effective exchange of the moral sentiments
through the sympathetic mechanism. Smith's contended that in order for this to
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even occur it was necessary for man to modify his natural reactions to the passions
by imposing an artificial construct on them. By reflecting upon and then altering
his initial reaction so that it corresponds with what these general rules would dictate
to be the correct expression in the particular circumstances, man can put himself in
a position to gain the maximum amount of sympathy. Essential to this process is
an understanding of, and control over, those initially instinctive reactions, so that he
can communicate that which is required to compel another's understanding and, as
a result, gain the maximum of the others' sympathy. The only way this can be
achieved is by his understanding how others characterise the correct
communication of sympathy in a given situation. Because mankind is able to act in
accordance with general rules of practice, we are also able to pursue consistent
lines of action relatively independent of the immediate prompting of the
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sentiments. This allows for the gradual but steady progression from simple
reactive expressions of the passions to the eventual calculated moral reactions.
The creation of set standards further implies that we are eventually able to
understand, and to a degree participate in, sentiments which we ourselves are not
moved to share. While our natural sentiments may not allow us to share in the
spirit of the moment, Smith maintained that "[W]e have learned, however, from
experience, what sort of pleasantry is upon most occasions capable of making us
laugh, and we observe that this is one of that kind. We approve, therefore, of the
laughter of company, and feel that it is natural and suitable to its object; because,
though in our present mood we cannot enter into it, we are sensible that upon most
occasions we should very heartily join in it".76 In this manner, we are able to
participate to some degree in the communication of the sentiments taking place,
though we ourselves are not moved by such sentiments. While our hearts might be
devoid of a contemporaneous experience of these sentiments for whatever reason,
75 T. D. Cambell, Adam Smith's Science ofMorals (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1971) p. 66.
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this nevertheless does not prevent us from participating intellectually in the social
exchange of such sentiments if they comply with our general rules of
appropriateness.
To substantiate this claim Smith notes that when, for example, we are informed
of the death of a man's father, we may, for whatever reason, not feel the slightest
instinctive sympathy. Still, even though we are not naturally moved to sympathy,
we learn through experience that such misfortune naturally excites in the other
person sorrow. Once we make an effort and become aware of this fact, we should
offer them our sympathy. "It is upon the consciousness of this conditional
sympathy," Smith notes, "that our approbation of his sorrow is founded, even in
those cases in which that sympathy does not actually take place; and the general
rules derived from our preceding experience of what our sentiments would
commonly correspond with, correct upon this, as upon other occasions, the
impropriety of our present emotions".77 It is this ability to respond in a sympathetic
manner in situations that do not arouse our natural instincts of sympathy, which
marks the transition from an instinctive response to a calculated effort to manage
our sympathetic reaction.
Like Hume, Smith realised that without some sort of common standards, each
individual would approach this interaction from his or her own unique perspective
and thus could not communicate competently with another. With each person
having their own personal prejudices and guided by their own self-interests, there
would be no common perspective and thus no common medium by which to
communicate the sentiments accurately arid effectively. Without such a common
medium, the process would ultimately be impossible. Smith noted, "[W]hen we
first come into the world, from the natural desire to please, we accustom ourselves
to consider what behaviour is likely to be agreeable to every person we converse
with, to our parents, to our masters, to our companions. We address ourselves to
individuals, and for some time fondly pursue the impossible and absurd project of
77 Ibid., p. 18.
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gaining the good will and approbation of every body. We are soon taught by
no
experience, however, that this universal approbation is altogether unattainable"
Smith, like Hume, was also aware that, in attempting to identify with an individual,
one will inevitably offend another unless two things are present: There must be
some means by which one commands an ability to modify their own personal
perspective; and one must make those modifications in line with socially acceptable
standards.79
Smith regarded the 'impartial spectator' as serving a crucial role in redressing
this balance and facilitating the proper communication of the sentiments. While the
'spectator' was a familiar figure in eighteenth-century discourse in relation to polite
ethics and was, for example, employed as a learning device by Smith's teacher,
Hutcheson, as well as Hume, it is in Smith's theory that it is first used in a strictly
philosophical way. The role of the 'spectator' comes to take this central role in
Smith's theory because the point of view of the 'spectator' is represented that view
from which moral judgements are made.80 Therefore, for Smith it is not possible
for man to derive a true and honest understanding of moral judgements from
sympathy without looking at the sympathetic sentiments in question from the point
of a spectator.
To achieve this necessary perspective, it is essential for the individual to
attempt to remove himself from his own bias and to assume a third person's
perspective. As characterised by Smith, the impartial spectator is assumed both to
have complete knowledge; and as a spectator, be apart from the situation and able
to judge it in a neutral manner. Thus, the ideal impartial spectator would be in a
position to know all the facts, but not actually personally involved. By adopting
this perspective when judging situations, one's chances of making a correct
assessment are dramatically increased and, in turn, allow an effective and accurate
communication of sentiments to occur.
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163
Attaining the perspective of the impartial spectator requires the building of
communication skills based on social interaction. This, in turn, leads to the
construction of general moral guidelines. To gain both the neutrality and
experience necessary to take on the role of the impartial spectator requires us to
study the implementation these skills from those around us that assume that role.
"Our continual observations upon the conduct of others," argues Smith, "insensibly
lead us to form to ourselves certain general rules concerning what is fit and proper
either to be done or to be avoided".81 As with language, those rules require us to
"learn from experience" the correct use of the right sign in the appropriate instance.
Over time, this allows for a system of general rules to be formed. "We have
learned," Smith noted, "from experience, that such a misfortune naturally excites
such a degree of sorrow ... even in those cases in which that sympathy does not
actually take place; and the general rules derived from our preceding experience of
what our sentiments would commonly correspond with, correct upon this, as upon
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many other occasions, the impropriety of our present emotions". While we may
very well attempt to perfect our moral sense by personal reflection, ultimately, it
can be developed only through social interaction. This point is made clear when
Smith asserted that, "men of retirement and speculation, who are apt to sit brooding
at home over either grief or resentment, though they may often have more
humanity, more generosity, and a nicer sense of honour, yet seldom possess that
equality [sic.] of temper which is so common among men of the world".83
The goal of this 'rule learning' and 'application process' is to master the
correlation between a given situation and the appropriate reaction. Significantly for
Smith, though, this process is not derived from some enshrined set of rules existing
as an entity outside our own personal experience, but, rather, the formation of such
standards are dependent on the discovery of them through our own experience.
"We do not," asserts Smith, "originally approve or condemn particular actions;
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because, upon examination, they appear to be agreeable or inconsistent with a
certain general rule. The general rule, on the contrary, is formed, by finding from
experience, that all actions of a certain kind, or circumstance in a certain manner,
are approved or disapproved of'.84 Smith states that, "by considering first the
general rule, and then, secondly, whether the particular action under consideration
fell properly within its comprehension,"85 a general understanding of the correct
use of sentiments is created within society. Smith is of the opinion that, "[W]hat is
agreeable to our moral faculties, is fit, and right, and proper to be done; the contrary
wrong, unfit, and improper. The sentiments which they approve of, are graceful
and becoming: the contrary, ungraceful and unbecoming. The very words, right,
wrong, fit, improper, graceful, unbecoming, mean only what pleases or displeases
those faculties".86
Smith's contentions in this regard echoed Hume's basic premise that societal
moral norms are evidenced by the application of specific words of approbation or
derision associated with specific sentiments as defined within a social context.
However, the degree to which these categorisations dictate our conception of these
sentiments differs greatly between the two theorists. While Smith acknowledged
that such a classification exists, it is important to note that it does not take on the
significance that it did for Hume. In Smith's judgement, the use of commonly
recognised words to distinguish between sentiments is necessary for
communication, but this conclusion does not rise to the level ofHume's faith in the
capacity of linguistic convention to accurately reflect and embody societal moral
standards. As we shall see in the following section, this causes Smith to present a
much more personalised and internalised means or coming to an understanding of
the nature of man's moral sentiments, and in turn, his characterisation and use of








3. The Gaining of Proficiency in the Communication ofMorals
For Smith, and similar in fashion to the growth in proficiency witnessed in
linguistic usage, as our knowledge of the medium of moral sentiments become
more and more developed, the act of moral judgement gradually becomes almost
instinctive as well. It is a skill, however, that takes time and effort to develop.
Smith maintained that, "with a weak man, it is not of long continuance. His own
view of his situation immediately recurs upon him. He abandons himself, as
before, to sighs and tears lamentations; and endeavours, like a child that has not yet
gone to school, to produce some sort of harmony between his own grief and
compassion of the spectator, not only by moderating the former, but by importantly
calling upon the latter".87 In contrast, one who has begun to master his sentiments,
"does not merely affect the sentiments of the impartial spectator. He really adopts
them. He almost identifies himselfwith, he almost becomes himself that impartial
spectator, and scarce even feels but as that great arbiter of his conduct directs him
88
to feel". It is thus through a process of "habitual reflection" that an individual
begins both to demand, and to give, the correct amount of sympathy and do so
without conscious reflection.89
At this stage, we finally learn to act in accordance with the wishes of the
impartial spectator. This entire process by which one masters the communication of
moral sentiments is vividly demonstrated in Smith's example of its progressive
development in a child. He noted that while a child has no self-command, they do
have the ability to naturally communicate their fears, grief, anger, etc. to those
around them. Smith also noted that, except perhaps for angry outbursts, the parents
tend to indulge those reactions and give the child what he wants. As the child ages,
however, such partiality is not to be so easily found amongst their peers. Still
craving partiality and wanting to avoid contempt, the child learns that he himself
87
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must moderate his behaviour to the degree that his play-fellows are likely to find
pleasing. Smith goes on to say that the child has at this point entered "into the
great school of self-command, it studies to be more and more master of itself, and
begins to exercise over its own feelings a discipline which the practice of the
longest life is very seldom sufficient to bring to complete perfection".90 (See
Appendix A) This illustration of early childhood succinctly summarised Smith's
premise that there necessarily must be a transition from an instinctive to a more
controlled awareness of our sentiments. Likewise, through a process of education,
association, and communication, we leam to manipulate and refine those
sentiments in order to maximise our sentimental connection with those around us.
Having presented his theory of moral sentiment communication, Smith then
presented the reader with what can best be characterised as an effective moral
'dialogue': "In all such cases, that there may be some correspondence of
sentiments between the spectator and the person principally concerned, the
spectator must, first of all, endeavour, as much as he can, to put himself in the
situation of the other, and bring home to himself every little circumstance of
distress of his companion with all its minutest incidents; and strive to render as
perfect as possible, that imaginary change of situation upon which his sympathy is
founded".91 Likewise, the person who wishes to gain the maximum amount of
sympathy realises that he must attempt to lower his passions and attempt to
determine just how much sympathy the spectator would be willing to give. "To see
the emotions of their hearts, in every respect" Smith asserted, "beat in time to his
own, in the violent and disagreeable passions, constitutes his sole consolation. But
he can only hope to obtain this by lowering his passion to that pitch, in which the
spectators are capable of going along with them. He must flatten ... the sharpness
of its natural tone, in order to reduce it to harmony and concord with the emotions








This is an effort, in essence, to discover what is in the mind of the spectator,
what his perception of the situation is, and thus what ideas he has formulated in his
mind as to what is the proper reaction in such a situation. Rather than
characterising this as an effort for each to meet the other half-way, it is better
characterised as an attempt by one to seek out the other's level of perception and to
communicate to each other what they, in mutual fashion, judge appropriate given
the situation. While this will not lead to perfect communication of the exact
sentiment being felt, the "two sentiments, however, may, it is evident, have such a
correspondence with one another, as is sufficient for the harmony of society.
Though they will never be unisons, they may be concords, and this is all that is
wanted or required".93
The characterisation of what is necessary as the communication of sentiments
become more refined again parallels that of the contemporary Enlightenment
discussion of language and language use. Locke and Condillac's emphasis was on
proper signification was reflected in Smith's repeated reference to the requirement
that the expression of moral sentiments be "precisely suited to its object",94 and
"proper ... to their object".95 For either a linguistic or moral system to function, the
terms used within the medium must be as precise as possible if there is to be a
mutual understanding and compliance. For accurate communication to take place,
be it in relation to the sentiments or more generally, the key is to come to an
understanding and mastery of the terms at hand, their general meaning and
accepted usage. Only when all the parties have a full and accurate understanding
of what is being signified, and what that signifier properly elicits, can any form of
interpersonal communication effectively take place.
93 Ibid.




4. The Personal Nature of Moral Sentiments: The Influence of Conversation
and Association on the formation ofMoral Sentiments
Given the dynamics of Smith's system, it is clear that the only way the perspective
of the impartial spectator, and thus accurate moral judgements, can be attained is by
actively entering into conversation with other members of society. Significantly,
he believed that the more distant the person is from his or her own selfish interests,
the better this individual is able to gain an accurate gauge for the modification of
our sentiments. This is because, "[T]he conversation of a friend brings us to a
better, that of a stranger to a still better temper". The reason for this is that, "[T]he
man within the breast, the abstract and ideal spectator of our sentiments and
conduct, requires often to be awakened and put in mind of his duty, by the presence
of the real spectator: and it is always from that spectator, from whom we can
expect the least sympathy and indulgence, that we are likely to learn the most
complete lesson of self-command".96 It would seem that our being more distant
from, and less connected to, the source from which we take our cue, the greater its
aid in our efforts to reduce our sentiments "to a pitch which any impartial spectator
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can approve of'. Due to the lack of natural inclination to sympathise with us, it is
the ability to communicate effectively and accurately our sentiments to a stranger
that is most essential to the development of our moral sentiments. This also implies
our need to have mastered the most effective and accurate means of communication
and persuasion in order for this to be possible. It would seem that Smith believed
the best gauge of our learning of this skill, and of its successful mastery, is in our
ability to bring a stranger from remoteness to sympathetic understanding.
This focus on drawing the basis of our general rules from as wide a range of
experience as possible appears also consistent with Smith's contention that,
because we have only our experience on which to base the formation of such rules,
the pool of individuals we draw our observations from plays a critical role in the
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shaping of the sentiments. Reflecting the concerns of both Shaftesbury and
Addison, given the means by which these general rules ofmoral action are formed,
Smith stressed that the character of these interactions are coloured by those with
whom we keep company. Since those with whom we converse on a regular basis
are seen as integral to the formation of our moral character, their leanings toward
virtue or vice will in turn affect the framework of our own moral character. Like
Shaftesbury, Smith stressed that we must be careful from whom we draw our moral
lessons.
In accordance with this premise, Smith stated that the "natural disposition to
accommodate and to assimilate, as much as we can, our own sentiments, principles,
and feelings, to those which we see fixed and rooted in the persons whom we are
obliged to live and converse a great deal with, is the cause of the contagious effects
of both good and bad company". He continued, "[t]he man who associates chiefly
with the wise and the virtuous, though he may not himself become either wise or
virtuous, cannot help conceiving a certain respect at least for wisdom and virtue".98
The opposite is true for those who associate with the "profligate and dissolute".
The manifestation of this fact was recognised by Smith such that "[T]he similarity
of family characters, which we so frequently see transmitted through several
successive generations, may, perhaps, be partly owing to this disposition, to
assimilate ourselves to those whom we are obliged to live and converse a great deal
with".99
In this sense, we see developing in Smith's theory the assumption that there is a
spectrum of possible manifestations of moral sentiments; something that was also
present in Hume's works. For Smith, however, these general spheres of social
awareness do not involve individuals' moral understanding being linked together
by, and evidenced in, linguistic conventions. Rather the understanding of our





though no less social, level. Although both Smith and Hume appeared to be a more
or less universal sense of right and wrong that still exists and is waiting to be
discovered, in Smith's view, the reason that this was not always realised is because
the individual can be led astray from reaching that level of virtue by drawing his or
her assumptions about virtue and vice from the wrong sources.
Smith's vision of multifarious possibilities of contacts that come to shape our
sense of reality does not necessarily negate Hume's contentions regarding linguistic
constructs. Even within this realm of inter-personal contacts outlined by Smith,
.there would seem to be over-arching moral constraints reflected in language use
and recognised by society as a whole. These more general moral norms would in
turn come to be reflected within the micro-social universe that Smith is so
concerned about. However, in the case of Smith it appears that the reality of over¬
arching moral values was taken more or less for granted, for his primary concern
lay in the method by which we shape our own moral sentiments within the societal
spectrum of virtue and vice to which we find ourselves exposed in everyday life.
With each association characterised by Smith as resulting in the manifestation
of a slightly altered moral universe, an individual modifies his or her assumptions
about the moral sentiments over time. For example, while family traits may be
passed on through several generations, this is not in any way pre-destined. When
such familial links are lost, long separated family members are no longer assumed
by Smith to share in the same moral universe as they did before. Though, indeed,
absence may make the heart grow fonder, in this case, Smith argued that time often
conspires against the individual's ability to open their heart to what would be
considered the closest of kin. Family members who have been separated for long
periods of time, ultimately:
[H]ave never lived in the situation that almost necessarily forces that
easy accommodation, and though they may now be sincerely
desirous to assume it, they have really become incapable of doing
so. Their familiar conversation and intercourse soon become less
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pleasing to them, and, upon that account, less frequent. They may
continue to live with one another in the mutual exchange of all
essential good offices, and with every other external appearance of
decent regard. But that cordial satisfaction, that delicious sympathy,
that confidential openness and ease, which naturally take place in
the conversation of those who have lived long and familiarly with
one another, it seldom happens that they can completely enjoy.100
It is nurture, not nature, which in Smith's world shapes man with regard to his
moral sentiments.
Likewise, it would appear that, rather than focusing upon the existence of over¬
arching, culturally defined, moral constructions evident within linguistic
convention as Hume had reasoned, Smith instead concentrated on the host of
micro-social units that come to colour each individual's unique moral reality.
Hume certainly would share Smith's conclusion that it is indeed ultimately nurture
not nature that shapes our moral sense. They would also both seem to agree that it
is an awareness of societal rules of morality gained through an understanding of
moral norms made accessible through language and language use that is central to
shaping our conduct. However, Hume seems to maintain that the guiding principle
behind this belief is ultimately the social utility offered by these standards, and the
general acceptance in society of the utility of those standards as reflected in the
language itself, occur at macro societal level. Smith's fundamental point, and one
he returned to time and time again, is that these macro-utility considerations only
play a marginal part in shaping our moral sense. In real terms, the agency which
does play the primary role in this is the impartial spectator; a much more personal
locus of influence. In turn, to Smith, the daily shaping of the internalised impartial
spectator in his everyday discourse with his fellow man was the principle concern.
100 Ibid., p. 221.
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5. Assumptions of Honesty and Veracity in Sympathetic and Linguistic
Exchange
In this section, we will briefly explore one other element underlying Smith's
commutative theory, namely, the need for honesty and openness in verbal
exchange. Smith, very much in keeping with the discussion in the previous chapter
on Hume, placed great importance on the fundamental assumption that morality is
dependent on the honest use of the common medium of language. Smith stressed
that, "[F]rankness and openness conciliate confidence. We must trust a man who is
willing to trust us. ... Reserve and concealment, on the contrary, call forth
diffidence". He went on to state that, "[T]he great pleasure of conversation, and
indeed of society, arises from a certain correspondence of sentiments and opinions,
from a certain harmony ofminds, which like so many musical instruments coincide
and keep time with one another. But this mist delightful harmony cannot be
obtained unless there is a free communication of sentiments and opinions".101 This
is very similar in wording to Hume's discussion of the origin of natural virtues in
Part Three of the Treatise, and reflects Hume's emphasis on this point as it relates
to effective interaction.102
In contrast to Smith's scenario in the above quotation, the individual who is
unwilling to freely, honestly, and openly enter into such an exchange is held in
some contempt. "The man who eludes our most innocent questions," affirmed
Smith, "who gives no satisfaction to our most inoffensive inquiries, who plainly
wraps himself up in impenetrable obscurity, seems, as it were, to build a wall about
his breast. We run forward to get within it, with all the eagerness of harmless
curiosity; and feel ourselves all at once pushed back with the rudest and most
101
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offensive violence".103 Clearly, this was seen by Smith as an attempt to isolate
oneself from society at a fundamental level. Further, such actions deny other
members of society, who wish to sympathise, the ability to do so. In essence, such
an action is seen as not merely cutting oneself off from society, but essentially
undermining the social cohesion of the community as a whole. It is the free sharing
and exchange of sympathy that binds the society together; when confronted with
such recalcitrance, society naturally reacts intensely against it. Those who do not
openly and honestly participate in the process of communication not only deny
themselves, but also deny others, the pleasures of sympathetic interaction.
While Smith seemed quite willing to admonish those who purposefully engage
in such actions, he extended a great deal of pity to those individuals unfortunate
enough to mistakenly be thrust into such an unpleasant position. These latter
situations most often arise when members of society, for whatever reason, fail to
believe that the individual in question is sharing his sentiments openly and
honestly. As with Hume, Smith implied by this that a high degree of honesty must
be assumed and maintained in order to assure the accurate transmission of morals.
When such honesty is seen to be lacking, even if mistakenly, the willingness of
society to bestow a sympathetic response is found wanting. Because of this, Smith
claimed that "[T]he man who had the misfortune to imagine that nobody believed a
single word he said, would feel himself the outcast of human society, would dread
every thought of going into it, or of presenting himself before it, and could scarce
fail, I think, to die of despair".104 Even if an individual mistakenly deceives
someone, he or she may suffer a similar fate. Smith lamented, "[Tjhough this
involuntary falsehood may frequently be no mark of any want of veracity, of any
want of judgement, or want ofmemory, of improper credulity, of some degree of
precipitancy and rashness. It always diminishes our authority to persuade, and
always brings some degree of suspicion Upon our fitness to lead and direct".105
Whether purposefully or not, a perceived lack of sincerity in the use of language is
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seen as a reprehensible act because it undermines the most fundamental assumption
of communication - veracity. Without veracity, the entire edifice of language, the
facilitating medium of all interchange, individual moral sentiments crumbles.
6. The Tension between Communication of Sympathy and Moral Judgement
At the start of this chapter it was argued that there are striking parallels between
how Smith conceived of the origin and development of moral sentiments and the
conception of the origin, nature, and development of language proffered by the
likes of Condillac and Rousseau. In both cases the origin of communication is to
be found in the instinctive expression of the passions in the presence of other
individuals. Because of the uniformity of these reactions between individuals, a
common core of sentiments is presumed to exist. Upon the recognition of these
common passions, a desire arises to express them, to share them, to persuade others
to identify with them, and to give sympathy. In order for any of these to occur, one
must make the proper observations of society, have the ability to reflect on what
one wishes to express, and do so in such a manner as to maximise understanding.
By undergoing this process, we develop a set of general rules that we use to guide
and modify our moral sentiments.
But, while Smith maintained that the system of communicating moral sentiment
could be formulated around general rules, he did not entirely surrender the
development of moral judgement to these general rules. Because of the deeply
personal and complex nature of moral sentiments, Smith was greatly perplexed by
the difficulties in formulating a set of rules accurate enough to allow complete and
effective communication to occur. While the greater part of Theory of Moral
Sentiments is an effort to trace the origin, development, and means of formulating
rules to guide moral sentiments, scattered throughout the text are efforts by Smith
to explain to the reader that these 'rules' in the end can only serve as guidelines. It
is clear that ultimately Smith was convinced that no matter how masterful we
become in the skill of communicating our sentiments, mankind can never fully
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depend on a concrete, socially constructed set of moral rules to govern our entire
ethical decision making.
Smith appeared to have placed great faith in the idea that, by observation and
reason, man could be guided to an understanding of the vague and complex ideas of
"what is prudent, of what is decent, of what is generous or noble". He also
believed over a period of time this process would lead to the creation of "general
maxims of morality" on which the greater part of our moral judgements could be
formulated.106 Ultimately, however, Smith believed that the relative effectiveness
of any guidelines is dictated by, "the precision and exactness, or the looseness and
inaccuracy of the general rules themselves".107 While, throughout the text, Smith
did refer to these guiding principles as 'rules,' he was also forced to admit that the
principles he had laid out to guide the passions, sentiments and morals (which by
their very nature are loose and inaccurate ideas) are subject to myriad exceptions
and modifications. Such 'rules' cannot, in the end, entirely regulate our conduct.
Smith succinctly articulated this contention in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles
Lettres when he asserted that:
The different passions all proceed in like manner from different
states of mind and outward circumstances. But it would be both
endless and useless to go thro' all these different affections and
passions in this manner. It would be endless, because tho the simple
passions are of no great number, yet these are so compounded, in
different manners as to make a number ofmixt ones almost infinite.
It would be useless, for tho we had gone thro all the different
affections yet the differences of character and age and circumstances
of the person would so vary the affects that our rules would not be at
all applicable.108
As a result, it is Smith's contention that "[W]e shall stand in need of no casuistic
rules to direct our conduct. These it is [sic] often impossible to accommodate to all
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differences and distinctions which, although not imperceptible, are, by their nicety
and delicacy, often altogether undefinable".109 As a result of this reasoning, Smith
characterised the guiding principles governing the expression of the vast majority
of the sentiments not as rules, but rather as what might be characterised as
'style'.110 The latter, being much more amorphous and nuance, seems to fit
Smith's characterisation of the sentiments most accurately.
What makes this naming and labelling process so difficult brings us to our
second major complication in Smith's view, that because of the inherent limitations
of language, the nuances of the sentiments can never be accurately expressed.
Smith seems to have judged language as the limiting factor in the perfection of a
sympathetic response. As he stated,"[Tjhey have only endeavoured to ascertain, as
far as language is capable of ascertaining" how such sympathetic interaction is
possible.111 Smith was emphatic that, while general maxims and ideas about
sentiments can be formulated and signified, "[i]t is impossible by language to
express, if I may say so, the invisible features of all the different modifications of
passion as they show themselves within. There is no other way of marking and
distinguishing them from one another"112 In a larger sense, Smith had to admit that
fixed moral rules in almost every case, are not only insufficient, but also,
unattainable. The one notable exception is the virtue of justice, a topic that we will
take up in the coming section.
Although Smith saw the sentiments as being labelled and categorised so that
some loose standards relating to the various types of morals could be made, he
considers this process as being greatly hindered by the inherent limitations of
language. This fundamental limitation in the nature of language itself is reflected
in a host of Smith's writings. Thus, in his essay Of the External Senses, Smith
noted that "[T]he language which nature addresses to our eyes, has evidently a
109
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fitness of representation, an aptitude for signifying the precise things which it
denotes, much superior to that of any of the artificial languages which human art
and ingenuity have ever been able to invent".113 In Smith's Lectures on
Jurisprudence, he is reported to have stated, in relation to oral contracts, that "the
uncertainty of language ... would make it hard to determine whether a man barely
signified his intention or made a promise".114 The limitations of language was
further expanded upon in Smith's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belle Lettres: "But
whatever the difficulty there is in expressing the externall objects that are the
objects of our senses; there must be far greater in describing the internal ones,
which pass within the mind itself and are the objects of none of our senses. We
have no parts into which we can separate them nor any by describing which we can
convey the notion of desire".115 Lastly, these conclusions about the inherent
limitations of language, as it relates to the expression of moral sentiments is
succinctly stated in The Theory of Moral Sentiment where Smith asserted that,
unlike the rules of grammar, "there are no rules by the knowledge of which we can
infallibly be taught to act upon all occasions with prudence, with just magnanimity,
or proper beneficence: though there are some which may enable us to correct and
ascertain, in several respects, the imperfect ideas which we might otherwise have
entertained of those virtues".116 It seems clear that Smith's continual emphasis on
this ambiguity, which occurs across the entire spectrum of his writings over the
course of his career, reflects his distrust of language's ability to enshrine and
categorise, definitely and accurately, the sentiments.
This attempt to strike a balance between what can and cannot be communicated
dominates a large part of Smith's discussion in The Theory ofMoral Sentiments.
For it is the juxtaposition between the desire to communicate one's sentiments and
the difficulty in expressing them accurately, due in large part to the inherent
112 Ibid.
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limitations of language, which becomes a notable point of concern within his
theory. The Theory ofMoral Sentiments is at least in part an attempt by Smith to
explain the complex and conflicting relationship between on the one hand, the need
and desire to communicate sentiments and our inability to consistently do so, on the
other. In order to overcome this hurtle, we must cultivate our sensibilities and
capacities for judgement, on the assumption that the more perfect our faculties and
sensibilities work the more able we will be able to reconcile this problem.
We also witness in The Theory ofMoral Sentiments a related problem caused
by the inherent difficulties in a theory that requires us to remove ourselves from the
passions being experienced in order that we find a mutually acceptable level at
which maximum sympathy can be given. This, in turn, creates a conflict between
our natural sympathies and our need to adopt a neutral stance. This neutral stance
is necessary for establishing neutral moral standards, for creating a mutually
acceptable medium of communication and, ultimately, for assuring the greatest
amount of sympathy. In order to achieve this, Smith famously insisted that we
adopt the role of an impartial spectator in order to judge the correct reaction. The
use of the impartial spectator allowed Smith to create the impartiality and neutrality
necessary for accurate moral decision making. More important, given Smith's
scheme ofmorals, it permits the individual to see how best to solicit a sympathetic
response from another individual. For "the impartial spectator; which allows no
word, no gesture, to escape it beyond what this more equitable sentiment would
dictate"117 is the ultimate judge of our actions.
But while the impartial spectator serves to bolster the commutative framework,
the concept also represents Smith's last, and perhaps largest obstacle, in his
attempts to present a working system of morals. For the impartial spectator
represents not only dispassionate judgement, but also the inherently individualistic
nature ofmoral decision making. In judging our own reactions to situations via the
116 Smith. Moral Sentiments, p. 176.
117 Ibid., p. 24.
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impartial spectator, we also inevitably judge ourselves. In our search for approval,
one whose approval we seek is our own, in the form of the interior audience, which
has a unique set of standards established by a unique set of experiences. As a
result, this internal self knows more, or at least thinks it knows more, and than the
external spectators and thus has more influence than they do. At times this
increased knowledge, perhaps, pseudo-knowledge, forces us to forsake all others
and strike out on our own. Thus, even given our desire to gain sympathy, and
given the general guiding principles on how this sympathy can be maximised
through accurate communication, in the end Smith was forced to admit that all
these desires at times must be discarded. For in certain situations, "[Tjhe applause
of the whole world will avail us little, if our own conscience condemn us; and the
disapprobation of all mankind is not capable of oppressing us, when we are
absolved by the tribunal within our own breast, when our mind tells us that
mankind are in the wrong".118 Interestingly, however, Smith began the next
paragraph by stating, "[B]ut though this tribunal within the breast be thus the
supreme arbiter of all our actions, though it can reverse the decisions of all
mankind with regard to our character and conduct, and mortify us amidst the
applause, or support us under the censure of the world; yet if we enquire into the
origin of its institution, its jurisdiction we shall find is in a great measure derived
from the authority of that very tribunal, whose decisions it so often and so justly
reverses".119
What Smith presented here could be characterised as a simple 'chicken and
egg' problem of sorting out what really motivates our response. Thus, the question
which needed to be addressed is: Would not the impartial spectator, in the same
scenario, also rely on an individual's decision to go it alone, since his decision is
ultimately based on what might be termed acceptable exceptions to the general
rules? Or is it the case, given Smith's theory as outlined in this thesis, that this
ability to stand against the whole world is the prerogative of any individual because
118
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these 'general rules' are ultimately of their own making? If the sentiments and
character are ultimately shaped by the individual's own unique effort to learn from
personal experience and to establish guiding principles, is he not, by following his
own will, ultimately following the general rules that the individual has worked so
hard to formulate? Isn't the individual's decision not to go along with the general
rules yet another building block in his personal understanding and mastery of
them? It would seem that Smith would answer the above questions in the
affirmative. While the 'impartial spectator' may appear to be going against the
established social standards, that decision is based upon the understanding the
individual has come to construct of the moral universe themselves.
However, the basis of how the individual comes to an understanding of what
will bring them inner peace, what in fact gives us a conception ofwhat this 'higher
moral authority' dictates, is still in question. Given Smith's overall theory, the
conclusions regarding what equates to inner peace would surely be shaped by the
same process that moulded our understanding of the larger societal standards. If
this is the case, it would appear that even the most apparently 'anti-social' decision
on the part of the impartial spectator is in reality shaped by that very same process
of inter-personal and refining conversation contact as was involved in coming to
our understanding of the general moral standards acceptable to the community at
large.
Having looked at the problems associated with relating the sentiments to
communal moral standards, we will next turn our attention to the one notable
exception to Smith's general rejection of hard and fast rules in relation to the
sentiments. Smith contented that the concept of justice stands in stark contrast,
both in character and manifestation, to the other sentiments." In the following
section, we will explore the unique character of this sentiment and the ramifications
of its differences on both morality and linguistics. As we will see, the fact that
rules of justice can be formulated and imposed has dramatic consequences for both
this sentiment's character and expression.
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7. The Effects of Smith's Linguistic Suppositions on His Characterisation of
Justice
As with Hume, justice was portrayed by Smith as a fundamental element in man's
conception of what is essential to both virtuous action and societal order.
Similarly, the virtue of justice is portrayed as a universal characteristic, because it
manifests itself in every nation and in every language. "[T]he word," states Smith,
"it is to be observed, which expresses justice in the Greek language, has several
different meanings; and as the correspondent [sic.] word in all other languages, so
far as I know, has the same, there must be some natural affinity among those
various significations".120 Smith seemed to suppose that because the concept of
justice has manifested itself in the language of every nation, it must therefore be
universal.
Like Hume, Smith considered the utility of justice to be central. Justice makes
a functioning society possible and, since such an orderly society naturally pleases,
mankind enjoys its contemplation. Thus, an individual recognises that, "his own
interest is connected with the prosperity of society, and that the happiness, perhaps
the preservation of his existence, depends upon its preservation. Upon every
account, therefore, he has an abhorrence at whatever can tend to destroy society,
and is willing to make use of every means, which can hinder so hated and so
dreadful an event".121 Because justice plays a fundamental role in society's
preservation, we therefore have a natural proclivity to acknowledge and approve of
its useful purpose.
However, the way in which Smith characterised the manifestation of this
universal idea of justice within society differed from that of Hume. Rather than
seeing justice as the central edifice of society and thus reflected in, and reinforced
120
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by, linguistic conventions, Smith maintained that the formal manifestation of the
virtue of justice stands in stark contrast to the vast majority of moral sentiments.
This is due to the necessarily rigid rules of justice and the distinct way in which a
compliance with such strict codes of conduct requires a natural process of personal
interaction. Thus, while justice's utility warrants its categorisation as a virtue, its
dependence on strict rules removes it from that general body of moral virtues that
are so dependent on nebulous sentiments and willing human interaction.
It appears that Smith struggled to reconcile the legitimacy of institutionalised
systems of justice with his premise that it is the need to give and receive sympathy
as the core to human interaction. In order to rectify this conflict, Smith ultimately
developed distinct categories of justice. "The first sense of the word," argues
Smith, "coincides with what Aristotle and the Schoolmen call commutative justice,
and with what Grotius calls the justitia expletrix, which consists in abstaining from
what is another's, and in so doing voluntarily whatever we can with propriety be
forced to do". 22 The second meaning of the word "coincides with what some have
called distributive justice, and with the justitia attributix of Grotius, which consists
in proper beneficence, in the becoming use ofwhat is our own, and in applying it to
those purposes either of charity or generosity, to which it is most suitable, in our
situation, that it should be applied. In this sense justice comprehends all the social
• 19^ •
virtues". Lastly, Smith related a final meaning that he deemed is not only more
extensive than either of the former types discussed, and is present in all languages.
In this sense of the word, "we are said to do injustice to a poem or a picture, when
we do not admire them enough.... In the last sense, what is called justice means the
same thing with exact and perfect propriety of conduct and behaviour, and
comprehends in it, not only the offices of both commutative and distributive
justice, but of every other virtue, of prudence, of fortitude, of temperance.124 This
final interpretation of the meaning of justice is said to be what Plato "calls justice,
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sort of virtue".125
As for the first form of justice, early in The Theory ofMoral Sentiments Smith
began to develop his characterisation of justice as something associated with civil
authority. For example, in Part II, Section II Smith described the distinction
between beneficence and justice. The central distinction Smith drew between the
two is that beneficence is always granted freely, whereas justice "is not left to the
freedom of our own wills, which may be extorted by force, and of which the
violation exposes to resentment, and consequently to punishment". Actual injury
and actual harm to an individual person mark this type of justice. Because the
motives of such hurtful actions are naturally disapproved of, Smith argued that it is
properly the object of resentment. As a result, man naturally approves of whatever
measures society implements to avoid such injury and ofwhatever civil punishment
is imposed on such violations. The perpetrator of such injustice is also keenly
aware of this reality, and necessarily assumes that such measures will follow if he
is found in violation of them. It is clear that this virtue, while exceedingly useful, is
built not on love or affection, but upon utility.
Smith did not deny the usefulness of commutative justice, but he was quite clear
in his assertion that the character of this type of justice stands in stark contrast to
that of the other virtues. One of the main reasons for this is that the vast body of
virtues do not lend themselves to hard and fast rules. While the "general rules of
almost all the virtues, the general rules which determine what are the offices of
prudence, of charity, of generosity, of gratitude, of friendship, are in many respects
loose and inaccurate, admit of many exceptions, and require many modifications,
that it is scarce [sic. ] possible to regulate our conduct entirely in regard to them".127
Even those virtues, such as gratitude, which lend themselves to more standard
notions of acceptable behaviour have thousands of exceptions corresponding to
"the difference between his character and yours, between his circumstances and
125 Ibid., p. 270.
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yours". Smith continues, "[Tjhose which ascertain the actions required by
friendship, humanity, hospitality, generosity, are still more vague and
indeterminate".128 It is clear that this discussion is meant to contrast justice with
the main body of virtues.
Agreeing with Locke, Smith noted that, unlike the other virtues, "[T]he rules
of justice are accurate in the highest degree, and admit of no exceptions or
modifications, but such as may be ascertained as accurately as the rules themselves,
and which generally, indeed, flow from the very same principles with them.
...Though it may be awkward and pedantic, therefore, to affect too strict an
adherence to the common rules of prudence or generosity, there is no pedantry in
sticking fast by the rules of justice". He goes on to make the analogy that, "[T]he
rules of justice may be compared to the rules of grammar; the rules of the other
virtues, to the rules which critics lay down for the attainment of what is sublime
and elegant in composition. The one, are precise, accurate, and indispensable; the
other, are loose, vague, and indeterminate, and present us rather with a general idea
of the perfection we ought to aim at, than afford us any certain and infallible
directions for acquiring it".129 It is clear then, that while Smith may have agreed
with Locke's general characteristic of justice, he did not share Locke's faith that it
could serve as the guiding example in defining and setting fast rules in regard to the
rest of the sentiments.
This linguistic analogy also highlights Smith's central precepts regarding the
nature ofmoral sentiments. While the design, implementation, and goal of justice
lend themselves to the hard and fast rules associated with grammar, the guiding
principles with regard to the other sentiments are quite different. As discussed
earlier in this chapter, the vagueness of the sentiments and the difficulty in
articulating them in a clear, consistent, and cogent manner, require that their use be
approached in a very different manner from that of justice. For example, the way
128 Ibid., p. 174.
129 Ibid., pp. 175 - 176
185
we learn to live by the virtue of justice is very different from that of the other
sentiments: "A man may learn to write grammatically by rule, with the most
absolute infallibility; and so, perhaps, he may be taught to act justly. But there are
no rules whose observance will infallibly lead us to the attainment of elegance or
the sublime in writing; though there are some which may help us, in some measure,
correct and ascertain the vague ideas which we might otherwise have entertained of
those perfections. And there are no rules by the knowledge of which we can
infallibly be taught to act upon all occasions with prudence, with just magnanimity,
or proper benefice: though there are some which may enable us to correct and
ascertain, in several respects, the imperfect ideas which we might otherwise have
entertained of those virtues".130 It is clear that learning the 'rules' for being just is
far less demanding and more straight forward than is mastery of all the other
virtues; for these elude such straightforward governance. The most we can
possibly hope for because of the vast majority of sentiments, and in contrast to
justice, is "[T]o describe, in general manner, what is the ordinary way of acting
which each virtue would prompt us. ... It is, indeed, scarce possible to describe the
internal sentiment or emotion upon which it is founded, without doing something of
this kind. It is impossible by language to express, if I may say so, the invisible
features of all the different modifications of passion as they show themselves
within".131
Expanding on these premises, Smith later in The Theory ofMoral Sentiments
returned again to this distinction between the rules governing justice as being
comparable to the rules of grammar, and the 'rules' governing the other virtues
more comparable to standards "which critics lay down for the attainment ofwhat is
sublime and elegant in composition, and which present us rather with general ideas
of the perfection we ought to aim at, than afford us any certain and infallible
direction for acquiring it". Smith went directly on to assert that, "[A]s the different
rules ofmorality admit such different degrees of accuracy, those authors who have
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endeavoured to collect and digest them into a system have done it in two different
manners; and one set has followed through the whole that loose method to which
they were naturally directed by the consideration of one species of virtues; while
another has as universally endeavoured to introduce into their precepts the sort of
accuracy of which only some of them are susceptible. The first have wrote like
critics, the second like grammarians".132 Therefore, the first type is characterised
as being held by all the ancient moralists, who focused on describing the general
manner of the different virtues and vices, but made no attempt to lay down precise
rules. While there may be basic premises of conduct which allow us to identify our
distinct sentiments, "[I]t is impossible, indeed, to express all the variations which
each sentiment either does or ought to undergo, according to every possible
variations of circumstances. They are endless, and language wants names to mark
them by".133 It is thus through the exploration of the concept of justice, and by
contrasting it to the main body of virtues, that Smith most clearly demonstrated the
major premises of his theory.
Smith highlighted the chasm between commutative justice and the vast
majority of moral sentiments in other ways as well. Smith asserted that "[I]n
treating of the rules of morality, in this manner, consists the science which is
properly called Ethics, a science which, though like criticism it does not admit of
the most accurate precision, is, however, both highly useful and agreeable".134 This
stands in sharp contrast to a second type of moralist, characterised by the middle








endeavour to lay down exact rules to govern human behaviour. Smith notes that,
"justice is the only virtue with regard to which such exact rules can properly be
given".135
It is interesting to note that whereas virtue of justice requires a set of rules
that are not dependent on the mechanism of sympathy; this fact has a profound
effect on how this virtue manifests itself in society. As justice does not depend on
a willing exchange of sentiments, it represents an artificial construct within the
sympathetic system. While commutative justice may be necessary, its
independence from the general pool of social bonds that are created through the
willing exchange of sentiments has dramatic consequences on both its virtuous
nature and on those who violate it. While we still share the resentment of someone
to whom a wrong has been done and believe that he or she has a right to have that
wrong corrected, the process by which we come to this state of sympathetic
reaction is distinct from Smith's general theory ofmoral sentiments.
This is due to the fact that, in contrast to the other sentiments, the virtue of
justice relates to man as a fellow member of a larger societal collective, not as an
individual character. As a result, the virtue of justice has its basis in our character
as citizens concerned with the greater good, not in us as individuals who feel an
affinity toward our fellow man. In order to act justly, we act in a manner contrary
to the vast majority of our sentiments in order to meet the requirements of the
virtue ofjustice. For example, Smith noted that even if an odious person is dealt an
injustice, we enter into resentment if there was no provocation. Smith likewise
cited the example of a sentinel who falls asleep on watch, which at the time was
considered a capital crime. "The natural atrocity of the crime seems so little," notes
Smith "and the punishment so great, that it is with great difficulty that our heart can
135 Ibid., p. 330.
reconcile itself to it".136 Yet we realise that the severity of the punishment does not
rest in the individual's action so much as in the greater good which his actions have
jeopardised.
While there are some acts, such as murder or parricide, that draw upon quite
instinctive sentiments which lead us to conclude that they are in violation of the
rules of justice, there are also a large number of other rules of justice which seem,
at first blush, to be unjust until their contribution to social cohesion and social
utility are taken into account. For example, in the case of the odious character or
the relatively innocent failing of the sentinel, we are forced to go against the grain
of the vast majority of our sentiments in order to apply the proper rules of justice.
Though Smith admitted that this presents a conflict and that it may taint our
judgement to some degree, he is confident that this ambivalence "does not in this
case altogether prevent our fellow-feeling with his natural indignation; though with
those who are not either extremely candid, or who have not been accustomed to
correct and regulate their natural sentiments by general rules, it is very apt to damp
* 137it". It is clear that Smith realised that our sentiments must at times be
transgressed ifwe are to fulfil the goals of justice.
Commutative justice also stands in stark contrast to the other virtues because,
as characterised by Smith, justice is a 'negative virtue' in that its breach deserves
punishment, but its observance does not warrant any reward. This is very much a
characterisation of the virtue of justice as. positive law, in that justice is a 'virtue'
that serves only to prevent one from doing actual harm to another member of
society. Therefore, one can "fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting still and doing
nothing". Thus, the rules governing this virtue require no interaction at all; one
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and very existence, rely on social interaction and conversation, Smith saw the strict
rules of justice as exerting their influence and control over us irrespective of any
inter-communication or action.
This severance of commutative justice from the other virtues is brought home,
in turn, in relation to the inapplicability of the rules of justice when judging our
internal sentiments. Smith is quite explicit in asserting that the rules of justice
cannot be used to pass judgement on our other internal sentiments for otherwise
"sentiments, thoughts, intentions, would become the objects of punishment; and if
the indignation of mankind run as high against them as against actions; if the
baseness of the thought which had given birth to no action, seemed in the eyes of
the world as much to call aloud for vengeance as the baseness of the action, every
court ofjudicature would become a real inquisition."139
Thus, whilst actions are to be punished:
Sentiments, designs, affections, though it is from these that
according to cool reason human actions derive their whole merit or
demerit, are placed by the great Judge of hearts beyond the limits of
every human jurisdiction, and are reserved for the cognisance of his
own unerring tribunal. That necessarily rule of justice, therefore,
that men in this life are liable to punishment for their actions only,
not for their designs and intentions, is founded upon this salutary
and useful irregularity in human sentiments concerning merit or
demerit, which at first sight appears so absurd and unaccountable.140
It becomes clear at this point that Smith attempted to isolate justice as a unique,
though necessary, element of society, and one which must necessarily operate in its
own sphere of influence. Due to the unique character of commutative justice, it has
a binding effect beyond our personal sentiments and, unlike other sentiments, acts
outside our control. Further, due to universal approbation of the premises of
justice, force may "be made use of to constrain us to observe the rules of the one,
Ibid., p. 105.
140 Ibid., p. 105.
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but not to follow the precepts of the others".141 Here we see that Smith
distinguished between the rules of justice, and the precepts that command all our
other sentiments. While essential, in no way should the former be allowed to
transgress the latter, for they are both essential, yet completely distinct, elements of
social cohesion.
As a result of this distinction, Smith seems to have contended that the
sympathetic mechanism, although primary to man's character, is not a factor in the
development of commutative justice. This distinction has a dramatic effect on the
manifestation of our sentiments in relation to justice. For example, Smith was
confident that "[T]he violator of the more sacred laws of justice can never reflect
on the sentiments which mankind must entertain with regard to him, without
feeling all the agonies of shame, and horror, and consternation".142 After the
violation of the rules of justice, when the individual has the opportunity to calmly
reflect on his or her actions; "[TJhey appear now as detestable to him as they did
always to other people. By sympathising with the hatred and abhorrence which
other men must entertain for him, he becomes in some measure the object of his
own hatred and abhorrence".143 Feeling self-pity and regret, he has a keen
awareness of the appropriateness of society's scorn, resentment, and punishment.
As Smith stated, "[T]he thought of this perpetually haunts him, and fills him with
terror and amazement. He dares no longer look society in the face, but imagines
himself as it were rejected, and thrown out from the affections of all mankind".
Most importantly, "[H]e cannot hope for the consolation of sympathy in this his
greatest moment of dreadful distress. The remembrance of his crimes has shut out
all fellow feeling with him from the hearts of his fellow-creatures. The sentiments
which they entertain with regard to him, are the very thing which he is most afraid
of 144 Smith continued that while such an individual might feel that his best option









would encounter there would be more dreadful than anything he could face from
his fellows. Given this, he has no other option but to come "again into the presence
of mankind, astonished to appear before them, loaded with shame and distracted
with fear, in order to supplicate some little protection form the countenance of
those very judges, who he knows have already all unanimously condemned him.
Such is the nature of that sentiment, which is properly called remorse; of all the
sentiments which can enter the human breast the most dreadful".145 (See Appendix
B) This quote highlights the sentimental ramifications caused by the artifice of
commutative justice. Separated from the other virtues by the lack of dependence
on the medium of sympathy, those who run afoul of the rules ofjustice are likewise
separated from the sympathetic support of others. Yet the artifice of justice does
not prevent the individuals themselves from reflecting on their actions and feeling
an irrepressible need to share sentiments of shame with their fellow man. When
these individuals most are in need of personal connection with others, when they
are most painfully aware of their trespasses due to their sentiments, it is at this time
that those sentiments cannot be conveyed.
The reason for this incongruity is the dominating artificial construct of justice
and its associated rules. Since the institution of justice is apart from the
sympathetic mechanism, the individuals who have both violated the rules of justice,
and affronted the sentiments created within the society around that transgression,
are likewise isolated. They not only lack the ability to participate in the willing
modification and exchange of the sentiments through the medium of sympathy, but
have also violated the 'artificial' foundation of justice on which that exchange is
accommodated within a society. Smith appeared to have lamented that, while
utilitarian and necessary, the sacrifice justice requires, the separation from the
sentiments it demands, is a great one. Hence, while justice may be the greatest
virtue, the price paid at an emotional level for its transgression, remorse, is judged
by Smith to be the most dreadful of all the sentiments.
145 Ibid., pp. 84 - 85.
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What we come to recognise is that, in Smith's opinion, commutative justice
does not represent a connection with our fellows, but rather was portrayed by him
as an 'appropriate' conflict with the wishes of others. Hence, proper resentment at
injustice "can justify our hurting or disturbing in any respect the happiness of our
neighbour".146 This friction with our fellows manifests itself in no virtue but
justice, and on its face seems the antithesis of all the more noble aspects of the
human character. Only when it is seen for what it is, the bedrock of a functioning
society, can this greatest of social artifices be brought into our breasts and acted
upon.
The movement of the sentiments associated with justice are characterised as
being quite different from that of the attempt to gain positive sympathy. Smith
immediately went on to discuss the fact that "[T]he opposite behaviour naturally
inspires the opposite sentiment".147 The man who intentionally does a generous
action feels himself to be the natural object of love and admiration, and "by
sympathy with them, of the esteem and approbation of all mankind".148 In such a
case, even when he adopts the position of the impartial spectator, he still enters into
it, and "applauds himself by sympathy with the approbation of this supposed
impartial judge". Due to this correlation both internally and externally, he finds
himself, "in friendship and harmony with all mankind, and looks upon his fellow-
creatures with confidence and benevolent satisfaction, secure that he has rendered
himselfworthy of their most favourable regards".149 Removed from the artifice of
commutative justice, the more natural exchange of sentiments characterised here
represents the harmonious interaction and balance that result from the vast majority
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It would seem that, while Smith would wish that all men could act at the
noble level of the more nuance virtues, he does not think that we can depend on
people to do so. As a result, Smith maintained that we must necessarily have a
system in place to ensure that a minimum level of social cohesion and predictability
is maintained in society. While virtuous behaviour is to be encouraged and is the
"ornament which embellishes" the social structure, Smith maintained that justice is
"the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice. If it is removed, the great, the
immense fabric of human society, that fabric which to raise and support seem in
this world, if I may say so, to have been the peculiar and darling care of Nature,
must in a moment crumble into atoms".150 This is because without some sense of
justice, man would care so much for his own interests, and so little for that of
others, as to render him unfit to function in a social context at all. While
beneficence makes life more comfortable, society can exist without it; yet without
justice society would be utterly destroyed. Still, it would appear that Smith wished
that it were otherwise, and only reluctantly embraced the rules of justice out of
social necessity.
However, perhaps in an effort to reconcile the apparent conflict between
commutative justice and the other sentiments, Smith presented the reader with
another form of justice, one much more in keeping with the general thrust of his
interpretation of the moral sentiments. Citing Grotius, Smith believed that there is
another, more comprehensive, concept of justice that is most accurately associated
with the idea ofjustitia attributrix, also known as distributive justice. In contrast to
Aristotle, however, who argued that distributive justice related to the proper
distribution of rewards from the public stock of a given community, Smith gave his
interpretation of justice a much more personal meaning. As noted at the start of
this section, Smith maintained that distributive justice is associated with coming to
an understanding "ofwhat is our own, and in applying it to those purposes either of
charity or generosity, to which it is most suitable, in our situation, that it should be
150 Ibid., p. 86.
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applied".151 In this sense of the word, "we are said not to do justice to our
neighbour unless we conceive for him all that love, respect, and esteem, which his
character, his situation, and his connexion with ourselves, render suitable and
proper for us to feel, and unless we act accordingly. It is in this sense that we are
said to do injustice to a man of merit who is connected with us, though we abstain
from hurting him in every respect, if we do not exert ourselves to serve him and to
place him in that situation in which the impartial spectator would be pleased to see
him".152
From this characterisation, 'distributive justice' is the ability to relate to each
person we encounter based on his or her individual situation. While this is a core
premise of Smith's moral theory more generally, it stands in sharp contrast to the
discussion of commutative justice that dominates Smith's writings on the nature of
justice. However, distributive justice is much more in keeping with Smith's
general contentions regarding the sentiments, and is thus characterised as
comprehending all the social virtues. While only mentioned in passing, this
conception of justice reflects Smith's major contention that the pursuit of virtue
involves self-perfection and the refinement of our individual characters to their
greatest social good.
Lastly, there is a closely associated meaning of justice, cited by Smith, which
builds on his general theory and also "runs ... through all languages".153 It is the
ability to discern between the nuances of objects, to judge them in a manner that is
fitting, and respond in such a way as an impartial spectator would approve. Based
upon standards of taste, this sense of justice compels the individual to judge
whether an object is proper and befitting its particular purpose in a particular
setting. Also these assume that there are no precise or necessarily correct
judgements in such cases, and thus allow a range of nuance and acceptable
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the general tenor of Smith's discussion of justice. This broader conception of
justice, for Smith, is related to taste, involves interaction and personal judgement,
and, therefore, is inherently repugnant to the imposition of hard and fast rules.
It is hard to know whether these alternative interpretations of the meaning of
justice are merely an attempt to explain away common usage outside of its more
institutionalised form, or perhaps to bring the virtue of justice somehow within the
scope of the other virtues. What is clear, however, is that these more rigid forms of
justice were not the primary focus in Smith's writings. Rather, the focus ofSmith's
attention was the role of justice in its commutative form. As such, it was seen as
not only essential, but also as very much distinct and removed from the main body
of the sentiments. Whilst its great utility might have brought it soundly into the
highest realm of virtue, the artificial constructs which created that foundation also
walled off its function from man's more natural sentiments. Consequently, Smith
was willing to admit that it is essential for justice to exist and that its unusual
manifestation be justified and explained. But he is in no way inclined to go farther
than this. Thus, like Hume, Smith believed that without justice we could not
express our other sentiments. However, once the foundation of commutative
justice is laid and secured, it is the two broader conceptions of justice, as we shall
see, that come to be the central focus of Smith's discussion of how we master the
communication of our moral sentiments. Unlike commutative justice, these
concepts of justice are intricately tied to the vast body of our natural sentiments.
Central to these latter forms of 'doing justice' is the consideration of our own
situation in order that we can use this resource in such a manner as to accentuate
and maximise our own personal realisation. It is these skills which we must
develop if we are to make this a reality and to which we turn in the following
chapter.
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8. Conclusions and Conflicts
Having reviewed the structure of Smith's argument, the relationship between his
theory and contemporary theoretical assumptions relating to language and language
use becomes evident. The discussion of language and language use by such as
Locke, Mandeville, Condillac, and Rousseau in the first half of the century and
Adam Smith's later elaboration of the formation ofmoral sentiments all sought an
understanding of how and why man first made a purposeful effort to express
himself to another individual. The roots of this process, in both cases, was seen as
arising most inadvertently in man's natural reaction to either joy or pain, and the
universality of that experience. From this beginning arose the next step, the
intentional effort to make this connection on command. In order for this to occur,
in both cases a system of communication with which people could interact was
necessary. For this to be achieved, the ability to exchange thoughts necessitated a
common medium by which to communicate; namely, by mutually recognised and
acceptable signs relating to a particular object, had to be created within a given
society. This in turn required individuals to learn the correct use of signs through
experience, to recall the correct usage through reflection, and to adjust those signs
using reason - all of which were themselves developed and refined in order to carry
out this task
But as regards the passions, which started off this whole communication process
in all the linguistic theories discussed, their role, beyond that instinctive stage at the
dawn of inter-communication, took on dramatically different forms. And in each
case, the role assigned to the passions did not fit into Smith's conception of the
transmission of moral sentiments. It is at this point that Smith and the
contemporary assumptions about the origin and evolution of language parted
company, and Smith was left on his own to struggle with finding a workable
scheme for the formation of moral sentiments. For example, as we saw in the first
chapter, Locke was able to address the difficulty of the expression of abstract
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sentiments by adopting a conception of language in which all conceptions of the
mind, no matter how simple or complex, could be defined, labelled and
communicated. Smith simply did not accept that it was as simple as this, and even
when forming his general rules, realised that the passions, at best, can be only
loosely defined. Smith in the end was not willing to go so far as to assume that all
the passions could be categorised and neatly defined so as to accommodate their
communication. While Smith might have agreed with Locke's reasoning when it
came to justice, it is clear that as regards the other passions, Locke's theory did not,
for Smith, adequately address the problem of communicating the passions.
To Mandeville the early emotional cries were the springboard of
communication, but not the purpose behind language. By specifically dismissing
communication of the passions as the reason why people converse with one
another, in favour of the desire to persuade, he clearly distanced himself from the
kind of argument presented by Smith. While Smith is very much in agreement with
Mandeville as to the seminal position of persuasion in communication, and indeed
as to how effective persuasion is to be achieved, he does not share in Mandeville's
contention that communication came about purely to persuade and was not created
to express the passions. Smith requires that man do more than just cajole and
manipulate; man must also convey a sentiment clearly, accurately and honestly. To
Smith, the element of persuasion was merely a means of achieving the goal that
Mandeville dismissed, namely, the expression of a passion to another person.
While Mandeville allowed man the freedom to use whatever means were at his
disposal to achieve the goal of engaging in the commutative act, Smith's use of
persuasion was necessarily limited in that it must at all time remain truthful to the
individual's desire to share the sentiment he is experiencing at the time.
As noted earlier in the chapter, to Condillac the passions were the origin of
inter-personal communication, and the passions were depicted as continuing to
have a role in linguistic development. Critically though, he did not maintain that
we can reflect on the passions while we are experiencing them. In addition, given
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his understanding of the manner in which man reasons, Condillac did not seem to
think that we have immediate control over our passions. If this is an accurate
portrayal of how we process our passions, then it follows that we cannot be
experiencing, reflecting, comparing, modifying and transmitting all of our
sentiments at the same time as Smith appeared to argue is possible. Condillac was
equally dubious that, due to the infinite permutations of the passions and a lack of
signs to express every nuance of those passions, men are forced to use only general
terms and broad rules to categorise them. This was particularly troubling in the
effort to define such concepts as virtue and vice. Thus, while Condillac would
seem to have concurred with the way Smith presented the general formation of the
'rules' governing moral sentiments, Condillac would appear to have little faith in
the success ofSmith's more general project.
Likewise, Rousseau also saw the desire to express the passions as the root of
language; but he had little faith that its development and refinement enabled a more
effective means of the communication of sentiments to be created. Rousseau in
fact considered the use of reason and reflection to guide moral judgements as a
huge hindrance to true personal fulfilment. To him the expression of the
sentiments via language represented, if anything, a dulling of the core passions, and
allowed man in society a way to justify his unwillingness to connect with his fellow
man.
It becomes apparent, then, that both Condillac and Rousseau were unwilling to
link their observations on the central role of the passions in stimulating the creation
of language to any conclusions regarding man's moral character. The difficulties
surrounding the passions once language had progressed was considered very
problematic by Condillac, and seen as negative by Rousseau. In so doing, they also
effectively isolated its use in any extended explanation of the nature and progress
of the formation ofmoral sentiments via a linguistic analysis.
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Unlike Condillac and Rousseau, Smith needed to address directly the
problematic area of the relationship between the core elements driving the
development of interpersonal communication and morality. In doing so, Smith
moved away from many of the communal assumptions about language maintained
by Hume and toward use of references to language and language use that
emphasised the need to formulate an internalised standard of morality. While both
based their conceptions of the sentiments on the idea of sympathy, Hume's
conception of the role of language in the formation of moral sentiments was quite
different. To Hume, linguistic convention played a significant role in moulding the
moral character of a social group, and it was the goal of an individual coming into
that social group to learn and adopt these standards. Due to Smith's conviction in
the nebulous nature of the sentiments, and the inherent limitations of language to
enshrine them, he seems to have been unwilling to portray language as the vessel
by which the moral character ofman is carried and shaped.
It becomes apparent, then, that with regard to the expression of the passions in
society, there is great discord among the various theorists as to the role of the
passions. The difficulties surrounding the passions once language had progressed
was marginal by Locke, considered a non-issue by Mandeville, considered
problematic by Condillac, seen as negative by Rousseau, and seen as established
based on utility and social convention as evidenced in social constructed acceptable
linguistic usage by Hume. Unfortunately for Smith, however, none of these options
were open to him. He had placed the inherent difficulty in the communication of
sentiments at the very centre of his theory, and was forced to deal head on with all
of its implications and inherent conflicts.
Smith attempted in The Theory ofMoral Sentiments to present the formation of
moral sentiments as a social construct, but this effort involved the application of
such concepts as the passions, sympathy, and moral judgement; abstractions that he
deemed, by their very nature, eluded being moulded into clearly definable social
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constructs as evidenced in language itself. This inevitably brought about the
dilemma faced by Smith throughout the. entire length of The Theory of Moral
Sentiments, of reconciling the conflict between the desire to gain sympathy, and the
'man in the breast.' In the end, Smith spends much of his time trying to strike a
balance between these two elements, and was forced to argue them both, always
reminding the reader, when discussing one, of its conflict with the other.
Given the inherent weaknesses in the communication of the sentiments made
evident by Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith had to take these
limitations into consideration when formulating his theory for how we develop and
refine our moral sentiments. What Smith believed we must strive for is proficiency
in the use of the available medium of language - at least as far as that limited
instrument will allow. As noted earlier, in discussing the lack of perfectibility in
relation to the sentiments, Smith referred to the fine arts, and that the closer one
comes to a refinement in that field, the more one realises that they are lacking. Yet,
even given this realisation, "the conduct and conversation of a whole life to some
resemblance of this ideal perfection, is surely much more difficult than to work up
to and equal resemblance any of the productions of any of the ingenious arts".154
Having relinquished the idea that we can ever truly become complete masters of the
expression of our moral sentiments, Smith resigns himself to the fact that the most
we can ever do is work toward that ideal; and do so by refining and developing a
command of our skills in the communication of those sentiments. In the face of the
struggle to convey sympathy to those around us, we know that: "[S]ociety and
conversation, therefore, are the most powerful remedies for restoring the mind to its
tranquillity, if, at any time, it has unfortunately lost it; as well as the best
preservatives of that equal and happy temper, which is so necessary to self-
satisfaction and enjoyment".155 As we will see in the following chapter, for Smith,
1M
Ibid., p. 249.
155 Ibid., p. 23.
the goal was the refinement of individual expression of the sentiments, and the




Rhetoric and Adam Smith's Conception of the Communication of
Sympathy and the Refinement ofMoral Sentiments
As we witnessed in the previous chapter, Smith did not share Hume's faith in the
ability of linguistic convention to reflect the moral universe of a given community.
While the communication of the sentiments mirrors the origin and development of
language and language use, and indeed plays a crucial role in that development,
linguistic convention itself is not portrayed by Smith as playing a central role in
developing our moral character, as was the case with Hume. This is due in large
part to Smith's insistence that the nuanced nature of the sentiments simply rendered
linguistic convention incapable embodying with any degree or certainty all the
multifarious shades associated with the sentiments.1
This does not mean, however, that language did not play a crucial role in the
formulation of Smith's theory ofmoral sentiments. While Smith did not agree that
general language usage led an individual to an understanding of particular society's
moral standards, Smith certainly did see the conscious use of language it as the key
to unlocking these standards. Through the command of language, and the ability to
make one's oral expressions fit as closely as possible to our individual character
and sentiments, each person within society can come to maximise their sympathetic
interaction through the mastery of language. For while general rules of morality
lay an essential foundation to our development, much like grammar rules are
essential to language, it is the effort to put these general premises into action with
'elegance and sublimity', associated with the development of style, that is a central
tenet ofSmith's theory ofmoral sentiments.
1 Smith noted, "No words are sufficient to convey an adequate idea of their [the passions] effect", Lectures
on Rhetoric. Lecture 16, p. 87; and that "It would be endless, because tho the simple passions are of no
great number, yet these are so compounded in different manners as to make a number of mixt ones almost
infinite." Lectures on Jurisprudence, p. 69.
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It must be remembered that Smith's conception of morals revolved around
man's need to communicate effectively with other individuals in order to solicit
sympathy from his fellows. To facilitate and develop this skill, the study of
rhetoric was judged by Smith to be the most useful tool for achieving this goal.
This fact is evidenced by John Millar's explanation that Smith, his former teacher,
chose to emphasise in his lectures the proposition that, "[T]he best method of
explaining and illustrating the various powers of the human mind, the most useful
part of metaphysics, arises from an examination of the several ways of
communicating our thoughts by speech, and from an attention to the principles of
literary compositions which contribute to persuasion or entertainments".2
Reflecting the surge in interest in belletristic rhetoric amongst the emerging urban
commercial class during this period, Smith advocated the refinement of belletristic
rhetoric as a tool of social and moral refinement. It is Smith's contention that it is
through the refinement of these rhetorical skills that we can most effectively come
to control and develop our moral sentiments. By adapting contemporary rhetorical
trends to his theory of moral sentiments, Smith provides a prime example of the
effort among some of the major Scottish theorists of the period to merge their
epistemological assumptions into operable, socially based, theories of moral
refinement.
1. Adam Smith and Rhetoric: A Lifelong Curiosity
Adam Smith demonstrated a lifelong interest in the study of both rhetoric and
moral theory. As a result, Smith's understandings of moral sentiments and the
nature of rhetoric not only appears to have evolved along side each other, but also
at times became so interwoven as to be almost indistinguishable. The delineation
of these two spheres is made all the more difficult, since references to the
relationship between rhetoric and morals exists in the form of obiter dicta scattered
2
Dugald Stewart, Account of the Life and Writing of Adam Smith. LL.D. originally published: London:
T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1795. Reproduced in: W.L.D. Wightman (ed.), Essays on Philosophical
Subjects. I. 16.
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throughout all Smith's works. This section will attempt to establish that, even
though not systematically presented, rhetoric played a central role in Smith's
characterisation ofmoral sentiments.
Ironically, Smith's rhetorical legacy can be gleaned only from his other works
and the writings of others. He never published his lectures on rhetoric and belle
lettres, and the only known manuscript dealing directly with rhetoric was among
those destroyed by his strict instructions the week before his death. If any other
original first-hand writings did ever exist, they have been lost. So when one refers
to 'Smith's rhetoric' or quote his lectures, we are in fact citing student notes or
references to rhetorical thinking found in his works on other subjects.4
The historic evidence, though, is unequivocal in its testament to Smith's lifelong
interest and involvement in the dissemination of eighteenth-century rhetoric. Smith
began his career at the age of 26, just two years out of Oxford, lecturing on rhetoric
and belle lettres.5 He presented these lectures on the subject ofwriting and asserted
that clear and concise writing was a culturally desirable goal, particularly in
Scotland.6 These lectures were well-attended over the two-year period that they
were taught, and as a result of their popularity, Smith was offered the Chair of
Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Glasgow in 1751, and the next year
3
See, Adam Smith Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. ed. J.C. Bryce (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1983) p. 1.
4 In 1961 John M. Lothian, Reader (later titular Professor) in English in the University of Aberdeen
announced his discovery ,at an Aberdeenshire manor-house library in 1958, of two volumes ofmanuscript
notes 'Notes ofDr. Smith's Rhetoric Lectures,' reported by a student in 1762 - 1763. For a more detailed
description of the interesting facts surrounding this discovery, see, Smith, 'Introduction,' Lectures on
Rhetoric, pp. 1 - 7.
5
'Rhetoric,' at this point can be loosely defined as the science of effective communication. 'Belle lettres,'
as the literature of the imagination and passions. And 'belletristic rhetoricians,' as those concerning
themselves explicitly with the rhetoric function of language.
6 Kurt Heinzelman, "The Last Georgic: Wealth ofNations and the Scene ofWriting", Adam Smith's
Wealth ofNations: New Interdisciplinary Essays, ed. Steven Copley and Kathryn Sutherland
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995) p. 172.
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moved to the Chair ofMoral Philosophy.7 It is thought that these initial lectures on
rhetoric were then incorporated into his teaching in these other disciplines, as well
as a separate course, in the years 1752 - 1763.
The original appointment as a lecturer on rhetoric, which launched Smith's
teaching career, did not come by pure chance. "It seems likely," Lothian surmises,
"that his friends considered that for his native bias of taste and his prolonged
literary studies that he was the natural choice." Due to his study under Francis
Hutcheson at Glasgow and his six years at Oxford, Smith's "awareness of the
language as an activity" made him a natural for the role.9 It was this awareness
which came to play a central role in his formulation of the nature of moral
sentiments. His interest in rhetoric also extended into his activities as a member of
various Edinburgh societies. For example, Smith was on the Select Society's
'Committee for Belle Lettres and Criticism,' and was best known among its ranks
as a literary critic.10
The copies of the student notes which make up Lectures on Rhetoric and Belle
Lettres (hereafter, Lectures on Rhetoric) were written between 1762 and 1763, and
appear to be the work of two of Smith's students who collaborated to make the
notes as accurate an account of Smith's words as possible.11 These notes lay the
foundation of our understanding of Smith's conception of rhetoric in relative
isolation. This grounding in rhetoric was yet further advanced when in 1764
Charles Townshend employed Smith as the travelling tutor to his step-son, the
young Duke of Buccleuch. Spending the next three years in France, Smith became
steeped in French drama and literary theory, expanding his already existing interest
in French rhetoric and philosophy.
7
Dorothy C. Broaddus, Moral Sense Theory In the History ofRhetoric (Louisville: University of
Louisville Press, 1989) p. 53.
8 John M. Lothain's, "Introduction" to Lectures on Rhetoric, cited by Thomas P. Miller, "Eighteenth-
Century Scottish Rhetoric in its Socio-Cultural Context," unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (University of
Texas, 1984) p. 48.
9 Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric, p. 7.
10 John Rae. Life ofAdam Smith (Bristol: Thoemmes Antiquarian Books, 1990) p. 116.
11 Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric, p. 4.
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The influence of rhetoric on Smith's thinking is evident during the remainder of
his career and was a focus of his scholarship right up to the time of his death.
Henry Mackenzie wrote to a Mr. Carmichael in 1783 that Smith, "has lying by him,
several essays, some finished, but the greater part not quite completed on subjects
of criticism and belle lettres, which, when he chooses to put them to the world, will,
12
I am confident, nowise derogate from his former reputation as an author." These
essays appear to have related to Smith's lectures on the history of the sciences and
arts, as well as on rhetoric and belles lettres.13 Unfortunately, these works never
came to fruition and were destroyed, at Smith's behest, shortly before his death.
While Smith's personal history clearly demonstrated that he was deeply
involved in the development and dissemination of rhetorical principles throughout
his life, we are still confronted with a less than clear history of his actual thoughts
on the subject. Our most isolated historical evidence of Smith's views on rhetoric
clearly comes from the student notes. Even if we assume that the note takers who
penned the Lectures on Rhetoric are as reliable as if the author himself penned it,
the simple fact ofwhen the notes were taken greatly impedes our efforts to examine
Smith's rhetorical thinking in isolation. The lectures that make up Lectures on
Rhetoric apparently date from the fifteenth year which Adam Smith lectured on
Rhetoric.14 As J. C. Bryce notes, "[Wjhat modifications the lectures on rhetoric
underwent between 1748 and the session which our notes were taken is almost
impossible to determine."15 However, for our purposes, it is important to note that
Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments had already been published when the
student's notes were penned and the text of the Lectures on Rhetoric reveals that
12 William R. Scott. Adam Smith as Student and Professor (Glasgow: Jackson, Son & Co., 1937)
p.284.
13 Herbert W. Schneider, "Biographical Guide," Adam Smith's Moral and Political Philosophy, London:
Harper and Row, 1970, p. xxvi.. An Advertisement by the editors of these essays in 1795 stated, "[W]hen
these were inspected, the greater number of them appeared to be part of a plan he once had formed, for
giving a connected history of the liberal sciences and elegant arts. It is long since he found it necessary to
abandon that plan as far too extensive; and these parts of it lay beside him neglected until his death."
(Black and Hutton, "Advertisement," V, [51 - 52], London, 1795).




the amalgamation of Smith's theory of moral sentiments and those of rhetoric had
already taken place.
As we will see below, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments a myriad of
correlation are drawn between rhetorical subjects and those of Smith's conclusions
on the nature of human sentiments. Thankfully, rather than serving as a barrier to
the deciphering of Smith's observations on rhetoric, this at times almost
impenetrable mixture of the two reveals much more than it conceals in the end. For
by examining the interaction between Smith's rhetorical thinking and his
discussion ofmoral sentiments, we discover how one served to advance the other.
2. British Empiricism, Rhetoric and Adam Smith
The first area we will investigate is the relationship between empiricism and
rhetoric in mid-eighteenth-century Scotland, which was marked by the
abandonment in rhetorical theory of reason, in favour of observation as the basis of
judgement. As a result of this transition, it became critical for both empiricists and
rhetoricians to formulate new theories as to what criteria of observation should be
followed. For example, it was natural for those interested in the empirical method
to look to rhetorical tools of judging aesthetics as the building blocks of their own
standards of observation. The preoccupation of the belletristic rhetoricians with the
judgement of observations of beauty and taste was seen as giving insight into how
humans perceived and judged both their environment and each other. In turn, the
systematisation, universality, and neutrality sought by the empirical method
intrigued the rhetoricians. It was hoped that the lessons learned from empiricism
could be adapted to the rhetorical concern with beauty and taste, and could be
utilised to formulate universal rules of aesthetics. Due to their mutual concern
following the rhetorician's rejection of pure reason by formulating new criteria for
judging the nature of observation, a process of interaction and exchange began
between them. In this section we will discuss this interaction, starting first with the
implications on the 'science ofman', and then turning our focus to rhetoric.
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While at face value, the empirical method pursued by the 'science of man'
appears to be, if anything, completely repugnant to rhetorical principles, we will
see that the Scottish Enlightenment discourse on human nature was in fact
profoundly influenced by rhetorical principles. As noted in Chapter II, though
Hume who pioneered the 'science ofman' never formally defined the notion, there
is no difficulty in identify their concern in taking a systematic investigation of
human nature parallel in rigour and comprehensiveness to the investigation of the
natural world to be found in the works of such men as Boyle and Newton. The
study of nature and the study ofman were considered by the Scots to be two parts
of the same discipline. It was their paramount goal to establish an understanding of
human nature that would parallel the certainty and methodological soundness
attributed to the natural sciences. In order to achieve this goal, moral philosophers
of the period adopted the scientific method of analysis and synthesis and adapted it
to moral subjects. It was their contention that the 'science ofman' like the 'science
of nature' ultimately rested on observation and experience that would, given
sufficient data, establish a causal relationship between the principles of nature and
observable phenomena. In the case of the 'science of man' this entailed
establishing a causal relationship between the principles of human nature and
man's cultural achievements.
The epistemological primacy of sensory data assumed by the science ofman,
and the conclusions that could be drawn from such observations, seems on the face
of it to be hostile to rhetoric. It would appear that the adoption of the empirical
method was, if anything, an attempt to purge the pursuit ofmoral philosophy of the
tainting influence of rhetorical influences. Since the time of Plato, rhetoric was oft
times labelled by philosophers as something inferior, dishonest, and having no
concern for truth but only the semblance of truth.16 Certainly, by the nineteenth
century, rhetoric had a pejorative meaning, suggesting underhanded tricks, fraud,
16 Samual Ijsseling, Rhetoric and Philosophy In Conflict (The Hague: Martinus Njjhoff, 1976) p. 86.
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• 17and deceit. But to assume this, is to make fundamental errors as to the nature of
both the 'science ofman' and rhetoric in eighteenth-century Scotland.
Empiricism during the eighteenth century was part of a larger literary and
philosophical culture in a way that modern empiricism is not. Theorists during this
period did not draw sharp distinctions between 'science' and 'philosophy.' For
example, often in the work of Smith the two terms are used almost interchangeably.
In his works, morality, sympathy and imagination are all illustrated with reference
to belletristic rhetoric. Conversely, he grounds his belletristic rhetoric in human
psychology and explains and evaluates it in terms of human nature. The 'limits' of
science and the 'limits' of philosophy were the frontiers which were under
investigation. Until such time as these boundaries were finally established, the
recourse to the techniques of other disciplines was completely valid. In the effort
to discover the core of human nature, any methods open to investigation were
pursued. With their roots in philosophy, rhetoric, or science, in the new pursuit of
the 'science ofman', old concepts utilised under the scrutiny of the new empirical
method were all potentially conceived as shedding light on man's nature.
A good example of this trans-disciplinary interaction is the interplay between
rhetoric and philosophy due to the necessary methodological changes precipitated
by the displacement of 'pure reason' as the basis of philosophical thought during
the Scottish Enlightenment. In the eighteenth century the Scots shifted away from
thinkers of the French Enlightenment such as Diderot, who had sought complete
final and exclusive understanding of all that there is by way of philosophical
reflection based on reason and independent of other enquiries, and adopted the
empirical method whose aim was to base judgement on actual experience and
observable phenomena. This rejection of, as Hume put it, "reasoning purely
philosophical",18 marked a fundamental alteration in how the study ofman's nature
was to be pursued.
17 Ibid. p. 1.
18
Hume, Treatise, p. 184.
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With the rejection of pure reason, the Scots turned their attention to the
empirical premises of experience and induction. Scottish empiricism was
preoccupied with the observer and with investigating the principles of the mind by
which one was led to understand and believe what one observed.19 As a result of
this shift in the locus of knowledge, the Scots were also confronted with the
problem of how to methodise and understand observation and reflection. For while
the "ideas of sensation" were at the forefront of this new methodology which the
Scots hoped to replicate, there was necessarily correlated with this the equally
important "ideas of reflection and judgement".20 It is here that we find the core to
the rhetorical element of Scottish empiricism. As Jules D. Law notes, "[f]or in that
confrontation with the sensory world that constitutes the central drama of empiricist
writing, language and sensation (particularly visual perception) are inextricably, in
fact dialectically, related ... the empirical characterisation of perceptual knowledge
is articulated explicitly in the form of linguistic distinctions."21 It is the empiricist
task of perception and processing of data which is the key here, for as soon as one
begins to comment on proper response to observations, rhetorical principles of
judgement necessarily enter the picture. For the empiricist the "account ofwhat we
see is inseparable from an account ofwhat we say".22
This need on the part of the empiricists for a standard by which observations
could be characterised coincided with a shift in the concept of perception in the
field of rhetoric during the mid-eighteenth century; a shift which itself marked a
movement away from reasoning and toward a reliance on observation. Smith
appears to have followed the shift in French rhetoric away from an emphasis on
cognition and toward an insistence upon the importance of sensory stimulation in
generating effective response. French theories replaced concepts of the 'rational'
19 Barbara Warnick, The Sixth Canon: Belletristic Rhetorical Theory and Its French Antecedents
(Columbia: University of South Carolina) p. 10.
20 Jules David Law, The Rhetoric of Empiricism: Language and Perception from Locke to I.A, Richards





with such aesthetic considerations as the roles of nature, culture, propriety, and
sensation. Thus, aesthetic criteria received the attention that had formerly been
given to reasoning and logic.23 This shift in rhetoric mirrored the British empirical
aim of basing judgement on actual experience derived from accounts of the
workings of the human mind and away from 'pure reason'. Thus, with both rhetoric
and the 'science ofman' rejecting the idea that understanding could be achieved by
simple reflection, each discipline was in a position to investigate how the other was
dealing with this fundamental change.
Smith looked to developments in belletristic rhetoric for insights into how better
to clarify observations of human behaviour. Belletristic rhetoric was fascinated
with aesthetics and the development of receptive competence. By focusing on
reception, rather than production, their aim became to discover what caused
pleasure and what made an impression.24 This emphasis was extremely compatible
with the introspective empiricism of eighteenth-century Scotland. In Smith's view,
rhetoric was worth studying because it represented the best way to explain and
illustrate the various powers of the human mind. By the premises of rhetoric,
everything we perceive, feel, and which operates on our minds is expressed and
delineated in such a manner that it can clearly be distinguished and remembered.25
It should be made clear that this process was not one of the empiricists merely
looking to the rhetoricians for insights into perception, but was also marked by the
alignment of new rhetoric with contemporary epistemology. As Barbara Warnick
notes, "[t]he development of receptive competence was a principal aim of the
belletrists; it shaped and profoundly influenced their agendas and their methods."26
The discussion of aesthetics within the rhetorical field itself during this period
adopted a very empiricist slant, revolving around sensory capacity and common
sense impulses of the interaction between cognition and judgement. Eighteenth-
23
Warnick, p. 10.
24 Ibid. p. 34.
25
See, Dugald Stewart, "Accounts of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith, LL.D." Essays on
Philosophical Subjects of the Late Adam Smith. 1795.
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century British belletristic rhetoric became increasingly focused on the specific
qualities that were desirable in a discourse and on their effects. This shift of focus
in Smith's approach to rhetoric was related by John Millar, Professor ofCivil Law
at Glasgow, a former student of Smith and a lifelong friend, who made clear that
Smith had from the start decided to radically overhaul the traditional teaching style
and curriculum when he took over the chair of the Professorship of Logic, turning
away from the traditional teachings of 'ancient logic' and toward a system that
focused on rhetoric and belles letters. Smith judged the latter two the best way to
illustrate the powers of the human mind, "from an examination of the several ways
of communicating our thoughts by speech, and from an attention to the principles
of those literary which contribute to persuasion and entertainment. By these arts,
everything we perceive or feel, every operation of our minds, is expressed and
delineated in such a manner, that it may be clearly distinguished and remembered".
Smith maintained that there was no contemporary "branch of literature more suited
to youth at their first entrance upon philosophy than this, which lays hold of their
taste and their feelings".27 (See Appendix A) In light of this quote, it must be
remembered that Smith's conception of rhetoric was marked by the adoption of
sceptical proofs as the basis of their rhetorical method. According to Smith, the
mind was said to combine ideas through patterns of association such as
resemblance and causation. In this way, rhetoric was seen to work by appealing to
the imagination. Rhetoric was to be aimed at stimulating the sensations and the
goal of the orator was to make general ideas concrete, lively, and vivid.28
Smith also began to incorporate empirical goals into his rhetorical writing. He
repeatedly returned to literary style as an index to the author's moral character
because he was attempting to establish a basic standard for evaluating literary
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possibility of establishing guiding principles of aesthetic judgement as the key to
the discovery of the most effective styles of composition. For if the former could
be established, then the latter could eventually be determined by the same means as
those used to discover standards ofmorality.
His proposition of how this could be accomplished is clearly driven by an
empirical orientation. To Smith, aesthetics were perceived not by reason, but by
imagination and taste. For the most part, then, aesthetic judgement was
characterised as in the mind of the perceiver and, like judgements ofmorality, are
actually expressions of personal sentiments. Thus, there are not any objective,
rational standards for aesthetic judgement built into the human character from birth.
But like moral behaviour, our natural disposition and personal experience enable
our rational faculty to discover, with relative certainty, not only the cause but also
• • • 90
the qualities of aesthetics. Just as reason and judgement, after, not before,
experience can determine the causes and qualities of moral propriety and thus with
a fair degree ofprobability inductively formulate 'rules' ofbehaviour - so too could
set standards for belletristic beauty be found.30 As reflected in Smith's moral
theory, everyone was assumed to have some idea of ideal writing style, as which
was gradually formed from experience.31 With the creation of standards of
composition, there could be created a guide for writers and critics because reason
could be used to ascertain those qualities of literature that universally please or
displease. However, due to the necessary provable qualities of these elements, the
number of such rules would be extremely limited.
29
See, Smith, Moral Sentiments, p. 290; Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, Lecture #13; Smith, Lectures
on Rhetoric. Lecture #20.
30
See, Smith, Moral Sentiments, pp. 29 - 30, 179, 181.
31
See, Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric. Lecture 30; Smith, Moral Sentiment, p. 30.
32 For example, the universally proven rhetorical principles of narration and description should be studied
and utilized, and rules of classic decorum should be carefully observed.
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3. Rhetoric as a Tool of Persuasion: Moral Sentiments, Polite Society,
and Adam Smith
At this point a discussion of the practical implications of the relationship between
rhetoric and morals must be offered. This is necessary in order to avoid reading
Smith with a naive intellectualism which isolates his characterisation of rhetoric
and moral sentiments from its traditional relationship with the socio-political life of
the people. For it must be remembered that this characterisation of rhetoric by
Smith was shaped by numerous crosscurrents of the cultural renaissance of the
eighteenth century. As discussed in the introduction, the rise of 'polite' society and
the corresponding interest in belletristic rhetoric, improvement, and commercial
society gave the 'science of man' a conceptual framework in which to fashion a
new understanding of man's fundamental nature. In its effort to fit its empirical
findings into the emerging nature ofmodern society, or, arguably, perhaps the other
way around, rhetoric was employed to make the 'data' fit the 'nature' of modern
commercial man, which rests at the core of Smith's theory of society and morality.
The rising influence of middling urban classes in the social and economic
institutions of Scotland in the early eighteenth-century was paralleled by a similar
increase in their influence on Scottish culture. As is often the case, concerns for
standards of behaviour and expression among this rising social rank were pursued
in order to consolidate their identity. In the case of the Scots, this search for a new
identity revolved around the pursuit of 'polite' society. Due to the nature of post-
Union Scotland, such a group was naturally more interested in the rhetoric of polite
behaviour and polite tastes than in the rhetoric of political discourse. This desire
coupled with the spread of literature and the decrease in the cost of books, made
literary culture more accessible to an increased number of people and
accommodated those interested in studying high culture as a way of gaining social
respectability and cultural authority. This new culture of 'politeness' revolved
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33around the correct usage ofEnglish and the expression of 'polite' taste. The desire
to learn how to write and speak English well, to behave like a proper gentleman,
and to develop one's 'judgement' and 'taste' prompted Scotland's mid-century
merchants, lawyers, and tradesmen to pursue belletristic rhetoric, which offered
these rising classes a criteria which demonstrated one's judgement and powers of
discernment.34.
Belletristic rhetoric studies had an important societal function, namely, the
promotion of good sense and morality by instilling the 'polite' values of the
emerging culture. For example, the teaching of rhetoric as a formal and distinct
discipline in Scotland began almost a century earlier than in English universities.35
The reason why the Scots began to teach English literature and rhetoric at college
level was due to the increased interest in 'polite' learning in society as a whole.
With a middling class determined to transform Scottish urban society, the pursuit
and mastery of 'polite' society allowed them to demonstrate that they were not
culturally inferior to their southern compatriots. It was also seen as a way to
introduce moderation into the society and thus squelch the political and religious
extremists that threatened the stability of the emerging system.
Smith was one of the first to respond to the contemporary developments in
philosophy and literary criticism by redefining rhetoric as the study of discourse,
including persuasion and literature. The practical nature of Smith's programme
was intended both to shape the intellectual discipline as well as social behaviour.
One of the most telling remarks relating to the practical implications of language in
shaping man is offered in Theory ofMoral Sentiments. For central to Smith's
hypothesis regarding the nature ofman is that:
The desire of being believed, the desire of persuading, of leading
and directing other people, seems to be one of the strongest of all
our natural desires. It is, perhaps, the instinct upon which is founded
33
Klein, p. 4.
34 Thomas P.Miller, Eighteenth-Century Scottish Rhetoric in its Socio-Cultural Context, Unpublished Ph.




the faculty of speech, the characteristical faculty of human nature.
No other animal possesses this faculty, and we cannot discover in
any other animal any desire to lead and direct the judgement and
conduct of its fellows. Great ambition, the desire of real superiority,
of leading and directing, seems to be altogether peculiar to man, and
speech is the great instrument of ambition, of real superiority, of
leading and directing the judgements and conduct of other people.36
As we witnessed in the previous chapter, it is ultimately for this purpose that we
hone the skills of communication in order to maximise our ability to elicit
sympathy from others.
Smith also contended throughout his life that man's moral and aesthetic
judgement could best be refined through engagement in pleasant, informed, 'polite'
discussion. In fact, Smith's earliest writings, which appeared in the Edinburgh
Review in 1755, called on his countrymen to apply themselves to the study of polite
culture. Likewise, The Select Society, of which Smith was an important member,
had set as its aim the improvement of culture and language. The connection
between a command of the language and a good society consistently coincides in
Smith's works as well, illustrating the close relationship of intellectual enquiry and
the cultivation of proper 'taste' to members of the Scottish Enlightenment.
Rhetorical discipline was presented as a skill which was the duty of the new social
elite to master. In both The Theory of Moral Sentiments,37 and Lectures on
38 • ...
Jurisprudence, Smith also asserted that the vehicle for the promotion of polite
society was literature, because it taught moral qualities and the good taste that
demonstrated them. If this end were to be achieved, these faculties should be
developed by way of education and social intercourse.39
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As a result, Smith's approach to rhetoric was far removed from the traditional
'Ciceronian' discipline outlined in Chapter I, and much more concerned with
writing and speech.40 Belletristic rhetoric featured significantly in Smith's new
approach to rhetoric, with its emphasis on style, observation, and moderation;
representing a new synthesis of selected rhetorical teachings with the contemporary
philosophy of polite society. Smith presented a rhetoric which was not a body of
knowledge containing pre-existing and prescriptive rules of formal modes of
argumentation to be mastered, but rather as negotiable and utilitarian, with
conventions reflecting the enhanced social flexibility and responsiveness to the
increasingly commercial orientation of the society in which it had to be applied.41
Smith saw the medium of style as a coefficient of civility, and 'right rhetoric' as
making an understanding morality accessible to society.
Not only was Smith's conception of rhetoric itself shaped by 'polite' society
and its goals; the influence of the goals of polite society, coupled with the ideals of
persuasive and convincing rhetorical methods, profoundly influenced the
presentation of Smith's 'science of man' as well. It was very much Smith's
project to endorse and naturalise the economic processes of commercial society as
he saw them, and to accomplish this by regarding these characteristics as
fundamental to human nature.42 The division of labour and the evolution of the
mechanisms of commercial exchange on which his theory of progress depends are
portrayed as the unplanned consequences of fundamental human propensities to
engage in commercial activity. Smith's utilisations of rhetorical tools in his
presentation of his theories are a striking example of rhetorical methods at work.
For example, Smith's grandiose style, his wealth of apt and convincing
illustrations, help to give his views of human nature an obvious and authoritative
air. Yet the assertions made and conclusions drawn are often far more complex,
40
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and questionable, than they first appear. He defined wealth and social prosperity as
relating to the status of society as a whole rather than just to the possessions and
power of the elite 43 This means that the income and well-being of a large sector of
society are seen as central in the evaluation of the wealth and stability of a nation.
He further maintained that human moral consciousness is developed by the
imagination through social interactions and feelings of sympathy for the experience
of others.44 Such philosophical assumptions are rhetorical: the former legitimises
the social aspirations of a larger section of society and the latter makes the
engagement in 'polite' society a means of strengthening moral consciousness.
The nature of Smith's writings on the 'science of man' stands testament to the
hybrid nature of his views on morality and rhetoric. As Kurt Heinzelman notes,
"Wealth ofNations is one of the last non-literary works in which we still see how
persuasion, in the absence of statistics, mathematics models, and even at times
sufficiently raw data," demonstrates that as a genre it lies somewhere between
belletristic 'fine' writing and didactically motivated writing.45 In the case of the
Wealth of Nations, "actuality and paradigm, description and prescription,
generalisation and disabling qualification, are all repeatedly, and sometimes
bewilderingly, elided in Smith's account of the way in which the obvious and
simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord in commercial
economics, and by extension in the societies in which they develop."46 Smith's
emphasis on competition as the means of advancing truth, as well as economic
profit, is especially relevant to the study of rhetoric because it makes the pursuit of
truth at least partly a rhetorical concern. In this work the text is essentially
converted into a virtual celebration of the power of human labour and an attempt to
redefine values as related to men's desires.47
43 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth ofNations (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1979) pp. 376 - 380.
44
Adam Smith, Moral Sentiments, pp. 11 - 66.
45
Copley and Sutherland (eds.), Kurt Heinzelman's article, p. 171.
46
Copey and Sutherland (eds.), Introduction, at p. 13.
47 Keith Tribe. Land. Labour, and Economic Discourse (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978) pp.
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It is clear that Smith imagined his writings on economic and moral subjects as
part of the whole socio-political infrastructure dedicated to 'polite' society. Due to
this fact, and the need to align his arguments with this goal, Smith's works as a
whole take on a 'belletristic aura'.48 In the pursuit of the 'truth' behind the 'science
of man' necessarily lie the strategic use of persuasion and the conformity of the
message with the desires of the reader that is so much a part of the belletristic
rhetorical tradition. In the end, it was often the case that the use of rhetoric was
employed by Smith to make the 'science ofman' conform to the dictates of 'polite'
society, and not the other way around.
4. Rhetorical Antecedents to Smith's Theory ofMoral Refinement: Influence
and Adaptation
Having looked at the ramification of empirical and social developments on Smith's
thinking, we will now turn our attention more specifically to the developing ideas
of rhetoric during this period which had a profound influence on Smith's
conception of moral sentiments. As we observed earlier in this chapter, in the
effort to create a 'science of man' and to present a more practical approach to the
study of rhetoric in Scotland we witness the replacement of pure reason with the
primacy of observation. The two disciplines, faced with similar problems, look to
each other for inspiration as to how they could achieve their objectives. More
specifically, it appears that in Smith efforts to refine his presentation of his ideas of
sentiments and propriety, his efforts to contribute to the creation of a 'science of
man' drew extensively on established rhetorical principles.
In order to appreciate this relationship we must first examine the influence of
French rhetoric on Adam Smith. The whole belletristic rhetoric methodology that
originated in France in the seventeenth century focused on reception, not
production, and on what created a pleasurable impression. At the root of this
objective was a conception of sentiment and propriety, which was later embraced in
113 - 114.
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Scotland. The French rhetoricians had seen the need to adjust discourse to the
audience's culture, predisposition, and functions of the mind in order to attain
rhetorical success. By briefly outlining the French developments in this area by
Dubos and Lamy and then turning our attention to Smith's writings on morality, it
will become apparent that there is strong evidence that French rhetorical theory
greatly influenced his conclusions on the refinement ofmoral judgement.49
The work of Jean-Baptiste Dubos demonstrates a methodology that was
empirical, subjectivist, and took into consideration the sentiments. It was Dubos's
contention that in any given case of 'judgement' a reaction precedes deliberation,
and thus sentiment precedes reason. Due to this, judgement played no immediate
role in this process.50 It was his contention that sentiment renders the decision,
whereas reasoning and judgement only justifies it after the fact. He argued the
general public could judge taste, since it was sentiment, rather than artistic rules
and principles that moved a person's reactions.51
In the pursuit of their 'science of man', the Scots were anxious to work toward
a new concept ofmorality in which it could be seen as a social phenomenon. For
this reason they were responsive to a theory which involved ready-made faculties.
As noted in Chapter I, following on Shaftesbury's presentation of sentiment as a
spontaneous reaction, Hutcheson was the first to elaborate on it and adopt
sentiments as the focal point of human nature. As with a physical sense, moral
sense was portrayed as reflexive, and as requiring no further psycho-analysis.
Through sentiment, Hutcheson maintained that an individual could perceive right
48
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and wrong conduct. Hume, discussed in Chapter II, pushed the analysis of
sentiments farther and began to develop his conception of sentiments and their
relationship to sympathy. As discussed in this and the proceeding chapter, Smith
also relegated both moral and aesthetic judgements to the realm of sentiment, not to
reason, and took the idea of sentiments as the key concept of the moral nature. It
would seem, however, that Smith, while maintaining the same basic premises as
regards the centrality of the sentiments rather than reason in discerning moral virtue
as Hume, took the rhetorical implications of these conceptions as being far more
important due to his conclusion that the desire for the maximisation of sympathetic
response was the key to man's conception ofvirtue.
To demonstrate the impact of rhetorical principles on Smith's efforts to illustrate
and substantiate his claims regarding how man goes about maximising his
sympathetic interaction it is instructional to review the work of the seventeenth
century French rhetorician Bernard Lamy. His work marked a radical departure
from the scholastic and neo-classical rhetoric which had preceded it. A precursor to
belleterism, Lamy was pre-occupied with studying forms of expression so as to
discover how the mind worked and how its functioning in turn affected human
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nature. Adopting a reductionist view of the mind's operation, he too focused on
the immediate, involuntary responses to discourse rather than on a cognitive,
rational response.
Lamy contended that persuasion was tied to all efforts to communicate. He
believed that this was essential for an orator to utilise the audience's inclinations by
discovering the values relevant to the audience and directing them into premises
that favoured his position in order to gain their approval.53 He judged that response
of an audience was nearly automatic, and the goal was to find what triggered a
response and to convey one's expression in such a manner as to incite a desired
52
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reaction in the audience. "To persuade," Lamy observed, "we must find a way to
bring People to our Sentiments that were of a contrary Sentiment before: We must
put our matter in Order in our minds, and having fairly disposed it, we must make a
choice of such words as are proper to express it."54
Lamy was pre-occupied with the idea of vraisemblance (verismilitude) and
bienseance (propriety). Vraisemblance refers to the need to conform one's
narration to the audience's past experiences and present expectations.55 It
developed from a general notion of what was natural and appropriate in given
circumstances. Even though an action might have actually occurred, it might very
well lack vraisemblance because it was such a derivation from the normal course of
action that no audience could be expected to identify with it. The expression that
was put forth was to be carefully attuned to the passion which was trying to be
conveyed. If this were not achieved, the speaker's or narrator's credibility would
be greatly undermined.56
Bienseance dictated that one must always be aware of cultural practices and
mores. It was a consideration of aesthetic judgement that referred to social
conventions and tacit rules as to what was appropriate in a given social situation.57
Revolving around the rigid class system of seventeenth-century France, bienseance
had two dimensions, one internal, the other external. The internal application
focused on whether a character's actions conformed to his rank, age, and situation.
The external application was concerned with whether a depiction matched the
audience's expectations ofwhat was normal and appropriate.58
53 Ibid., pp. 28 - 29.
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The aim was to strike a balance between vraisemblance and bienseance which
would evoke admiration and the effective response from the listener.59 Through the
observance of propriety at both levels, it allowed the listener to identify with the
speaker and with the experiences and the responses the speaker wished to convey.
If the speaker's style, manner or expression did not match up with those the listener
would experience in similar circumstances and so propriety was violated, then the
rhetoric would have no effect upon the listener.60
Smith's conception of rhetoric and moral propriety was very likely influenced
by Lamy's rhetoric, particularly Lamy's conceptions of vraisemblance and
bienseance. In fact he entitled his initial section of Theory ofMoral Sentiments "Of
the Sense of Propriety," Bienseance, which is dedicated to a description of
essentially vraisemblance and bienseance principles. As with Lamy, the central
focus of this section is how to strike a balance between these two elements in order
to evoke admiration and an effective response from another. In this case, the
relationship is not between orator and listener, but between the agent of a particular
sentiment and the individual from which he wishes to evoke a response.
Smith concurred with Lamy's contention that a writer should transmit his
thoughts in a manner which is coherent, natural, and suited to the capacities of their
audience.61 He states, "[W]hen the sentiment of the speaker is expressed in a neat,
clear, plain and clever manner, and the passion or affection he is poss{ess}ed of
and intends, by sympathy, to communicate to his hearer, is plainly and cleaverly hit
off, then and then only the expression has all the force and beauty that language can
give it." In his opinion, "the perfection of stile consists in Express(ing) in the
most concise, proper and precise manner which best conveys the sentiment, passion
or affection with which it affects or he pretends it does affect him and which he
designs to communicate to his reader." This is a standard which is, "equally
59 Ibid. p. 57.
60 Ibid. pp. 58 - 59.
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applicable to conversation and behaviour as writing. For what is that makes a man
agreeable company, is it not, when his sentiments appear to be naturally expressed,
when the passion or affection is properly conveyed and when their thoughts are so
agreeable and natural that we find ourselves inclined to give our assent to them."63
Smith also agreed that expression should be natural, not overworked, and
ordered so as best to express the author's character and emotions. He states that in
writing, "one should stick to his naturall (sic.) character: gay man should not
endeavour to be grave nor the grave man to be gay, but each should regulate that
character and manner ... and hinder it from running into that vicious extreme to
which he is most inclined."64 In Smith's opinion, observing propriety in one's style
and expression enables an audience or readership to identify more easily with the
speaker or author and, in turn, what they are trying to convey. For, "it is when the
expression is agreeable to the sense of the speaker and his affections that we
admire."65
For Smith the chief aim of any discourse was to so express oneself so that the
idea or passion conveyed could be fully and easily experienced by the reader.66
"The whole of the objects described should tend to excite the same emotion
otherwise the end will not be answered. Where the chief design is to excite mirth
and chearfullness nothing should be brought in that is gloomy and horrible, and on
the other hand where we would raise awfull grand sentiments, the whole must tend
that way."67 In a similar vein, Smith noted "[Tjhat when the words neatly and
properly expressed the thing be described, and conveyed the sentiment the author
entertained of it and desired to communicate [to his hearer] by sympathy to his
hearers; the expression had all the beauty language was capable of bestowing on
it."68 Thus, when this balance is struck, granted the inherent limits of language
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recognised by Smith and discussed in the previous chapter, it is the most that any
individual could hope for in his efforts to both share the true sentiments they are
feeling and, in turn, elicit the maximum amount of sympathy.
Lamy's approach to rhetoric seems to have had a profound effect upon Smith's
conception of moral propriety as well. For at the centre of Smith's view of
sympathy lies the need to measure one's action by the yardstick of propriety in
given circumstances. It is the coupling of the infinite nuances of the sentiment with
the infinite manifestations of different personalities that Smith sees as the
explanation for the lack of clear fast rules in the area ofmorality. Smith notes in
his lectures on rhetoric: "The different passions all proceed in like manner from
different states of mind and outward circumstances. But it would be both endless
and useless to go thro' all these different affections and passions in this manner. It
would be endless, because tho the simple passions are of no great number, yet these
are so compounded in different manners as to make a number of mixt ones almost
infinite. It would be useless, for tho we had gone thro all the different affections
yet the difference of character and age and circumstances of the person would so
vary the affects that our rules would not be at all applicable".69 It is this reality was
discussed in the previous chapter, and it will be remembered that the innumerable
manifestations of sentiment was something that he was troubled by in relations to
effective sympathetic interaction. Therefore it is Smith's project to provide
individuals with the tools by which they may, despite this fact, still reach some
degree of mutual understanding, and thus moral understanding. In order to do this,
both the nature of language and the uniqueness of each individual situation must be
taken into consideration.
As a result, the idea of vraisemblance plays an important role in Smith's
conception of the effective transmission of the sentiments. Smith not only
contended that propriety, approbation and sympathy are inexorably linked, but that
approval is only granted when the agent acts in a manner appropriate to the given
69
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situation. This idea of the decorum of the agent in relation to their character and
situation directly affected his view of the effective transmission of sympathetic
feelings:
The objects with which men in the different professions and states of
life are conversant, being very different, and habituating them to
very different passions, naturally form in them very different
characters and manners. We expect in each rank and profession, a
degree of those manners, which, experience has taught us, belong to
it. But as in each species of things, we are particularly pleased with
the middle conformation, which, in every part and feature, agrees
most exactly with the general standard which nature seems to have
established for things of the kind; so in each rank, or, if I may say
so, species of men, we are particularly pleased, if they have neither
too much, nor too little of the character which usually accompanies
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their particular condition and situation.
This distinction based on an individual's particular station is reflected throughout
his notes on rhetoric. In the end, conformity to one's 'role' in a given the situation,
appears to be the very significant element ofSmith's conception ofmorality.
This element also figures heavily in what is considered by Smith to be a proto¬
typical example of virtue. In Part VI of The Theory of Moral Sentiments in a
section entitled, 'Of the Character ofVirtue', a prudent man is characterised as who
is characterised by being to carry on convivial, inoffensive, and sprightly
conversation. In this respect he is a better example of proper behaviour than has
been done by such 'splendid talents and virtues' from past ages from Socrates to
Voltaire, from Alexander the Great to Peter the Great, who have "too often
distinguished themselves by the most improper and even insolent contempt of all
the ordinary decorums of life and conversation, and who thereby set the most
pernicious example to those who wish to resemble them, and who too often content
themselves with imitating their follies, without even attempting to attain their
perfection".71 (See Appendix B) This passage amply demonstrates the balance
that Smith maintained must be struck between vraisemblance and bienseance in
70
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order to make for effective communication. It also highlights the fact that this
equilibrium does not necessarily manifest itself in those of rank or status, yet, at the
same time, is achievable by anyone. Smith would seem to argue that man couldn't
simply look to the great or grand for guidance on such matters, no matter how
refined and estimable their characters are often portrayed.
This is not to say that these individuals, as individuals, do not necessarily act in
a fitting matter in regard to their own character, but simply that one should not
attempt to pattern one's own life by mimicking exactly the unique character and
personal status of any one person. The reason for this is that Smith does not accept
that there are any iron-clad methods of judgement, but rather that such
determinations have everything to do with the particular circumstances surrounding
them and the variable character of the individuals involved. For example, Smith
goes on to describe the very contrasting styles of ridicule utilised by Swift and the
Epicurean Lucian. In the case of Swift, while Smith cited him as someone whom
we would not necessarily look to pattern our lives around, this does not mean that
his actions were not befitting his own character. Swift's naturally morose nature,
coupled with a trying life, resulted in contempt being a fitting part of his character.
While this temperament may have gone against the grain of abstract societal
convention, his "morose temper" resulted in a writing style that utilised clear and
proper language to make a folly of the trivial concerns of the society he found
around him. In the end, Smith concluded that the "characters which Swift exposes
79
were those which best suited his taste." That character would not, however, be
likely to suit another person, nor would an attempt to mimic Swift's writing style
result in an effective expression of that person's sentiments.
In order to highlight this point, after his discussion of Swift, Smith moved on
to discuss the writings of Lucian. In contrast to Swift, Lucian is portrayed as
having a dramatically different personality. He exhibits a "merry gay and jovial
71
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temper", as a man who sought out as much pleasure as possible. In turn, his
writing style also stands in stark contrast to Swift's approach to the conveyance of
ridicule. His focus is not on folly, but on the most solemn and respectable of
characters. Lucian, however, is able to inject humorous ridicule even the most
serious of topics by surprising and diverting his audience at every turn.
This contrast in characters seems to be presented by Smith in order to highlight
the fact that the correlation between the vraisemblance and bienseance is very
much dependent on striking a personal balance between the two based on the
individual's unique character, experience, and social setting. Though dramatically
different in their temperaments and writing styles, both Swift and Lucian
effectively utilise ridicule. "There is hardly any folly of the gayer sort that Swift
passes over and scarce any of the graver that is omitted by Lucian. Either of them
taken alone might be apt to prejudice one in favour of the follies contrary to those
he ridicules; But both together form a System ofmorality from whence more sound
and just rules of life for all the various characters ofmen may be drawn than from
the most set systems of Morality."73 The reason for this is that "[M]en do not
differ so much in the degrees of Virtue and Wisdom as in the Peculiar Tinges
which these may Receive from the other Ingredients of their Character."74 It is this
premise which plays such a critical role in Smith's conception ofmoral sentiments.
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The idea of bienseance also goes some way toward sorting out Smith's
distinction between different manifestations ofmoral sentiments witnessed between
nations and cultures. In line with the fundamental premise of bienseance, Smith
maintained that, "[I]n describing the character of a nation The Government may be
considered in the same view as the air of a single person; The Situation, Climate,
Customs as those peculiarities which give a distinguishing tincture to the character,
75and form the same general out lines into very different appearances." Degrees of
temperament also explain the differences seen between different ages and
nationalities, (see Appendix C) Nevertheless, at the most fundamental level, they
all share similar primal characteristics. "All these effects of custom and fashion,
however," asserts Smith, "upon the moral sentiments of mankind, are
inconsiderable, in comparison of those which they give occasion to in some other
cases; and it is not concerning the general style of character and behaviour, that
those principles produce the greatest perversion of judgement, but concerning the
propriety or impropriety of particular usages."76 Thus, at the foundation, the same
fundamental moral sentiments inherent in all mankind are at play, yet the
manifestation of these basic sentiments exhibit themselves in multifarious ways
given the influence of bienseance on their external expression.
This fact, in Smith's opinion, did not have to do merely with style, but with the
"nature and temper of the Language itself'.77 Smith goes on to compare the very
different writing styles between Ancient Roman and Ancient Greek authors. Due
to the nature of Roman society, with its limited number of citizens who controlled
all the power and wealth, the language of the society was pompous and ornate. In
contrast, the citizens of Athens were all on equal footing, and thus they "lived and
talked" together with the greatest of familiarity. As a result, we see that in the
Dialogues of Plato there is no "Politeness or Compliments"; whereas Cicero has a
great deal of them. This is due to the fact that, "[I]n the one country the People at
75
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least the Nobles would converse and harangue with Dignity, Pomp and the air of
those who speak with authority. The language of the others would be that of
freedom, ease, and familiarity. ... Pomp and Splendour suit the former well enough
but would appear presumption in the other."78 In the end, "[T]hese differences in
the Stile [sic] of these orators may probably arise from the different condition of
the countries in which they lived; the tempers of the men had no doubt also have
had their effects."79
Here we see Smith grappling with the same issue we saw addressed by Hume in
Chapter II, namely, how do we explain the characterisation of different
characteristics in different cultures and at different points in history as valid
without being accused of moral subjectivity? Hume had justified such differences
by relying upon an analysis of the utility of the actions within a given social context
or society. Smith on the other hand seems to rely on those attempting to assess the
virtue of a given activity based on their experience and taking into consideration
the temperament of the party under scrutiny. The fact that the individual lived in
another time or another culture is only pertinent in so much as that the impartial
spectator would take certain temperaments, personal or cultural, into consideration
when passing judgment. That this reaction would take these elements into
consideration is assumed by bienseance. In the end, Smith concludes as did Hume
that we will be able to see through such differences and see the essence of the
virtue behind the action, albeit in a dramatically different matter.
For in Smith's view the aim of all discourse, be it in writing or personal
interaction, individual or national, was to present a given experience in a manner
that allows the experience it conveys to be readily replicated in the experience of
the reader or hearer. This ability was equated with 'propriety', which implied, as
Brian Vickers has said, "that the listener will judge the speaker's accuracy in
• 80
expressing emotion by reference to what he has himself felt in similar occasions".
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The propriety of a person's actions is strictly determined by the propriety of his
sentiments. Thus, the 'audience' in the moral sense is the 'spectator' of some
morally determinable action. The spectator judges as proper "the original passions
of the person principally concerned," when they "are in perfect concord with the
sympathy emotions of the spectator," when to this "spectator, they necessarily
appear ... just and proper and suitable to their objects."81 And in so doing also,
82
"rendering ourselves the proper objects of esteem and approbation".
Thus, the one way we determine if an action is deserving of sympathy is ifwe
judge that the reaction is in accordance with our own. This is determined in
Smith's theory by the spectator identifying an agent's actions as in conformance
with the spectator's past experiences and conforming with what he believes is
natural and appropriate given the circumstances. This concept is central to Lamy's
definition of, vraisemblance. As with Lamy, if the behaviour is not in conformity
with what is appropriate given the situation, the spectator judges an action as is
improper when "upon bringing the case home to himself, he finds that they do not
coincide with what he feels", thus, "they appear to him unjust and improper, and
unsuitable to the causes which excite them."83 Using sympathy as a means of
judging actions in others, the spectator naturally judges a particular action by
whether the act is appropriate to its causes and its effects. If the action fits the
situation, then the spectator determines the act to be appropriate and worthy of
merit.
In order to put oneself in another's place by sympathy, one must evoke in
oneself a sentiment similar to that of the other person's. Experience alone enables
one to imagine another's feelings under the circumstances. These experiences are
drawn from the society in which we ourselves experience approval and disapproval.
Since this sense of approval or disapproval is necessarily drawn from cultural
experience, bienseance, is necessary. In accordance with Lamy, this has a
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regulative function in Smith's theories, as people internalise appropriate and
inappropriate reactions from their societal experiences and moderate their
behaviour in order to conform.
This type of analysis is not limited to the person judging the action but also
involves the agent being judged. Like Lamy's narrator, who tries to find
vraisemblance, we are anxious to communicate our sympathy to others. We desire
to sympathise with others, and desire to share others' sympathy. Thus, we attempt
to reach an accord or balance, and, if it is reached, then we have found a standard of
propriety. As with Lamy's narrator, if this is not achieved our credibility is greatly
undermined and the likelihood of receiving an understanding response from the
audience is greatly decreased. A person in search of sympathy, like a narrator,
must constantly be aware that his case should not be overstated and that his
characterisation of the situation at hand, transmitted by his emotional reaction to
the situation, should always be gauged so as to conform to what is expected. Only
then can the passions being conveyed to the spectator be expected to receive the
response they are after.
Presupposed in this free communication and adjustment of sentiments is the
primacy ofpersuasion, rather than force, as a mode of daily social relations. Again,
we see Lamy's contention that persuasion is tied to all efforts to communicate, has
been utilised in Smith's theory. "In a civil nation," asserted Smith, "the passions of
men are not commonly so furious ... seldom very hurtful and seem frequently to
aim at no other satisfaction, but that of convincing the spectator, that they are in the
right to be so much moved, and of procuring his sympathy and approbation."84
Thus, sentiments become more social and more dependent upon the art of
persuasion. The sympathy dynamic even makes persuasion something of an end,
rather than a mere means.85
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Lastly, as with Lamy's description of bienseance, there is an internal and
external application of propriety in Smith's idea of sympathy. The internal
application in Lamy focused on rigidly, revolving around conformity with one's
own character. In Smith this was transformed into the introspection of the internal
spectator, who is the final arbiter of an individual's own character. The external
application for Lamy was whether the depiction matched the audience's
expectations of what was normally and appropriate. This is essentially the criteria
ofjudgement used by the spectator in Smith's theory ofmoral sentiments.
The influence of the concepts of rhetoric advanced and popularised by both
Dubos and Lamy on Smith's conception of sentiments, at this point, seems to be
quite perceptible. As has been pointed out in the previous section, the Scots were
very much open to the utilisation of concepts that in their mind accurately
explained human nature regardless of their origin. While Dubos and Lamy's
observations on the nature of the transmission of sentiments had traditionally been
termed 'rhetoric,' in the new age they were seen as sufficiently provable facts
worthy of inclusion in the 'science ofman'. It was not their label, but rather their
usefulness, which dictated whether they had any place in the empirical world that
was emerging. The insights offered by Dubos and Lamy appear to have been
deemed of sufficient merit and accuracy as to have been adopted and adapted by
Smith in his presentation of how one goes about maximising sympathetic
interaction. In their efforts to discover the fundamentals of human nature,
philosophers such as Smith used the discovery and utilisation of any tool available
to them. Many of these tools were in a former incarnation seen as rhetorical, but
were re-conceptualised by Smith as the very foundations of the exchange, and
particularly the refinement, ofmoral sentiments themselves.
In the end, we see the degree to which the influence of language came to
permeate the social and moral theories of Adam Smith. The examination
undertaken in this and the previous chapter make it clear that language was held by
Smith to be an essential tool in both the formation and refinement of man's moral
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sentiments. The formation of linguistic skills within society were seen by Smith as
a perfect model on which to illustrate, substantiate and refine his theory of moral
sentiments. In addition, due to the ambiguous nature of language, the onus of
moral refinement was placed on the individual, and was only achievable through
the medium of language and the refinement ofbelletristic rhetorical principles.
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CHAPTER VI
Thomas Reid: Linguistic Discourse and
Theoretical Discontent
It has been argued in the preceding chapters is that, while perhaps not discussed in
isolation, Hume and Smith's assumptions regarding the nature of language were
utilized as tools to illustrate and substantiate their characterisations of man's social
and moral nature. This chapter will maintain that these conclusions are reinforced
by the antithetic methodology championed by Thomas Reid in the latter half of the
century. Traditionally seen as one of the great antagonist of the sceptical and
arguably relativistic leanings emerging out the Scottish Enlightenment, it will be
argued that Reid's efforts to refute the theoretical conclusions of Hume and Smith
likewise enlisted man's use of language to illustrate and demonstrate his own
theory. This fact, in itself, lends weight to the claim that contemporaries of Hume
and Smith took very seriously the implications of their references to language as it
relates to the 'science of man' and, as a result, Reid's challenges to their moral
theories drew upon linguistic distinctions.
Best remembered as the founder of Common Sense Philosophy, as the successor
ofAdam Smith to the Moral Philosophy Chair at the University of Glasgow, and as
the great intellectual foil of David Hume, Reid's use of linguistic models to
illustrate, and perhaps more importantly, demonstrate the validity of his
methodology. Following even the most cursory exploration ofhis reasoning it soon
becomes evident that Reid's intellectual endeavours to counter the assertions of
Hume and Smith are honeycombed throughout with references to language and
language use. Reid's published works, unpublished writings, and student notes
taken in Reid's lectures at the University of Glasgow all point to the fact that he
must have been thinking quite seriously about language and its natural relationship
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to man's nature in the wake of both Hume's and Smith's theories, setting forth a
discussion of language and language use which coloured his effort to counter their
arguments.
For, while the use of language as both an illustrative and analytical tool are
present in Reid's philosophy, he does not, in contrast to Hume and Smith, conceive
of language as playing the same role in the transmission and development of moral
sentiments. This divergence, I will argue, can be traced to Reid's aversion to moral
relativism, sceptical deduction, and the ethical fallout he predicted would result if
society were to be constructed on the foundations outlined by both Hume and
Smith. Fusing together traditional Christian ideals and Common Sense philosophy,
Reid attempted to re-assert the more traditional lines of thinking which both Smith,
and particularly Hume, had undermined with their conception of morality as
manifested in linguistically demonstrable social reality. As we shall see, Reid's
challenge to both Smith and Hume regarding their characterisation of morals
ultimately revolved around Reid's fear that if their theories were to take hold, there
would be "nothing left for us but to sink into an abyss of absolute scepticism".1
In order to counter this alarming conclusion, Reid presented a theory of morals
in which language was characterised as not merely a relative social construct, but
rather the conduit through which universal moral truths are made evident to
mankind. While it is clear that Reid, along with Hume and Smith, maintained that
personal virtuousness was manifest when one's private moral sentiments were
reflected in the moral character of the nation as a whole, Reid's conception of how
this process took place differed dramatically from that ofHume and Smith. Hume
had focused the capacity for linguistic convention to reflect the social utility
enshrined in ideas of virtue and vice, and Smith had seen an awareness of language
and language use as important in our efforts to maximise our sympathetic
interactions and our moral understanding. However, Reid argued that the
1
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cultivation of specific moral virtues was dependent on understanding and training
the rational powers of the mind. This assertion presented a challenge to what Reid
judged to be Hume's relativist moral theory as well as Smith's sentiment-based
ethical system. To contest the theories of Smith and Hume, Reid deemed it
necessary to distance his moral theory from a simple evolution of man's
sympathetic responses. Yet, at the same time, he also considered it compulsory to
re-affirm the universal and innate moral character ofman in any operable theory of
man's social or moral character. In order to do this, Reid would need to present a
characterisation of language and language use that differed dramatically from that
ofboth Hume and Smith.
Defining language as, "all those signs 'which mankind use in order to
communicate to others their thoughts and intentions, their purpose and desires",2 it
is Reid's contention that much can be discovered by "the sense of mankind
expressed in the structure of language".3 As we will see, in order to discover this
sense, Reid constructed an interpretation of the 'science ofman' around a depiction
of language and language use that underscored the innate and universal element of
mankind's nature as manifest in language itself. Reid stressed the fact that "[N]o
man can be ignorant of the importance of this faculty, for our instruction, for our
direction, and for our comfort in the mutual intercourse of mankind. But few
perhaps are aware of it in order to [aid] our learning to think and to reason. The
capacity of thinking and reasoning we have from Nature. But the habit of thinking
as rational creatures, is got by exercise and imitation of those whose thoughts can
be communicated to us [as we] learn to speak and to think at the same time and
every improvement in the first carries improvement in the last".4 By unlocking the
true nature and influence of language, Reid believed that not only was the true
moral character of man revealed, but also that the misguided reasoning of his
fellow Scots would be exposed.
2 Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. 1764. Ronald E.
Beanblossom and Keith Lehrer (eds.), (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1983) p. 32.
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1. First Principles, Common Sense and the Construction of Reid's Linguistic
Paradigm
A basic tenet of Reid's methodology was his contention that, "if philosophy was
subjected to the discipline of methodological first principles it would furnish a
grammar by which to understand the 'languages of things themselves' as they
appear to the human mind".5 Reid appeared to consider the most effective way to
establish the existence of such a 'grammar' and 'language' of the human mind was
by an exploration of the existing linguistic system. By studying and observing the
attributes of language, Reid hoped to ultimately reveal the true nature of human
understanding which it mirrored. In order to gain an understanding of how Reid
envisioned this project, it is necessary to explore briefly the relationship Reid saw
between language and the building blocks of this methodology, namely, first
principles and common sense.
Reid defined first principles as innate necessary truths. They reveal themselves
as self-evident facts via both our perceptions of the outside world, and through
internal beliefs arising from them. Reid maintained, "to suppose a general
deviation from truth among mankind in things self-evident, ofwhich no cause can
be assigned, is highly unreasonable".6 First principles are the result of the maxims
of common sense and do not require justification by reasoning from ideas or
impressions as was necessary in Hume's philosophy.7 It was Reid's contention
also that every man is a competent judge of first principles: "[T]o judge of first
principles, requires no more than a sound mind free from prejudice, and a distinct
conception of the question. The learned and the unlearned, the philosopher and the
4
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day-labourer, are upon a level, and will pass the same judgement, when they are not
misled by some bias, or taught to renounce their understanding from some mistaken
religious principles".8
Reid located the initial, and crucial, connection between the concept of first
principles and language in the vast array of characteristics he associated with
natural language. It was Reid's contention that one distinguishing characteristic of
first principles was that first principles are not discovered by reasoning. They were
portrayed as being antecedent to reasoning, due to the fact that man must have the
ability to enter into society before reason can be developed. If there were not a
built-in method of advancing man's ability to reason and interact with his fellow
man, argued Reid, "[W]e could have no more intercourse with man than with trees.
The principle is the foundation of all knowledge that is received by instruction and
information".9 Given this assumption on the part of Reid, the existence of natural
language was crucial to the advancement of first principles, as it served as the
foundation structure upon which they are founded, and also serves as the medium
through which they were brought into society and to man's understanding.
The first stage by which these principles became evident to man was through
the pse of natural language. Reid maintained, in line with Condillac and Smith,
that, "we know the thoughts and passions of the mind by their signs in the features
of the face, the modulation of the voice and the gestures of the body". This is prior
to any experience, and as a result, most passions have natural signs. Reid opined,
"[Ejvery emotion has a feature, a modulation, or gesture proper to it and which
gives evidence of it".10 Reid further asserted that natural language is a language
common to all, both learned and unlearned people, and as such, was judged by him
to be the crucial foundation upon which man comes to know these first principles
and utilise them to expand his mind. It is the communicative character of natural
language itself, therefore, which facilitates man's ability to access and understand
8





all the other first principles that he becomes aware of over time. Through this most
basic of communicative means, a huge wellspring of assumptions about man's
innate character was therefore realised.
Significantly, linked with these contentions relating to the innate character of
natural language were the associated assumptions regarding natural language's
universality and uniformity. Reid maintained that if all minds shared the same
basic structure, the same basic predisposition for communication, and the same
signified objects as reference points, it stood to reason that this uniformity would
manifest itself as well in man's actions and interactions. What we find is that,
throughout Reid's works, there are constant justifications given in all areas based
on the simple fact that a certain term 'is universal in all languages', 'all languages
have a word for this', or words to this affect.11 Reid presented this fact as proof
that the language itself revealed certain elements of man's nature, which are both
universal and uniform. "Every language has its peculiarities", noted Reid, "but
what is found common to all language must be considered as springing from a
common cause. Thus, for example, all languages have a plural number. This could
not have been the case ifmen had had no idea ofwhat philosophers call universals,
i.e. mind and classes commanding many individuals".12 As we shall see, be it
grammatical structure or moral categorisation, Reid believed these first principles
manifested themselves in all languages, and this fact in turn proved the universality
and uniformity of the principles themselves.
Building upon these philosophical premises associated with the innate
character of natural language, Reid drew the same conclusions in regards to his
characterisation of the relationship between linguistic constants and first principles.
For example, student notes record that Reid began his first lecture on Moral
Philosophy at the University of Glasgow in 1779 by asserting:
As in every language there are words common to the vulgar equally
as to the philosopher we need no explanation, so in every Science




there are principles we admit of no proof. All men of common
understanding agree in them and justly consider the man who denies
them as lunatic. It is in vain to reason with such a man, before we
reason with any one we must be in possession of some first
uncontravened first principles to which we could appeal as a
standard.13
This quote adroitly encapsulates the way in which all three, namely, natural
language, common sense, and first principles, were crucial to Reid's philosophy,
each offering a means of pointing out the manifestation of those intrinsic human
characteristics ofman which are not only central to his character, but also essential
to any true understanding of his nature. Rather than seeing Reid's conceptions of
first principles as being dictated by the construct of natural language, or seeing his
discussion of natural language as merely an example of a first principle, it seems
more true to Reid's methodology to depict them as one organic whole.
Part of the confirmation of this shared reality is the ability of individuals to
communicate with each other. In order for this to take place there must be some
means by which this universal ordering creates a medium in which like minds can
communicate. One of the essential ways this universal structuring itself is revealed
is in the form of universal grammar rules. It is due to the fact that we find, for
example, the same parts of speech: nouns, adjectives, verbs active and passive,
adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, and general rules of syntax. In Reid's opinion,
this fact revealed something very profound: "There are certain common opinions
of mankind, upon which the structure and grammar of all languages are founded.
While these opinions are common to all men, there will be a great similarity in all
languages that are to be found on the face of the earth There are general rules of
grammar, the same in all languages. This similarity in structure among men in
those opinions upon which the structure of language is founded".14 This
grammatical uniformity was presented by Reid as confirming his conclusions
regarding the structure of the human mind. This contention, that we possess an
innate capacity to grasp the rules of grammatical structure, was central to Reid's
13 Ibid., Lecture 1.
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argument. This structure revealed that human linguistic competence was innate and
that universals in grammatical underlying structure reflect this fact. The existence
of such uniformity across the spectrum of human existence and experience was
seen as providing evidence of the uniformity of human thinking and social
character.
Closely associated with this grammatical correlation was the uniformity to be
found in the concepts themselves, enshrined within this grammatical structure.
These are the universal concepts, in the form of general words, which these
grammatical first principles are used to structure. It was Reid's contention, that
"[Gjeneral words are so necessary in language, it is natural to conclude that there
must be general conceptions, ofwhich they are the signs".15 The reason for this is
that:
Words are empty sounds when they do not signify the thoughts of
the speaker; and it is only from their signification that they are
denominated general. Every word that is spoken, considered merely
as a sound, is an individual sound. And it can only be called a
general word, because that which it signifies is general. Now, that
which it signifies, is conceived by the mind both of the speaker and
the hearer, if the word have a distinct meaning, and be distinctly
understood. It is, therefore, impossible that words can have a
general signification, unless there be conceptions in the mind of the
speaker and of the hearer, of things that are general. It is to such
that I give the name of general conceptions; and it ought to be
observed, that they take this denomination, not from the act of the
mind in conceiving, which is an individual act, but from the object
or thing conceived, which is general.16
Due to these assumptions Reid concludes that universals are always expressed by
general words and that, "all the words of language, excepting proper names, are
general words; they are the signs of general conceptions, or of some circumstance
relating to them". These general conceptions are formed in Reid's opinion for the
purpose of language and reasoning; and "the object from which they are taken, and
14
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to which they are intended to agree, is the conception which other men join to the
same words; they may, therefore, be adequate, and perfectly agree with the thing
conceived." This implies that men who speak the same language will inevitably
agree as to the meaning ofmany general words.17
While Reid may have chosen to draw the line at what is known within a particular
linguistic group, it is clear that he contended this process goes on in all languages
and represents not only the uniformity of concepts within a language, but also
revealed the universal correspondence between these general concepts. These
general words, or at least the concepts signified by them, are not limited to
individual linguistic groups. As noted earlier, if one reads through Reid's notes,
published works, and student lecture notes, one discovers a re-occurring theme
throughout: Reid consistently concluded explanations of concepts, be they
extremely basic or the most abstract, with the remark that the particular concept in
question 'could be found in every language'. While these almost endpoint-like
statements on the surface might seem to be examples innocuous afterthoughts, their
persistent use would indicate a much more purposeful and profound intention. By
tagging this statement on to the end of his discussions, these general concepts were
all depicted as representing fundamental principles shared in common by all men.
Albeit in different languages, the universality of the thing signified by these general
words meant that, though all men might not share the same language, all languages
throughout the world utilised the exact same categories.
Regardless of the vocal signs used, the language's range of subject matter, the
things signified, and the grammar used, in Reid's opinion are all pre-ordained. It is
thus through the medium of language, and the revelation about the universal and
inherent nature of man revealed by language, that allows us to gain an
understanding of others. "[A]ll the distinct knowledge we have or can attain of any






the essence of any individual. This seems beyond the reach of human faculties.
Now, every attribute is what the ancients called an universal [sic]. It is, or may be,
common to various individuals. There is no attribute belonging to any creature of
God which may not belong to others; and, on this account, attributes, in all
• 18 • • •
languages, are expressed in general words". It was Reid's contention that this
uniformity in the structure of language demonstrates the existence of a degree of
uniformity in the grounds upon which that structure is based, "[A]nd that nature has
dictated the same to all men, appears from the structure of all languages; for in all
languages men have expressed thinking, reasoning, willing, loving, hating, by
personal verbs, which, from their nature, require a person who thinks, reasons,
wills, loves, or hates. From which it appears, that men have been taught by nature
to believe that thought requires a thinker, reason a reasoner, and love a lover."19
The uniformity of grammatical structure, combined with the universal nature
of the concepts being signified within that grammatical framework, led Reid to
believe that language demonstrated the universal uniformity of man's mental
abilities as well. "When we try to prove that there is life and intelligence in the
creatures with whom we converse in society", Reid noted, "laying aside our natural
conviction, no other reason can be given for it but that their [illegible] are so like
our own that we judge them to proceed from the same thoughts, reasoning from the
same similarities of the effects to the same source of the causes".20 Without such a
means to gain correlation with the thoughts and feelings of others, "we could have
no language, no intercourse with other men".21 The universality of language use,
as well as the universal structural similarities of that use, were seen by Reid as clear
evidence as to a nearly every aspect of human nature. He stated, "[N]ow if we
compare the general principles of our constitution, which fit us for receiving
information from our fellow-creatures by language, with the general principles










to be very similar in their nature and manner of operation". It is the fact that all
men, regardless of the age they live in or the language they speak, are developing
their use of language from the same innate and universal traits of man that the
uniformity in man's development can be explained. As a result, when referring to
different information, or the same information in different language, "the signs
used in these different cases, produce the knowledge and belief in the things
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signified, by means of the same general principle of the human constitution".
Therefore, regardless of the language or the signs used, it was clear in Reid's mind
that the elements upon which the system functions would be the same in all
languages and all cultures.
Building upon these assumptions, Reid theorised that, "[L]anguage is the
picture of thought and from the picture we may frequently draw pretty accurate
conclusions respecting the original. Now in every language we find the essential
parts of speech exactly correspondent. We may therefore conclude that the
operation of the mind on which language is founded are uniform". Language was
here used by Reid to demonstrate the universal fact, in contrast to Hume's
philosophy, that every man believes himself to be something distinct from his ideas
and impressions, something which continues the same identical self when all his
ideas and impressions changed. Reid maintained that, "[I]t is impossible to trace
the origin of this opinion in history; for all languages have it interwoven in their
original construction. All nations have always believed it. The constitution of all
laws and governments, as well as the common transactions of life, suppose it."25
It must be remembered that these connections between language and first
principles were seen as a tool of attack by Reid in his effort to keep the forces of
scepticism and relativism at bay. Reid firmly maintained that, "what is common in
22
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the structure of languages, indicates an uniformity [sic] of opinion in those things
upon which that structure is grounded. The distinction between substances, and the
qualities belonging to them; between thought and the being that thinks; between
thoughts and objects of thought; is to be found in the structure of all languages.
And, therefore, systems of philosophy, which abolish those distinctions, wage war
with the common sense ofmankind."26 By illustrating his theory of first principles
by drawing examples from the nature of language and its use by man in
interpersonal communication, it seems understandable that Reid would go on to
utilise references to language and language use in his effort to challenge and
present a viable alternative to the theories ofboth Hume and Smith.
2. The Centrality of Natural Language in Reid's Linguistic Theory
As witnessed in the previous chapters, Smith's characterisations of the transition
from natural language to artificial language had a profound influence on the way
each theorist went on to conceptualise man's nature. It is no less true in the case of
Reid, whose investigation into the development of language helped support his
philosophical enterprise. As we will see, in Reid's case, even after the creation of
artificial language, the influences of natural language were portrayed as
indispensably "woven into the structure of language" and thus were depicted as
playing a decisive role in shaping man's social and moral character.27 As a result,
natural language retained a pervasive influence over man, and played a central role
in Reid's efforts to describe man's constitution.
Reid argued that the key to unlocking the role of natural language was through
an exploration of the origin of artificial language. Reid clearly believed that the
exploration of the origin of artificial language was a useful tool in his effort to gain
an understanding ofman's nature. Reid contended that, "[T]he origin of language
deserves to be more carefully inquired into, not only as this inquiry may be of
importance for the improvement of language, but as it is related to the present
26
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subject, and tends to lay open some of the first principles of human nature". Like
many of the philosophers of this period who dealt with the attributes of language,
Reid did consider it important to address the question of how man came to
construct an artificial language. Reid maintained that the following conundrum
was at the core of the current Enlightenment controversy regarding the origin of
language: "The difficulty which has puzzled these Philosophers so much lies all in
the very first step toward language, and it is this. All Language consists of artificial
signs of our thoughts. Now all artificial signs have their signification by compact.
There must therefore be compacts in society before there can be language. But it
seems impossible that there should be compacts without language". While
Rousseau had identified this problem earlier in the century, Reid contended that
this puzzle was easily settled once the basic dynamics of the process were brought
to light. "This difficulty indeed would be insurmountable", continued Reid, "and it
is evident that men could never have agreed upon artificial signs of their thoughts if
they had not some natural sign of them. But it is evident that men have natural
signs of looks and gestures, and tones of voice, by which they can communicate
their thoughts to one another in some degree."29
It is interesting to note at this point that there is no evidence that Reid ever
considered it necessary to incorporate the contemporary 'two savages' scenario in
his exploration of the origin of language or to highlight the importance of the use of
rudimentary gesture as the foundation of inter-personal communication. However,
there is a possible reason for this traditional scenario's exclusion, one brought to
light by an exploration of what Reid offered up by way of example in its stead. In
lieu of the 'two savages', Reid presented what might best be termed a 'Robinson
Crusoe' scenario in which he proffered the example of an individual has been
marooned on a foreign shore. "We have innumerable instances of navigators
thrown upon some unknown coast whose Inhabitants have not the least knowledge
of their Language. Yet they can easily perceive in each other not only the Signs of
27
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Amity or Hostility; but they can make bargains and exchange commodities". He
continued, "[T]hey can ... signify their wants and to know whether they may expect
supply of them, all these transactions are carried on by Natural signs which we may
call the natural language ofMankind".30 The goal ofReid and other theorists of the
period in furnishing such a scenario was the same, namely, to illustrate the central
role played by innate universal signs and gestures in acting as the catalyst for the
later use of artificial language. But by presenting it in this manner, Reid
emphasised the fact that there exists a form of natural language between individuals
who already possess artificial language, but lack the ability to use that artificial
language due to their individually unique signifying systems. Thus humans,
regardless of language grouping or societal differences, always have the innate
connection of universal natural language upon which they can fall back on. It was
on the retention of this natural language, and its importance as a fundamental
element ofman's social nature, that Reid focused his attention
This 'Robinson Crusoe' scenario also served Reid in his attempt to marginalise
the role of the sympathy as a necessary basis of natural language and, in turn, as the
building blocks of artificial language. Rather than two savages sharing in each
others' anguish through sympathy with physical pain, Reid presented the scenario
of men thrown onto a foreign shore who are able to instantly use this innate and
universal language to barter and trade. Therefore, in Reid's opinion, natural
language does not simply demonstrate a pool of shared instinctive sympathetic
responses, but rather a common understanding upon which rational interaction can
instantly be founded. As a result, language serves not as the basis for an expansive
view of the influence of language on shaping and refining our sympathetic response
to others, ala Smith, but rather as the means by which we are able to build rational
reaction to universally shared principles. The ability to advance toward this
rational exploitation of natural language is no more evident than in that crucial and
defining element of human civilisation, the movement toward a spoken language.
As we will see later in this chapter, this distancing of language from sympathy
30 Ibid.
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played a crucial role in Reid's efforts to contest Smith's moral theory.
What also distinguished Reid's discussion of the relationship between natural
and artificial language was his emphasis on the continued significance of natural
language in shaping man's character even after the creation of artificial language.
As noted earlier in this chapter, Reid judged the influence and impact of natural
language, as manifest in first principles, to be so important that it defined man's
very being. Natural language was interpreted by Reid as encapsulating the entirety
ofmankind's character, for it is in the ability to make natural connections between
things signified and the innate recognition of that item, in the form of universally
recognised signs, which is the central analytical tool of man's understanding. "In
the testimony ofNature given by the senses", Reid asserted, "as well as in human
testimony given by language, things are signified to us by signs; and in one as well
as the other, the mind, either by original principles or by custom, passes from the
sign to the conception and belief in the thing signified".31
Critically in Reid's case, this progression from natural signs to language was
not merely seen as being the necessary pre-cursor to spoken language, but as the
unquestionable proof of the nature of the relationship between the mind and the
body. Reid, like his contemporaries, assumed natural language to be the
fundamental building block upon which artificial language is constructed. What
sets Reid apart was the fact that he envisioned the role of natural language as
having a far greater and enduring influence than most individuals during this
period. While building upon very similar assumptions common within the Scots'
discourse on language during the Enlightenment, it is Reid's interpretation of the
character of natural language and its continuing influence upon language, as well as
man's character more generally, which seems to typify his thinking. While other
theorists did extrapolate ideas of universal connection and understanding based on
the inherent ability of individuals to communicate rudimentary sentiments via
natural language, Reid characterised this shared ability to communicate as
31
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reflecting man's rational, rather than emotional, universality. This being the case,
natural language did not merely represent a pool of instinctive emotions in Reid's
opinion, but rather the manifestation of man's innate ability to engage in rational
thought. As we will see in the next section, these assumptions were to have great
effect on Reid's characterisation of the formation of artificial language.
3. The Formation of Artificial Language and the Marginalisation of
Sympathy
Due to Reid's belief in the pervasive influence of natural language on man's
character, it should come as little surprise that he did not believe that there was any
great mystery as to how the development of artificial language came to fruition.
"Our original perceptions are few", stated Reid, "compared with the acquired; but,
without the former, we could not possibly attain the latter. In like manner, natural
language is scanty, compared with artificial; but, without the former, we could not
possibly attain the latter".32 As noted in the previous section, it was Reid's
contention that, "there must have been a convention previous to any articulate
sounds, when certain sounds were agreed to denote certain ideas; hence it is evident
that this natural language composed of gestures and signs previous to the
introduction of articulate sound or an artificial language".33 It is the means by
which this transition took place, and the implications of this transition are the
central concern in Reid's discussion of artificial language.
Reid stressed, however, that sympathy was not the distinguishing characteristic
upon which the transition from natural to artificial language was based. Nor, in
fact, unlike language, was sympathy a distinguishing characteristic of man at all.
In his discussion of the characteristics which separated man from beast, Reid
stressed that language is perhaps the greatest defining characteristic of mankind.
Reid asserted that, "[T]here never was a tribe of men living in society found to be
without language. I mean articulate sounds invented to express their sentiments
32 Ibid.
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one to another. Yet there never was found a tribe of beasts that had any such
artificial language".34 He was also quick to point out that while animals engaged in
sight, smell, taste, affection, and even "sympathy in the enjoyments and suffering
• 35of their owners", they were incapable ofmaking the leap to artificial language. In
this way, Reid coupled the idea of sympathy with those instinctive and base
characteristics shared by man with animals. Rather than a defining element which
could serve as the basis of all those characteristics that make man so unique,
sympathy was judged by Reid to be better identified with those elements of man's
nature which were instinctive and not unique to man. This has the effect of
marginalising the contention that sympathy could serve as a defining element of
man's social and moral character, as the sentimental theorist would have one
believe.36
In contrast to sympathetic reactions, Reid argued that the true origins ofman's
unique qualities were revealed by his ability to construct an artificial language by
which he could communicate his thoughts. "No man will pretend to say", asserted
Reid, "that English or French, Latin or Greek, are natural to men. We see every
nation has different articulate sounds which is a plain proof that they are not
natural. Nature however has intended that articulate sounds should be the things by
which we should express our thoughts. For if this was not the case, we might find
some nation expressing their thoughts by the motions of bodies or some other
means of that kind which we never did."37 Reid maintained that artificial language
was a pre-ordained element of our nature that is necessary for us to express our
thoughts. Artificial language was not simply something we hit upon and expanded
upon, as the 'two savages' scenario would suggest, but something which man was
destined to attain. It was simply the next predetermined step in making the
34
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functions of the mind fully operable. Therefore, it was man's ability to engage in
rational thought, not evolved sympathetic reactions as Smith had maintained, that
marked the unique transition point between natural and artificial language use.
It would seem that, while the influence of natural language may indeed be
pervasive, it was by the creation of artificial language that man became capable of
participation in those inter-active communications distinguishing him from the
brutes. In Reid's opinion, the catalysis for this development was man's unique
sociable nature, [T]o society we owe the ability of communicating our thoughts and
sentiments to each other by language. Though many brutes animals are gregarious,
and have a kind of society with their kind, by which they are very helpful to one
another, yet none of them was ever found to have language, by which one can
communicate its knowledge and experience to another." 38 (See Appendix A) It is
the ability to communicate via artificial signs, within the unique social realm
occupied by mankind, which Reid envisioned as the fundamental dividing line
separating man from the rest of God's creation. 39 It is, therefore, this universal
character shared by all men in all ages, which Reid considered mankind's most
distinguishing feature.
As a result of these assumptions about the nature of artificial language, Reid
maintained that the ability to engage in the creation of an artificial language also
represented the fundamental elements of man's higher reasoning and moral
character: "Brutes, as far as we know, have no notion of contracts or covenants or
of moral obligation to perform them. If nature had given them these notions, she
would probably have given them natural signs to express them. And where nature
had denied these notions, it is as impossible to acquire them by art, as it is for a
blind man to acquire the notion of colours. ... [ A]nd ifmankind had not these
38
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notions by nature, and natural signs to express them by, with all their wit and
ingenuity they could never have invented language.40
In line with so much of Reid's theory, just as man's ability to reason is
portrayed as facilitating language, so too, language is judged to facilitate man's
ability to advance his powers of reasoning. This universal similarity also dictated
that the use of artificial language was necessary for unlocking man's ability to
reason. While Reid admitted that without language man might be able to retain
notions of things around him both directly and upon further encounter with these
stimulants as any animal is capable of doing, he did not judge man capable of
abstract thought and mental composition, what he termed 'general notions' without
having language to formulate such complicated thought patterns. The ability to use
language allows us to comprehend such abstractions and give names to them by
which to categorise and define its boundaries, distinguishing it from other abstract
notions. Reid argued, "[Tjake away the name and the enclosure is removed. Like a
field which has no limits to distinguish it form the contiguous ground."41 (See
Appendix B)
Thus, it is through the unique instrument of language that man was able to
categorise, and therefore conceptualise, the world around him. Without language,
he would be incapable of bringing his perceptions into another individual's
understanding, for he would lack a means of defining these perceptions. What we
witness in Reid is the advancement of a theory in which reason and language
mirror each other, sustain each other, and in the end and as a result, inevitably to
coalesce; expanding man's personal and social potential in the process.
For it is man's ability to categorise and process such an abstract which serves
the foundation for all of his more noble powers. "For reasoning", asserted Reid,
"must consist of propositions and every proposition must include some general
notion. We learn to form such general notions by learning language and ifwe had
40
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no language we should never have learned to form them. I believe that every man
will in his experience, that when he attempts to any regular train of thinking,
though he does it in silence and without uttering a sound, he will find it impossible
to go on without conceiving more or less the words by which his thought may be
expressed and the more distinctly he cloths his thoughts with words, the more
accurately he will think." Reid continued, "[A]nd I see no reason to think that a
man without society and consequently without any kind of language, would ever
acquire so much of the exercises of his rational powers as to be entitled to the
denomination of rational creature".42 (See Appendix C)
Therefore, it was through artificial language that man comes to all higher
understanding. As man's linguistic skills came to fruition, so too did his ability to
reason. He not only expresses his thoughts in words, but the thoughts themselves
take on a linguistic form. Man uses linguistic categories to define concepts, and, as
a result, he also uses these signifiers as the basis of internal thought. Man both
speaks and thinks in the form of an artificial language, and, as a result, "[M]an
without any society of his fellow men would never acquire the exercise of his
rational powers. This I take to be the necessary consequence of his having no kind
of language."43 In Reid's estimation, therefore, artificial language was seen as the
lynchpin of man's ability to understand himself and as an essential tool for the
formation of societal bonds with those around him.
The above analysis makes abundantly clear the importance Reid placed on role
of language in bringing to light the true operation of the human mind. In his
opinion, man's ability to reason, to conceptualise the world around him, and to gain
an understanding of himself and his fellow man are dependent upon language. The
importance of man's use of language in Reid's philosophical conclusions did not
end here. It would also come to exercise as well a profound influence upon his
ethical theory.
41
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4. The Moral and Ethical Ramifications of Reid's Rational Construction of
Language and Language Use
What has emerged from the above discussion of artificial language is that Reid
considered man's use of language as lending great insight into the fundamental of
man's nature, including his ethical nature. While natural signs gave rise to
language, in Reid's opinion language does not always result from natural signs.
Rather, man makes language from natural signs, and he does so, according to Reid,
by virtue of an ethical character. Due to man's notions of 'moral obligation,' Reid
argued, man is driven to fulfil his duty to keep his 'contracts' and 'covenants'
regarding the use of the signs of language, and as a result he is able to sustain
language as a reliable tool of understanding and communication.44 Only if these
'contracts' are kept can man add to his natural language an artificial language in the
form of words. Precisely how far Reid meant for the ramification of this ethical
basis of language to extend will be explored later, but it is clear that he believed the
very foundation of artificial language rested in a moral substrata, where man has
the ability to make and maintain binding contracts built on the trust in the fair and
honest use of those signs. Indeed, other animals are incapable of inventing
language more complex than natural signs because they do not possess a moral
sense by which to make these durable compacts and agreements necessary to create
the artificial signs used in language.
A prime example of what Reid saw as the relationship ofmorality to language,
and how he differed from Hume and Smith, is revealed in his discussion of virtue.
Reid was convinced that man was predisposed by his conscience toward moral
virtue. As opposed to Hume's focus on artificial virtue, Reid's contention that man
has a natural devotion to virtue dramatically shifted the locus of his characterisation
of language and language use. For example, Reid's major disagreement with
Hume's theory of justice was that Reid maintained that man has an inherent desire
44Reid, Inquiry, pp. 31 - 34.
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to keep contracts, a desire which was "as natural as the emotions of gratitude and
resentment".45 Reid claimed that Hume's theory of justice rested on obviously
specious grounds, for Hume "infers, that our notions of justice arise from the
particular situation of society, without which we would have no notion of it". Reid
maintained that "children early on are sensible of injustices done them, so that this
is not the effect of society, it is a principle inherent in our nature, and the rules of
justice are as obvious as the principles of any of the sciences". It was Reid's
contention that the "moral conscience prompts us immediately to the exercise of
this virtue, for, there is no dictate of course more plain and universal than this, that
we should withhold from no man what is his due".46 From this discussion of
justice, it becomes clear that Reid assumed that men were essentially moral and
social beings, meant that these character traits manifested themselves both in men's
intellectual rational powers as well as social affections. As a result, Reid stated in
his Aberdeen lecture notes, "[Tjhose notions discover themselves in all men, not by
Language only but by a certain natural effections of the mind which are natural
objects."47
Reid also attempted to re-establish the classical balance between reason and the
passions, and to impugn any theory of man based upon countervailing passions.
For example, in defining virtue Reid stated, in direct reference to Smith, that some
theorists claim that it is "the relation of strings", by which we sympathise with
others and attempt to "bring down our own so as that they may sympathise with
55 48us". However, in Reid's account of virtuous actions sympathy, as characterised
by both Smith and Hume did not play a significant role: "The formal nature and
essence of that virtue which is the object of moral approbation consists neither in
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affections toward others, nor in qualities useful or agreeable to ourselves or to
others, nor in sympathising with the passions or affections or others, and in attuning
our own conduct to the tone of other men's passions; but it consists in living in all
good conscience - that is, in using the best means in our power to know our duty,
and acting accordingly.49
While Reid acknowledged there are two parts to our human constitution, reason
and passion, it is clear that he did not place great faith in the passions as guides to
virtuous conduct. As noted earlier in this chapter, while these passions were innate
in man's character, they did not make him distinct from the rest of God's creation.
In line with his dismissal of sympathy in his discussion of the transition to artificial
language, Reid stated, "[I]n all languages there is some name indicating our
passions, which comprehend various springs of action similar to what we have in
common with brutes, appetites, desires, and affections" and "common to all of
them that they carry us to an object, which may be indeed resisted but not without a
struggle. No judgement is required to feel their influence."50
We also see Reid emphasised the fact that, the passions, since they do not
involve free will, do not enter into the realm ofmoral judgement. Crucially for our
purposes, Reid contented that the very nature of language inexorably leads us to
this conclusion. Reid maintained that his dismissal of the passions in relation to
morals is confirmed by the simple fact that all individuals know that the passions
do not involve any judgement, and thus have no place in the characterisation of
morals. Due to what Reid judged to be the universality of the revelation of this fact
in all languages, he drew upon linguistic usage in order to confirm the nature and
position of the passions in man's character. All men know it to be the case, and
this is reality is confirmed by the fact that they signify this reality in the same way.
Since, in Reid's words, "[Ejveryone realises that unbridled passions and appetites
lead to wretchedness and ruin",51 they cannot be depended upon as the fundamental





building blocks ofmoral sentiments. It is, in fact, because "[t]he passions are such
a degree of affections as deprives us of self command", that they make reason
necessary, as a means of curbing them and bringing man toward his higher
purpose.52
Reid maintained that man's reason would, if only it were more perfectly
developed, guide him toward an appropriate course of action. Unlike the passions,
reason "operates calmly and coolly on the conduct while the passions hurry
violently away".53 Though we have not reached a state where our reasoning powers
have gained such perfection, we are still impelled toward that course of action.
Reid opined, "[A] 11 virtue consists in acting against these motives which for the
present have the strongest impulse but are less rational. If a man is induced by
appetite to perform any action and if reason resists that impulse the impulse of the
appetite is then considered duty, decency or interest."54 Standing in opposition to
"animal appetite", it is reason which leads us to virtuous action.
The existence of linguistic forms by which people express their moral
judgements is, in Reid's view, a convincing argument for the objective status of
these judgements. "This is the power on which all morality is founded;" asserted
Reid, "when an action is performed agreeable to it, then it is called moral, if
contrary to it, it is said to be immoral".55 Given these assumptions, it becomes
clear that Reid thought that various elements of the first principles revealed,
through the use of language, the existence of a universal standard from which all
moral systems drew their understanding of ethics and virtue. This is due to the fact
that, as are the majority of first principles effecting man's character, the innate
moral character ofman is deemed by Reid to be inexorably linked to the reality of
these principles as revealed through linguistic usage. Reid's first principle maxim










underlying that usage must be correct. As a result, universal moral terms are
judged to be the expression of universal moral sentiments, with the former being
consider as irrefutable proof of the latter.
The confirmation of the different virtues is likewise tied to linguistic usage.
For example, the terms 'wisdom' or 'courage' are considered to be virtuous. Reid
believed that there is a simple reason for this: "It may be asked from what original
are these conceptions formed? And when are they said to be true or false? It
appears to me, that the original from which they are copied - that is, the thing
conceived - is the conception or meaning which other men, who understand the
language, affix to the same words."56 Thus, in every language there are words for
wisdom and for courage, and an associated idea connected with these words. All
users of the language use the same word because they are all aware of the presence
of the virtue which is being signified and share, due to an innate and universal
understanding of this signifier, as manifested in the correct usage of that word.
This necessary connection between a specific innate quality that all men can
recognise and a specific word means that this connection will be found in all
languages and all ages.
While the words for the concepts of wisdom and courage may vary depending
upon the random vocal sounds assigned them in a particular culture, the mere
existence of some specific word for that particular virtue in all cultures corroborates
that it is a universal human trait. This also means that this trait is to be found in all
cultures throughout time, and is given the same degree of moral approbation or
disapprobation regardless of the particulars of any given societal structure. In this
sense, language plays a central role in revealing the universal nature of moral
sentiments, as well as the fact that these sentiments are uniform and not dependent
on cultural variables. Therefore, Reid appeared to be working from the same
assumptions as Hume and Smith, namely, that a system of morality would be
enshrined in the society and evidenced through the use of language. Reid rejected,
56
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however, what he judged to the apparent relativity and subjectivity evidenced in
their characterisation ofmorality, and in turn, their characterisation of language and
language use within a given society. This being the case, it was specious in
Reid's opinion to look below the surface of language use in an attempt to aid in the
search for the 'true' universals ofman's character. As we shall see, these attempts
on the part of Hume and Reid are judged by Reid to merely demonstrate an
inability, or perhaps an unwillingness, to see the obvious truths revealed in the
nature of universal language use. There was no need to look beyond the universal
truths as evidenced in the core elements of universal language usage to alternative
explanations based on utility or sympathy. No such ulterior motivations need be
explored to justify human judgment and morality. All that was necessary was to
accept the reality of the universals revealed uniformity of accepted language use
and accept the standards they recognised as virtuous to be indeed virtuous.
It is important, though, to note at this juncture that Reid's interpretation of
morality did not negate the idea of individual free will. Reid, heavily influenced by
the Christian conception of free will, adamantly maintained that moral approbation
or disapprobation necessarily implied real judgement. Though universal moral
premises are encoded in man's nature, this fact did not negate the need for each
individual to utilise his or her free will in acting upon these standards. By stressing
the need for the conscious exercise of free will in engaging in moral conduct, Reid
once again challenged the claim that sentimentalism is the basis for our moral
determinations. Through this emphasis on the centrality of free will, Reid attempted
to impugn both Hume's and Smith's conception of virtue, which he believed to be
grounded in simple utility or the sentiments.
Free will was necessary to Reid because, "[I]t is of the highest importance to
us, as moral and accountable creatures, to know what actions are in our own power,
because it is for these only that we can be accountable to our Maker, or to our
fellow-men in society; by these only we can merit praise or blame; in these only all
our prudence, wisdom, and virtue must be employed; and, therefore, with regard to
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them, the wise Author of nature has not left us in the dark".57 It must be
remembered that reason and judgement were central to Reid's thought. Man would
be incapable of functioning in society without the ability to govern his actions
through the use of reason. Will and reason were seen as connected by Reid, though
he did not expand on this relationship, claiming that it was evident simply due to
their association.
Since every man is assumed by Reid to be a moral agent who has the power to
determine his own will, man is also portrayed by him as an accountable being and
one capable of self-improvement. Reid asserted that, "[Ejvery man is led by nature
to attribute to himself the free determinations of his own will, and to believe those
events to be in his power which depend upon his will. On the other hand, it is self-
evident, that nothing is in our power that is not subject to our will."58 Again, this
is clearly demonstrable by an examination of linguistic usage. "If any man", argued
Reid, "therefore, affirms, that a being may be the efficient cause of an action, and
have power to produce it, which that being can neither conceive nor will, he speaks
a language which I do not understand. If he has a meaning, his notion of power and
efficiency must be essentially different from mine; and, until he conveys his notion
of efficiency to my understanding, I can no more assent to his opinion than if he
should affirm that a being without life may feel pain."59 This passage makes it
clear that even in the affirmation ofman's free will, Reid taps into the universality
of that truth as evidenced in language. Language so reflects the essential nature of
our being, that anyone who does not feel that free will is indeed necessary is
portrayed as not speaking the same language. By this Reid did not mean that he
lacks the ability to simply understand the person, but that the person's basis of
understanding in general is flawed, a fact demonstrated by his inability to
understand the truth behind Reid's assertion.
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It becomes apparent that one of the major reasons Reid chose to emphasise the
use of free will and reason was tied to his efforts to counter those theories that
characterised the formation of our moral understanding as bound up with the
passions and sympathy. Addressing the ifnplications of Hume's and, particularly,
Smith's theory of moral sentiments which stressed the importance of sympathetic
reactions, Reid feared that, "morals, necessary truths, for all determination would
be reduced to matters of fact, namely, to their agreement or disagreement with the
feeling".60 In response to this, and very much in keeping with the discussion
presented in relation to sympathy and artificial language, Reid presented a theory of
morals which used a linguistically based analysis to sever sympathy from the realm
of morality, enshrining reason in its place. As we shall see, this effort to isolate
and disparage the role of sympathy was accomplished in large part by references to
language and language use.
Another great concern ofReid was Hume's apparent emasculation of the notion
of human action and, as a result, the denial ofman's capacity for acting morally. In
opposition to Hume's contention that the theory of necessity dictated that both men
and animals reason from experience, Reid believed such an assertion effectively
eliminated man's noble and distinct moral character. Repeating his normal pattern,
what we witness was that Reid, in contesting Hume's theory, presented linguistic
usage as the central feature of his defence of the use of free will in moral
judgement.
Reid believed that the doctrine of moral liberty was attested to by experience
and was supported by the common sense ofmankind as revealed in their belief in
this reality. As a result, men act upon the belief that they are responsible for those
acts that depend upon their will. Therefore, they feel remorse and guilt when they
fail to live up to these standards, as well as forgiving those who, due to lack of
capacity, cannot act in such a manner. These facts are perfectly intelligible and




overwhelming evidence of everyday life in support of this reality, the burden of
proof rested with the advocates of necessity to disprove the reality demonstrated in
our everyday interaction. Reid maintained that if it cannot be proved that we act
from necessity then there is no need to prove the opposite, namely, that we are free
agents; nor would the doctrine of necessity influence an individual's conduct. Our
everyday interaction, the understanding of those around us, and us of them, all
dictate the reality which is enshrined in everyday language use and understanding.
The onus is on those who are unwilling to see the verification of this reality in
everyday language use to disprove the truth which is being demonstrated around
them every day.
In conclusion, it becomes evident that Reid believed there are two layers to the
realm ofmorals. One is that fixed, innate and universal realm ofmoral axioms that
is revealed by shared signifiers and signs in everyday linguistic usage. The other
realm revolved around the use of the individual's free will in deciding whether or
not to follow the dictates of these universal and immutable standards. The former
was judged by Reid to be essential to ensure that his moral theory was in keeping
with the principles of common sense and first principles. The latter was brought to
the fore by Reid in order to re-assert the idea of a morality revolving around
rational and wilful decision as opposed to merely a sentimental or utilitarian
learned reaction.
What we have witnessed in the preceding discussion is that, while Reid
depended upon similar ideas as to the building blocks of linguistic proficiency, his
interpretation of these premises resulted in a dramatically different characterisation
of the relationship between natural and artificial language than both Hume and
Smith. In an apparent effort to counter what he saw as the moral relativism of
Hume and Smith earlier in the century, Reid attempted to construct an account of
man's nature which re-establishes the universal gauge of morals as well as man's
free will in directing individual virtuous conduct. In order to do this, Reid not only
presented a concept of morality and virtue heavily influenced by linguistic
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presuppositions, but also used language as a tool in his efforts to undermine the
arguments supporting the theories ofHume and Smith.
5. The Ambiguity of Language and Reid's Attack on the Philosophical
Presumptions of Hume and Smith
It is interesting to note that Reid's differences with Hume and Smith regarding the
nature and impact of language on moral philosophy were not limited to their
theoretical conclusions, but extended as well to disputes over methodology.
Indeed, it is perhaps the latter which most frustrated and worried Reid. He feared
that both Hume and Smith represented the end result of an ill-based, if not indeed
exploitative, effort amongst modern philosophers to channel moral philosophy
away from its true course. For example, Reid opened his Essays on the Intellectual
Powers ofMan by stating: "There is no greater impediment to the advancement of
knowledge than the ambiguity of words".61 He continued, "[T]o this chiefly it is
owing that we find sects and parties in most branches of science; and disputes
which are carried on from age to age, without being brought to an issue".62
Rather than seeing the reality of self-evident truths and first principles as enshrined
in linguistic usage, Reid believed that the manipulation of inherent weaknesses in
linguistic construction gave philosophers an opening to advance moral theories
which were not only erroneous, but in fact destructive to society as a whole.
As Reid judged the fundamental principles of man to be evidenced through
universal linguistic traits, it is understandable that the inherent limitations of
linguistic signification, and the ambiguity that necessarily resulted, were of
considerable concern to him. Having examined the centrality of language in Reid's
philosophy, it is easy to understand why he concluded that this was significant.
Reid's entire common sense philosophy revolved around the claim that the 'true'
first principles of human nature are evidenced in, and ultimately proven by, the
physical revelation inherent in natural language and further evidenced in the
61




unfolding of universal artificial language use. It stands to reason, therefore, that
Reid would deem it necessary to address the inherent ambiguity of language as
well, paying particular attention to what light it shed on the nature of man's
morality.
Reid acknowledged the general concern over the ambiguity of language
reflected in the Enlightenment discourse on language and morality. For he
contended that, "[W]e are perplexed with the ambiguity of terms and no more than
in the Theory ofMorals".63 On closer inspection, however, what Reid implied by
this statement was dramatically different from the apprehension voiced by Hume
and Smith regarding this particular matter. While Reid was concerned with the
ambiguity of language, he was not troubled by the vague nature of language per se,
but rather was apprehensive that the lack of specificity in language opened a
dangerous loophole by which philosophers could manipulate the self-evident proofs
offered by common sense. In fact, he believed that this was one of the major
pitfalls that the 'science of man' must consciously make an effort to avoid. For
those who engage in the pursuit of man's nature must never loose site of the
'proper' meaning of words. It is, therefore, this fear of the abuse of language that
prompted Reid to state with great foreboding that "the ambiguity of words, and the
vague and improper application of them, have thrown more darkness upon this
subject than the subtlety and intricacy of things".64
Therefore, this trepidation regarding the ambiguity of language was not judged
by Reid to be a mere prospective possibility, but as a process which was already all
too prevalent. There was no better proof of this fact than in the theory of morals
put forward by Hume and Smith. In Reid's opinion, these two theorists had failed
to characterise properly the role of language in revealing the ultimate truths about
man's character. It must be remembered that Reid maintained if one sits down and
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proper understanding of its crucial role in revealing man's nature. Reid argued that
just because, "[T]he variety of human thoughts exceed the bounds of any
language,"65 this fact did not undermine his general theory. Nor should it give
philosophers such as Hume and Smith free rein in misinterpreting language's
effects or justify the misappropriation or twisting of commonly understood terms in
order to advance their own counter intuitive systems.
Reid mounted his defence of these premises by focusing on the debate relating
to the ambiguity of abstract concepts. Disagreeing with Locke regarding the almost
insurmountable difficulty expressing abstract ideas via language, Reid concluded
Locke's contentions were ill based.66 In contrast, Reid maintained that: "There
may be some abstract and general conceptions that are difficult or even beyond the
reach of persons of weak understanding; but there are innumerable which are not
beyond the reach of children. It is impossible to learn language without acquiring
general conceptions; for there cannot be a single sentence without them. I believe
the forming of these, and being able to articulate the sounds of language, make up
the whole difficulty that children find in learning language at first.67 Of particular
interest to Reid was this latter means by which man came to an understanding of
abstract concepts without ever actually defining them. Rather than basing the
'solution' to the ambiguity problem in an effort to produce precise definitions as
Locke had argued was necessary, Reid maintained that there was no other means of
coming to an understanding of such terms, other than through use.
The main reason why such conceptions do not lend themselves to definition is
because these principles are part of our natural character, and thus do not need
defining in order to reveal their existence. Reid reasoned that a definition was
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meaning is already known". As a result:
It is evident that every word cannot be defined; for the definition
must consist ofwords; and there could be no definition, if there were
not words previously understood without definition. Common
words, therefore, ought to be used in their common acceptation; and,
when they have different acceptations (sic) in common language,
these, where it is necessary, ought to be distinguished. But they
require no definition. It is sufficient to define words that are
uncommon, or that are used in an uncommon meaning.68
Reid argued that the majority of such indefinable words emerged from the innate
and universal nature of first principles upon which man's understanding is based.
He contended there was no need to define such abstractions. Nor did man have any
capacity to do so, even if he so desired.
Reid asserted that the "poverty of language" was also the reason why "many of
the names of the virtues have an ambiguity - yet must be understood at some level
in order to be deemed a virtue".69 Reid maintained that we come to an
understanding of what is virtuous through interaction and conversation with our
fellow man. Since all these other individuals will use the terms fixing the limits of
virtue in a like manner, the more we converse with our fellows, the more we
increase our understanding of its parameters. Though perhaps, if pressed, we could
not in fact offer a clear and concrete definition of a particular virtue, Reid
concludes that this does not mean that we do not have an understanding of it. Thus,
the basic ideals of virtue, however blurred at the edges, are "interwoven into our
language and we consider the man divested of them, as divested of the best and
noblest powers of human nature, as really deficient in what properly belongs to a








are therefore internal. As a result, they cannot be defined and are characterised as
being extremely complex. Though we have some conception of it, from a
• 71definitional point they "cannot be understood by those who have them."
This does not mean that man is unaware of these moral determinations, or that
he lacks ability to act upon these amorphous and abstract concepts. Reid contended
that: "if we attend to the cause of this indistinctness, we shall find that there is no
definition of them that has authority. Their meaning, therefore, has not been
learned by definition, but by a kind of induction, by observing to what individuals
they are applied by those who understand the language. We leam by habit to use
them as we see others do, even when we have not a precise meaning annexed to
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them." Through man's interactions in society, therefore, he becomes aware of
moral determinations, their character, and their parameters without actually being
able to define them clearly and specifically even after he becomes fully aware of
them.
Use, then, was in Reid's view the ultimately the 'arbiter of language'. This
being the case, common usage should take precedence over more specific, or
defined, usage when it comes to such ambiguous subject matters as ideas of virtue.
"When we speak ofmaking an impression of the mind", Reid argued, "the word is
carried still farther from its literal meaning; use, however, which is the arbiter of
language, authorise this application of it - as when we say that admonition and
reproofmake little impression on those who are confirmed in bad habits. The same
discourse delivered in one way makes a strong impression on the hearers, delivered
another way, it makes no impression at all."73 This process of acculturation and
use is crucial to Reid, as is his understanding of how such ambiguous terms are
brought into our gambit of understanding. Through social interaction, man builds
up an understanding of appropriate and inappropriate expressions of those concepts
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By presenting an explanation of the ambiguity of words based on common
sense, Reid attempted to make his theory of the mind truly comprehensive. By
giving a first principle based explanation of the reason behind such ambiguities,
Reid established that the linguistic construct which results from these principles
was not hindered by the ambiguity of language, but rather was proven by it.
Definable abstract terms, as well as whole range of undefined, but nevertheless
tangible, conceptions known and identifiable by all, resulted in a system in which
the prevailing linguistic usage reigns supreme. But, unlike Hume, the basis of
Reid's theory was built upon innate first principles. This significant distinction
necessarily led Reid to the conclusion that this process would be duplicated in the
same manner in all societies regardless of the cultural or linguistic differences, and
would be founded upon a universal and uniform understanding of even the most
indefinable of abstract concepts. It was Reid's conclusion that, "[A]s in every
language there are words common to the vulgar equally as to the philosopher we
need no explanation, so in every science there are principles we admit of no proof.
All men of common understanding agree in them and justly consider the man who
denies them as lunatic. It is in vain to reason with such a man, before we reason
with any one we must be in possession of some uncontravened first principles to
which we could appeal as a standard."74
Reid conceded that in a perfect, scientifically systematic, world the ability to
rectify the problems surrounding the ambiguity of language would be addressed by
building a system based on clear definition and self-evident axioms. "If all the
general words of a language had a precise meaning", asserted Reid, "and were
perfectly understood, as mathematical terms are, all verbal disputes would be at an
end, and men would never seem to differ in opinion, but when they differ in
reality". This, however, is far from being the case, Reid continued, because "the




mathematical axioms: they have not the same kind of evidence, nor are they
necessary truths, as mathematical axioms are".75 Later, Reid elaborated on this
issue:
The meaning of most general words is not learned, like that of
mathematical terms, by an accurate definition, but by the experience
we happen to have, by hearing them used in conversation. From
experience we collect their meaning by a kind of induction; and, as
this induction is, for the most part, lame and imperfect, it happens
that different persons join different conceptions to the same general
word; and, though we intend to give them the meaning which use,
the arbiter of language, has put upon them, this is difficult to find,
and apt to be mistaken, even by the candid and attentive. Hence, in
innumerable disputes, men do not really differ in their judgements,
but in the way of expressing them.76
Reid, therefore, presented the ambiguity of language neither as an inherent flaw nor
as presenting an insurmountable impediment to the systematic exploration of man's
character in general, or his moral sentiments in particular. For the intrinsic
ambiguity of language was not judged a limitation in Reid's mind. Rather,
ironically, it was depicted as offering further substantiation of the fundamental and
universal nature of man. The inability to define all of man's more abstract
thoughts, and the universal pattern adopted to deal with this situation, in fact went
far to substantiate that uniformity.
In the end, it is clear that Reid believed that he had quite adequately dealt with
the 'problem' of ambiguity in language within his own theory. The real problem
lay in the failure of other theorists to see the truth of his position: "In all languages
there are phrases which have distinct meaning; while, at the same time, there may
be something in the structure of them that disagrees with the analogy of grammar
75
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or with the principles of philosophy. And the reason is, because language is not
made either by grammarians or philosophers." Reid cites the example that in
common parlance we speak of 'feeling pain', as if pain was something distinct
from the feeling of it, talk of pain coming and going, and moving from one place to
another. "Such phrases are meant by those who use them in a sense that is neither
obscure nor false", Reid opined, "[B]ut the philosopher puts them into his alembic,
reduces them to their first principles, draws out of them a sense that was never
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meant, and so imagines that he had discovered an error of the vulgar'.
The true conundrum rested, then, in the fact that: "The principles of natural
philosophy have, in modern times, been built upon a foundation that cannot be
shaken, and that they can be called in question only by those who do not
understand the evidence on which they stand. But the ambiguity of the words
cause, agency, active power, and the other words related to these, has led many to
understand them, when used in natural philosophy, in a wrong sense, and in a sense
which is neither necessary for establishing the true principles of natural philosophy,
nor was ever meant by the most enlightened in that science.78 It also followed that
if there was universal and uniform agreement on this front, philosophers must
restrict their analysis to the inherent truth revealed by such patterns. Reid feared,
however, that many philosophers could not accept the explanation proffered by
these first principles. Too often there was a vast gap between what philosophers
derived from the language and what the vast majority saw as self-evident truths
revealed in daily linguistic usage. This problem manifested itself in various forms
and in many guises. To Reid, however, modern philosophers all too often abused
these self-evident truths, and were unwilling to look at the reality which was before
them in favour of creating ill based pseudo-scientific axioms.
According to Reid, the problems associated with language had been more
successfully excluded from mathematics and the natural sciences, since the former




provide axioms which dictate exactly how numbers relate and correlate. As for the
latter, Reid believed that the two centuries leading up to the eighteenth century had
witnessed more advances in science than had the past two thousand years. He
attributed this to the natural sciences' ability to draw lessons from mathematics and
to formulate hypotheses in line with mathematical principles. With respect to
philosophy, however, Reid did not believe that the definitional certainty of the hard
sciences could be reached, simply because there were no 'definitions' to be found.
One could, however, lay down general principles, "for the sake of those who are
less conversant in this branch of logic".79
One of the greatest errors pointed out by Reid in the works of other philosophers
of the mind, such as Hume and Smith, was their attempt to define the indefinable.
For, as we have noted, Reid's theory dictates that the words that describe the most
simple, yet fundamental, operations of the mind are characterised as not lending
themselves to definition. Certain concepts simply cannot be defined, yet every man
understands the meaning of the words, and has a clear and distinct notion of them.
One can, however, explain the meaning of a word without actually defining it.
These are operations of the mind, or consciousness, which are immediately known
to us internally, and do not have an external object, and thus there is no need to
have a sign and signifier relationship. These elements make up the constitution of
the mind itself, and thus determine the scope and range of operations that the mind
has the capacity to perform.80
Unwilling to accept, or critically understand, the first principles revealed by
language and the reasons behind the necessary ambiguity of language, Reid
maintained that many in the contemporary philosophical community were creating
a vast gap between themselves and the common man. This fact was evidenced
when Reid warned, "[I]t ought likewise to be observed, that although philosophers,
for the sake of being understood must speak the language of the vulgar - as when
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they say, the sun rises and sets, and goes through all the signs of the zodiac - yet
they often think differently from the vulgar".81 As we will see in the following
section, it was this conflict over the usage of language that Reid judged to be one of
the most troublesome elements of the contemporary debate regarding the 'science
ofman', and why, in this struggle between philosopher and the common man, Reid
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was keen to point out that, "I find myself classed with the vulgar."
6. Honesty of Usage: Linguistic Veracity and Philosophical Subterfuge
As noted in the previous section, Reid readily admitted that language did not lend
itself to clear definition. But unlike many early modern theorists, he did not
believe that this was an impediment to communication. Rather, these ambiguities
were regarded as revealing great truths about man's inherent nature. In Reid's
mind, the real danger with the vagueness of language rested not in its perceived
hindrance on communication of moral sentiments, but rather that it had left a
degree of ambiguity around certain terms which other theorists were exploiting for
their own benefit. For the failure of these other theorists to truly understand the
vague nature of language not only led them away from the inherent truth enshrined
in linguistic usage but, even more intolerably, the ambiguity itself allowed a degree
of interpretative room that resulted in the twisting of language and terminology into
definitions far removed from their actual meaning. Thus, not only were
philosophers failing to see the truth, but through their insistence in misusing
language, they were also leading the rest of mankind away from the truth. To
Reid, the theories of Hume and Smith served as prime examples of this corrupting
force. Not only did these individuals fail to see the clear philosophical lesson
demonstrated by the ambiguity of language, but they also twisted language from its
predestined course in order to serve their own theories. It was an intolerable state
of affairs in Reid's mind, and a pattern of inquiry that he felt compelled to rectify.
81 Reid. Active Powers, p. 310.
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Due to the temper of Reid's methodology and its dependence on both natural
and artificial language as the means of verifying and clarifying the world around us,
it is not surprising that Reid stressed the importance of veracity in language use.
What we also discover is that this emphasis on veracity played a notable role in
Reid's efforts to legitimise his common sense philosophy and undermine both
Hume and Smith. In this latter context, Reid insisted that the opportunity for abuse
due to the vagueness of language, particularly with regard to the more abstract
areas of thought, had furnished contemporary moral philosophers a means to twist
the clear meaning, and implications, of language toward dubious ends. In order to
forward their own agendas, Reid argued, the contemporary discussion moral
philosophy made a mockery out of the language itself and, as a direct result,
'modern philosophy' was "in reality, when examined to the bottom, nothing else
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but an abuse of words". It is this accusation regarding 'abuse of words' which
came to play a central role in Reid's effort to refute the moral theories of both
Hume and Smith.
Let us first, however, enquire into Reid contention that veracity was so essential
to his conception of man's nature and, the corollary to this, that man must have
faith in the common definition of words. This element of Reid's philosophy can be
traced back to his suggestion that the reason we believe in the existence of anything
was based ultimately upon the foundation of natural signs. This premise dictated
that when two things are constantly conjoined together in the mind, the appearance
of one of them makes us immediately think of the other. The former was judged by
Reid as the natural sign of the latter, and this constant conjunction in the past, gives
us confidence in their constant conjunction in the future as well. This process is so
natural to our mind that we do not even dwell upon how it occurs but merely take
the reality of this connection as a self-evident truth. This assumption extends
beyond the uniform signifier use and further implies the necessity of veracity in
inter-personal communication as well. In turn, this leads to a faith in the
uniformity and accuracy of the linguistic assumptions, which are so necessary for
83 Reid. Inquiry, p. 68.
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man to function and to create a social universe. The ability to recognise the
legitimacy of this system allows us to confirm both the predictability of the
physical universe and our own human nature.84
As a result of these assumptions, Reid's common sense philosophy
endeavoured to illustrate, "the general principles of the human mind which fit us
or
for receiving information from our fellow-creatures, by the means of language".
Due to this fact, veracity in usage was judged by Reid to be the very cornerstone of
artificial language, and, in turn, morality and sociability. For, in order for us to
function as individuals, or to understand the human condition generally, we must
gain information from those around us. Reid maintained that prior to any
experience, use of our faculty of reason, compact or promise, "our fellow-creatures
will use the same signs in language, when they have the same sentiments".86 It was
Reid's contention that, "[Tjhis is, in reality, a kind of prescience of human actions;
and it seems to me to be an original principle of the human constitution, without
which we should be incapable of language, and consequently incapable of
instruction".87
The vehicle for this understanding was language. Reid stated that, "[W]hen we
try to prove that there is life and intelligence in the creatures with whom we
converse in society, laying aside our natural conviction, no other reason can be
given for it but that their minds are so like our own that we judge them to proceed
from the same thoughts, reasoning from the same similarities of the effects to the
same source of the causes".88 Without this connection with others 'thought and
84 For example, Reid points out the temperature at which water freezes today, will be assumed to be the
same temperature which will freeze it tomorrow. Citing Hume, Reid states that our belief in the
predictability of natural laws is not derived from reason. Rather, Reid asserts it is an "instinctive
prescience of the operation of nature, very like to that prescience of human actions which makes us rely
upon the testimony of our fellow-creatures; and as, without the latter, we should be incapable of receiving
information from men by language, so, without the former, we should be incapable of receiving










feeling' we could have no language, no intercourse with other men. Since
language use requires shared assumptions about what is and is not signified, we
must also assume that those around us are using language in like manner to
ourselves. This is a fundamental element of man's nature and the key to his
advancement. "The wise and beneficent Author of Nature," asserted Reid, "who
intended that we should be social creatures, and that we should receive the greatest
and most important part of our knowledge by the information of others, hath, for
these purposes, implanted in our nature two principles that tally with each other".90
The first of these principles is a propensity to speak the truth, "and to use the signs
of language so as to convey our real sentiments".91 The second is, "a disposition to
Q7
confide in the veracity of others, and to believe what they tell us". In order for
this to occur, the veracity of linguistic use must be established.
Yet, if, in Reid's view, the existence of language was necessary for the
establishment of an ethical system, it would seem that he also believed that
rudimentary innate ethics, and a leaning toward veracity in particular, were just as
necessary for the establishment of language. In treating the rational principles of
action, Reid discussed the topic of moral first principles, demonstrating again his
devotion to the universal common sense of man. Moral first principles, according
to Reid, required only that the one considering their truth be of mature
understanding and unprejudiced judgement in order to ascertain their legitimacy.
For example, at one point Reid discussed the tendency to believe the authority of
another human being. Reid explained that in the human constitution there exists,
"an early anticipation, neither derived from experience, nor from reason, nor from
any compact or promise, that our fellow-creatures will use the same signs, when
they have the same sentiments. When an individual speaks in an attitude of good
will, we understand that he will use the same language he or she has used on
89 Ibid.
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previous occasions when his attitude has been similar." Accordingly, the person
is convinced of its truthfulness because of his own nature, and is innately qualified
to judge the evidence when it is presented fairly and truthfully, and when the mind
is unprejudiced. This contention has implications for the communicator as well as
the listener. The speaker is obliged to employ evidence truthfully and fairly, and
the listener is equally obliged to unshackle his mind from encumbering biases
related to the matter upon which he would judge. A two-way relationship of trust
is thus established.
It was Reid's contention that man was naturally inclined to use language
truthfully, to reveal his true opinions and sentiments, and also to believe that others
do the same. To use language untruthfully, presenting unfair or prejudiced
evidence to the other party was in Reid's judgment a violation of the very nature of
man as well as a threat to human society, which is based on, and possibly even
created in reliance on, veracity in the use of language. Language was regarded by
Reid as the embodiment of a fundamental social contract, a contract whose terms
dictated that one must use signs in a given manner. If this contract was violated by
the unethical use of those signifiers, all other contracts and agreements among men
are challenged, since they are grounded in the truthful use of language.
This interplay and circular relationship between language and morals
continued throughout the work of Reid, drawing parallels between their
foundations and development within the social context. It would seem that, in
Reid's opinion, if these two elements had not been present from the beginning, the
initial germination of civilisation would not have taken place. Once having taken
place, this interaction must continue to be honoured and preserved.
As a consequence of this two-way relationship between language and veracity,
Reid also believed there was yet another original, and divinely implanted, principle:




hence to believe what others tell him. This Reid termed 'the principle ofcredulity',
a power thought by Reid to be limitless in children, until they encounter deceit and
falsehood as their experience of the world widens. Despite this experience, Reid
maintained that we still tend to believe the truthfulness of others throughout our
lives. If this were not the case, we would have no inclination to believe anything
that was told to us until we had positive evidence of its truthfulness. Reid argued
that this was not the case, and that we assumed truthfulness unless there was clearly
reason not to do so. 94 As a result, Reid stated, "[S]uch distrust and incredulity
would deprive us of the greatest benefits of society, and place us in a worse
condition than that of savages".95 Otherwise, for example, children would be
absolutely incredulous and thus unable to be educated, for the ability to adopt
manners and judge personal character would be made impossible.
We therefore witness a concerted effort on the part of Reid to prove that
revelations about the innate truths of human nature ultimately rest upon
fundamental assumptions regarding the truthfulness of linguistic human interaction.
It is clear that, for Reid, language revealed all we can know about our nature. His
theory judged the medium of language to be the intermediary between the reality
that is human nature and our understanding of that reality. For this to take place,
the medium of transmission must not only be trustworthy, but must also be
acknowledged that language has encoded within it these universal truths. We must,
therefore, trust not only each other, but also the medium itself. For the language in
common use is the very embodiment of common sense.
This being the case, it was Reid's contention that "in matters of common sense,
the few must yield to the many, when local and temporal prejudices are
94 While Reid shares Pufendorf s general view as to the contractual relationship of language, it is unclear
what Reid would make of Pufendorf s contentions regarding 'white lies' or that one need only speak
truthfully to another person if you have some obligation to do so. Reid would seem to contend that such a
selective process is not only counter-productive to society, but perhaps not even possible at all. Given
Reid's paradigm, in which the honest use of language is seen as so essential, Pufendorf s contention that
their is only a selective duty to use language truthfully based on a myriad ofpersonal obligations would
most likely be deemed as completely unworkable.
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removed".96 The reason why this basic principle must be followed is because "men
sometimes lead us into mistakes, when we perfectly understand their language, by
speaking lies. But Nature never misleads us in this way: her language is always
true; and it is only by misinterpreting it that we fall into error."97 It becomes clear
that our innate proclivity toward veracity and credulity were in Reid's mind not
merely tools to make our functioning in daily life possible, but the use of language
was depicted as a truth-revealing undertaking in itself. If language were allowed to
take its natural course, and if individuals use the terms of that language in their
conventional manner, than they would also be facilitating the exposure of the
inherent truths of man's nature embodied in language. However, what must be
avoided, at any cost, is any action by a minority, intentionally or not, to divert
linguistic use away from this natural course.
Reid insisted that one of the most egregious problems facing philosophy was
that these ill-based theories drew their philosophical conclusions by twisting words
and language into forms that severed them from their true and natural course. Not
merely did these philosophers miss the obvious proof that the use of language
revealed, modern philosophy was attempting to hijack the language itself, and was
twisting its terms in such a manner as to make the guiding first principles ofmankind
inaccessible and misleading. Reid contended that, "[W]hen we use common words,
we ought to use them in the sense in which they are most commonly used by the best
and purest writers of the language; and, when we have occasion to enlarge or restrict
the meaning of a common word, or give it more precision that it has in common
language, the readers ought to have warning of this, otherwise we shall impose upon
• no ,
ourselves and upon him". The reason for this was simple: "The vulgar have
undoubted right (sic) to give names to things which they are daily conversant about;
and philosophers seem justly chargeable with an abuse of language, when they
change the meaning of a common word, without giving warning. If it is a good rule,
to think with philosophers and speak with the vulgar, it must be right to speak with
96
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the vulgar when we think with them, and not to shock them by philosophical
paradoxes, which, when put in common language, express only the common sense of
mankind."99 Reid argued, for example, that the philosopher's contention that colour
is not a quality of the body of the object, but rather only an idea of the mind, goes
against common usage of the word colour. After briefly re-asserting his common
sense philosophy, he stated emphatically: "Philosophers have thought fit to leave that
quality of bodies which the vulgar call colour, without a name, and to give the name
of colour to the idea or appearance, to which, as we have shewn, the vulgar give no
name, because they never make it an object of thought or reflection. Hence it
appears that, when philosophers affirm that colour is not in bodies, but in the mind,
and the vulgar affirm that colour is not in the mind, but is a quality of bodies, there is
no difference between them about things, but only about the meaning of a word".100
(See Appendix D) If the philosophers had agreed with the common usage and had
given the name of colour to the cause, as they should have done, "[Tjheir language,
as well as their sentiments, would have been perfectly agreeable to the common
apprehensions of mankind, and true Philosophy would have joined hands with
Common Sense".101 It becomes apparent that Reid was pitting the philosopher
against the people, and characterising the latter as the genuine holders of the truth,
and the former as the antagonist in their ill-based attempt to gain an accurate
understanding ofman's nature.
This analogy was carried forward by Reid into his discussion of what he
believed to be the most egregious effort to undermine language's common usage,
the attempts of theorists to create definitions of ethical terms. Reid stated: "As if
we found a language in which were names to divide the various colours and all
great variety of shades in each, we would conclude infallibly that the language had
eyes to discern colour, so from the various names to distinguish virtue and also the
particular virtues, that as found in all language we may safely conclude, that all
99
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men have a process to distinguish virtue from vice, right from wrong. As with
the case of distinguishing colour, Reid believed that "[I]n like manner if a man
wants to know what is right and wrong, set before him some striking instances of
i m
both he will soon perceive the merit or demerit of each by this natural faculty".
The eye discerns shades of colour and without this faculty, and could not proceed at
all, yet "by it that we acquire the very idea of colour".1
Reid contended that in any debate regarding man's nature, both sides should
apply the same terms and definitions. In such a manner, an agreement could be
made in the discussion ofmorals and should apply to "both parties on the question,
whether the moral qualities of actions are perceived by sentiment or some feeling
or reason".105 What all too often occurred, however, was an "abuse of language"
by philosophers regarding external objects. As a result, the "vulgar affixing a
different idea to the word do not understand him," however, "if he explains himself
they readily agree".106 Therefore, if the philosopher allowed the natural course of
language to guide his enquiry, and the self-evident first principles that it necessarily
revealed, then it would be possible for him to maintain his credulity. "But if he puts
a different meaning upon the word", argued Reid, "without observing it himself, or
giving warning to others, he abuses language and disgraces philosophy, without
doing any service to truth: as if a man should exchange the meaning of the words
daughter and cow, and then endeavour to prove to his plain neighbour, that his cow
is his daughter, or his daughter his cow".10/
Indeed, it was Reid's position that the manipulation of the self-evident truths
revealed by language rests at the heart of his disagreement with the contemporary
efforts on the part ofHume and Smith. As a result of this process, Reid alleged that
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opposite of their sentiments". 108 As a result, the effort to counter this
misappropriation of linguistic usage came to play an important role in Reid's
efforts to confront and counter the influence of such theories.
In Reid's mind, there was no better demonstration of this misuse and
manipulation of language than Hume's discussion of virtue. One of the main
accusations that Reid repeatedly made against Hume and other philosophers in
Intellectual Powers related to their "intolerable abuse of language".109 Reid
maintained, as did Hume, that, "disputes about words belong rather to grammarians
than to philosophers". Reid, however, immediately went on to qualify this
statement, "philosophers ought not to escape censure when they corrupt a language,
by using words in a way which the purity of the language will not admit".110
Reid maintained this was problematical for three reasons, each ofwhich related
to the use and nature of language. The first reason was that, in the case ofHume, he
"gives the name of perceptions to every operation of the mind, Love is a
perception, hatred is a perception; desire is a perception, will is a perception; and,
by the same rule, a doubt, a question, a command, is a perception. This is an
intolerable abuse of the language, which no philosopher has authority to
introduce."111 The second factor related to Hume's contention that we can divide
all the perceptions of the mind into two classes distinguishable by their vivacity.
This, argued Reid, violated Hume's conception of the basic linguistic distinction
regarding the categorisation by species. "To say," stated Reid, "therefore, that two
different classes, or species of perceptions, are distinguished by the degrees of their
force and vivacity, is to confound a difference of degree with a difference of
• • • * • 112 t •
species, which every man of understanding knows how to distinguish." Thirdly,
Hume was guilty, in Reid's opinion, of using a 'vague and undetermined word' in
the case of impressions which is lacking a clear definition which would distinguish
108
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what he means by the use of this word in this context. Reid went on to discuss,
"the proper meaning of the impression in English" in order to find out the 'truly
logical' use of the word. He then proffered a definition of common usage that,
Reid maintained, stood in stark contrast to Hume's usage.113
As noted earlier, in Reid's philosophy, it was ultimately common usage that
established the legitimacy of common sense. In the case of Hume, Reid contended
that the examples cited above stand as egregious violations of this principle. "The
structure of all language is grounded upon common notions", contended Reid in the
Essays on the Intellectual Powers, "which Mr. Hume's philosophy opposes and
endeavours to overturn. This, no doubt, led him to warp the common language into
a conformity with his principles; but we ought not to imitate him in this, until we
are satisfied that his principles are built on a solid foundation."114 Reid went on to
point out in a later passage: "We know of nothing that is in the mind but by
consciousness, and we are conscious of nothing but various modes of thinking;
such as understanding, willing, affection, passion, doing, suffering. If philosophers
choose to give the name of an idea to any mode of thinking of which we are
conscious, I have no objection to the name, but that introduces a foreign word into
our language without necessity, and a word that is very ambiguous, and apt to
mislead".115
Another illustrative example of Reid's utilisation of a linguistically based
refutation of Hume is to be found in the student notes of Reid's unpublished
Glasgow University Moral Philosophy Lectures from 1779 - 1780. Hume, it will
be remembered, presented in the Enquiry an Appendix entitled 'Of Some Verbal
Disputes', a tract that emphasised language's inability to capture the nuances of the
sentiments. It is interesting to note that Reid not only devoted a vast majority of a









this particular lecture concluded his series of Moral Philosophy Lectures at
Glasgow. Since this particular tract is generally regarded to be of little import in
traditional interpretations of the Enquiry, it is very curious that it singled by Reid
and deemed worthy of such a lengthy and strategically placed reproach.
In unpacking this topic, Reid began the lecture with a discussion of Hobbes and
Mandeville. The greater genius, in Reid's opinion, was Mandeville who "takes
advantage of all the ambiguity of terms, giving to every passion or affection that
odious name which has in its [illegible] excesses. Pride is associated with self-
approbation, vanity, flattery, luxury", "all love of the sex is lust", and "all virtue is
the offspring of flattery begot by pride".116 It was Reid's opinion that such a
characterisation ofman's moral character resulted in a system ofmorality in which
there is no such thing as virtue in human conduct. Reid contended that the root of
the ill-based conception of this system, "is founded on the ambiguity of
language".117
By tracing this 'abuse' of the ambiguity of language back to Hobbes and
Mandeville, Reid appears to have been attempting to establish that linguistic abuse
lies at the very heart of contemporary developments in moral relativism and
sceptical reasoning. Citing the intellectual, precursors to this developing line of
reasoning, Reid appears to be attempted to prove, if not a conspiracy, at least a
long-standing misdirection in the use and understanding of the nature and role of
language in coming to an understanding of man's nature. Reid thus appears to be
establishing the 'pedigree' by which this ill-founded line of enquiry had been able
to gain a foothold in moral theory. It was only through the misappropriation of
language, and a corresponding misunderstanding of its nature, that this line of
philosophical enterprise had been able to develop and gain ascendancy. By
beginning with this discussion ofwhat Reid judged to be the progenitors of this
116 Baird, Lecture 98.
117 Ibid.
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methodological mistake, and linking both Hume and Smith to it, Reid was able to
link these later philosophers not only to this abuse of language, but also to the
philosophical repercussions which result from it.
Having established this ill-based philosophical lineage, Reid proceeded to deal
with "Mr. Hume's elaborate theory of virtue", namely, "that virtue is no more than
the qualities that are agreeable to ourselves or others or that are useful to ourselves
or others".118 Reid feared that the sceptical basis of Hume's moral theory would
lead to a moral relativism which would cause man to approve of vice as well as
virtue. Reid did not think it right to conclude that such actions as 'oppression,
corruption and venality' could simply amass a large following and lead to them
becoming admired because they prove to be useful to the individual.119 "But Mr.
Hume thinks", opined Reid, "it is wholly to the caprice of language that the former
are not called virtues and the latter vices", an assertion which Reid found to be
patently "absurd."120
It is clear from the tone of the lecture that this assertion by Hume, that moral
distinctions are traceable merely to the caprice of language, was a major bone of
contention for Reid. He stated, "[I]t is not easy to say what Mr. Hume means by
the caprice, of language. There are undoubtedly defects in language but they are
defects of a contrary notion to what he supposes"; differences "which are not
distinguished, where it is not necessary to the affair of common life that such
distinctions should be made, but there is no instance of a distinction being made in
all languages between things but what are really different".121 Reid maintained that:
"If there is really a moral rectitude and fortitude discerned by the moral faculty, the
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judging, condemning, ought and ought not, we are perfectly understood and need
not express ourselves by a strange circumlocution of which there is no similar use
122in any language".
It is easy to see why Reid felt threatened by Hume's sweeping dismissal of
moral distinctions as simply examples of the caprice of language. With a single
word, 'caprice', Hume can be seen as completely undermining Reid's conception
of immutable and universal standards of virtue and morality. To Reid, the
distinctions attributable to linguistic usage were anything but examples of caprice.
It was, in fact, the approach to language and morals proffered by Hume that
undermined the entire effort to establish a legitimate 'science ofman'. As a result,
this passing reference to 'caprice' by Hume was singled out as the prime example
of where the sceptical and relativism of the present moral theory developing in
Scotland was heading.
Reid proceeded to give yet another example of what he sees as a misuse by
Hume, citing Hume's seeming admission at one point regarding the guiding
influence of common sense and right reason in the discernment of moral
distinctions. Reid found Hume's use of the word reason "different from original
meaning" and used in an "uncommon sense" which "cannot be justified by the
authority of any single philosopher".123 Yet this assertion conflicts, Reid argued,
with Hume's assertion that reason must be the slave of the passions. "He lays it
down", argued Reid, "in a very peremptory manner that their is a language which is
as [impossible] to make intelligible".124 Reid finds this to be a "shocking paradox"










order to back up his claim, Reid offered language as proof: "they who say it is an
error to call it reason, must surely account for it getting this name and also for the
universality of that name".126
Throughout the rest of this lecture, Reid systematically dissected Hume's
• • 127inconsistent usage. In the face of what Reid termed 'plain English', he
proceeded to use the universality of language against Hume.128 For example, Reid
accused Hume of using sentiment, feeling, and internal sense as equivalent "and
into them he resolves all moral obligations, without attempting at all to explain the
1 9Q
words". Reid argued that the relation between language and first principles
revealed the fact that there are universal similarities in the operation of the mind as
well. Likewise, when discussing the operation of the mind, by which Hume meant
an entire spectrum of things - seeing, desiring, willing - Reid stated "[I]n the
structure of all languages, they are considered as acts or operations of the mind
itself, and the names given them imply this. To call them impressions, therefore, is
to trespass against the structure, not of a particular language only, but of all
languages."130 In the end, it seems clear that through accusations of systematic
misunderstanding, misuse and abuse of language, Reid hoped to strengthen his
argument that Hume's entire theoretical enterprise was completelymisguided.
Nor does Smith escape these accusations of linguistic misuse levelled by Reid.
It would seem that Reid did not maintain nearly the same degree of foreboding in
relation to Smith's moral theory, perhaps because Smith's theory does preserve a
sub-stratum of universal moral uniformity. Nevertheless, Reid found Smith's
theory of moral sentiments to be misjudged, based predominantly on what Reid
regarded to be examples of the subversion of proper language use. For example, in
the Birkwood Collection, which comprises Reid's reflections while at the
University of Aberdeen, Reid began his remarks regarding Smith's systems of
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morals with the contention that Smith not only changes his definition of sympathy
throughout his work, but also that he failed to define sympathy, "as is necessary to
make it the foundation of a distinct Theory ofMorals". Reid agreed with Smith's
initial assessment of what sympathy entails, namely, "every passion pleasant as
well as painful, the emotions of the bystander correspond to what, by bringing the
case home to himself, he imagines should be the sentiments of the Sufferer. And
that this disposition of the human mind is what we call Sympathy". This is true
because the etymology of the word according to Reid plainly points to this meaning
in the English language. However, Reid goes on to say that as Smith's presentation
of his theory ofmoral sentiments progressed, his characterisation of sympathy took
on an understanding wholly alien to this commonly understood meaning of
sympathy. Rather, "Dr. Smith makes his Sympathy to correspond not to what the
person sympathised with reality & actually suffers or enjoys but what he should
suffer or enjoy. ... I conceive this meaning of the word Sympathy is altogether new
& that if one had not a hypotheses to serve by it he would never have dreamed that
it is Sympathy that makes us blush for the imprudence and rudeness of another." 131
It is clear in this passage that Reid sees Smith's novel interpretation of what
sympathy actually entails as a clear example of a theorist twisting the true meaning
of a word, and the necessary universals reflected in that usage, into something
completely different in order to forward their own assumptions and conclusions
about man's character. Reid argued that Smith's latter characterisation of
sympathy was in fact Antipathy, and that even if we do use Smith's verbiage, that
in the end it is Smith's point is that in the judging of morality is our feeling the
emotions of another that we ought to feel but do not feel, that this supposed a moral
judgement and consequently a moral faculty. There is no need it would seem in
Reid's opinion to resort to twisting the meaning of sympathy in order to somehow
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cover up the fact that in the end it is indeed an innate moral faculty at its base.
Such efforts again only blur, distort, and lead mankind away from discovering the
much more obvious truths as evidenced in acceptable linguistic usage and common
sense. (See Appendix E)
In addition, while Reid agreed with Smith that we can only judge the sight of
others by our sight, assume what others hear is the same as we hear, that others will
reason in a similar way to the way we reason, he did argue that Smith failed to
carry his analogy to its logical conclusion:
In these instances I agree with him. The eye must ultimately be the
ultimate judge of objects of vision. The faculty of taste in like
manner the objects of taste and the faculty of reason in objects of
reasoning; and I add that in like manner the moral faculty is that by
which we must ultimately judge ofmorals. And so it is with regard
to every original power of judging. But this must be confined by
our judging powers. And therefore when he adds that I judge your
resentment by my resentment, of your love by my love, & that I
neither have nor can have any other way of judging about them.
This I can by no means assent to. To judge by resentment and to
judge by love are ways of speaking altogether new. Neither
resentment nor love are judging faculties, and it is impossible to
judge of any thing by them, [emphasis added]132
It was Reid's conclusion that, "the author uses approbation and disapprobation in
too vague and figurative a sense. When he speaks at one time of the approbation of
an opinion and at another time, of the approbation of actions, the word approbation
is taken in different senses."133 As a consequence, "[T]o this system it has also
been objected that the ultimate measure of right and wrong is not fixed; it makes
virtue to depend not on the truth of things but on the passions ofmen which differ
in different persons & in the same person at different times".134 On this front,
Reid's central, and seemingly only, bone of contention is that "these theories make





structure of language will admit, these theories then are irreconcilable with the
common sentiments and the common language of all mankind".135 In contrast,
Reid maintained that there is some real and tangible worth in men's actions as well
as in what they ought and ought not to do. Reid supported this contention, in
contrast to the one proffered by Smith, by presenting the following observation:
"[T]his obligation does not depend on the constitution of the agent but on the
nature of the action, moral obligation agrees to the common sense and language of
mankind which is a strong support in its favour".136
What we observe is that Reid was pre-occupied with turning the tide ofwhat he
judged to be the abuse of language by Hume and Smith in their pursuit to establish
a system ofmorals. Reid hoped to present an alternative vision, one more soundly
constructed, but equally dependent upon, assumptions about language. If his vision
had become a reality, Reid was quite confident of the consequences:
But this darkness will not last for ever. Light will arise upon this
benighted part of the intellectual globe. When any man is so happy
as to delineate the powers of the human mind as they really are in
nature, men that are free from prejudice, and capable of reflection,
will recognise their own features in the picture; and then the wonder
will be, how things so obvious could be so long wrapped up in
mystery and darkness; how men could be carried away by false
theories and conjectures, when the truth was to be found in their
own breasts if they had but attended to it.137
This florid verbiage reflects the passion Reid felt in this battle for the intellectual
high-ground regarding the character and influence of language on the Scottish
Enlightenment. It also eloquently illustrated that language was not just an
illustrative tool or metaphorical device within the Scots' efforts to delineate the
character of man's moral sentiments. If Reid was going to be successful in his
attempt to turn the tide of scepticism and relativism in moral theory, then his effort
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necessitated a more convincing conception of language to be proffered. As we




Hume, Reid and Smith all proffered theories of sociability and morality that
were literally permeated with references to language and language use. From
passing allusion to extended discussion, there is no doubting that references to
language and language use played a role in the dissemination of their theories on
these topics. Given this fact, this thesis has sought to explore if any uniform
patterns emerged in their works relating to these references to language, and if so,
how these references shed light both onto their understanding of their
characterisation of man's nature in general, and, more particularly, on the
relationship between language, sociability, and morality envisioned by them.
At the most general level these allusions to language and language use reflect
the general discourse going on in both academia and popular culture during the
Eighteenth Century regarding nature of language and the important role attributed
to interpersonal discourse in the shaping of our social and moral character. For
example, it would appear that the concurrent discussion of language and language
use taking place throughout the course of the Enlightenment played a significant
role in colouring the broad framework in which Hume, Smith and Reid went about
constructing their individual theories. These Scottish philosophers were very much
in tune with the contemporary assumptions and analytical conclusions regarding
the usefulness of analysing language and language use in shedding light on both
man's innate predisposition and developmental potential. Advancing this
exploration into the analysis of man's sociability and morality, Hume, Reid and
Smith can be seen to draw upon their epistemological conclusions regarding the
nature of language in their efforts to discover what human characteristics drive man
to cooperate socially and act morally.
These authors' consistent references to language and language seem also to be
influenced by the general social pre-occupation with polite society and social
refinement through the medium of polite conversation. Hume, Smith and Reid all
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demonstrated an awareness of the importance of controlled interpersonal
communication in the formation, understanding and refinement of proper moral
sentiments. While each theorist constructed his own unique take on what exactly
proper refinement entailed, they all seemed to share in the idea that those who
wished to inter-act socially and act morally benefited greatly by consciously
engaging his fellow man in conversation and demonstrating, as a result of this
intercourse, a more refined understanding of his moral sentiments.
In this climate of heightened epistemological and social awareness of language
and language use, Hume, Smith and Reid drew upon these movements and infused
their presentation of their social and moral theory with elements of both strands of
thought. As we have seen, this manifested itself in their work in various
discernable ways. At the most simplistic level, in their efforts to build an
understanding ofman as a social and moral creature, it seemed both important and
convenient for Hume, Reid and Smith to use the medium of language and language
use as a tool of illustration in the discussion of their theories. The use of language
being such a common denominator among all men of every nation, the utilisation
of reference to language by way of illustration and illusion by Hume, Smith and
Reid served as an easily accessible means of engaging the minds of their audiences.
In this instance it would appear that references to language and language use by
these scholars served as a tool by which to make sometimes very abstract concepts
more accessible and readily comprehensible.
However, the very assumption by these theorists that such analogy and
illustration were indeed valid and relevant seems to point to some further, more
profound, conclusions by these theorists relating to the nature of language and
language use, which extend well beyond simple references to language as an
illustrative tool. The very idea that such references were relevant point to the
apparent realisation on the part of Hume, Reid and Smith that in their efforts to
create a 'science of man' an understanding of language's capabilities and
limitations, both epistemological and social, shed valuable light on an
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understanding ofman's social and moral character. As unique, distinguishing and
fundamental as perhaps any characteristic in separating man from beast, man's use
of language and its use as a social medium of communication were seen as
potentially contributing to their investigations. Therefore, we see language and
language use being utilised to substantiate certain claims about the fundamentals of
the human character, and arguments that fundamentals of the human character are
necessarily reflected in language and language use. As the medium of all
understanding and communication within society, language was seen as both the
sustainer and mirror of much of man's social interaction and the formation of his
understanding ofmorality. For, if there were fundamental truths as to man's social
and moral character, they would most likely be reflected in the medium by which
man communicates and interacts with his fellow man. Likewise, limitations and
complications in the nature of language itself as the bridge between individuals
might in some ways impact or limit the ability of man to adequately communicate
his internal sentiments whatever they may be. In this manner, references to
language were used to substantiate certain claims, on the assumption that the
legitimacy of the claim that 'such and such' a characteristic ofman existed would
manifest itself and be evident in the language itself; and inherent limitations in the
ability of man to always articulate his internal sentiments might impact how those
sentiments are perceived and developed within a social context.
Thus, in their efforts to search out empirical evidence as to man's true nature,
the utilisation of language by man shed much light onto some fundamental and
profound elements of his unique character. The result of this awareness is evident
in their respective theories, with the analysis of theoretical methodologies presented
by each suggesting a moral universe in which epistemological claims were
strengthened by references to language and the importance of a proper
understanding of the nature, attributes and limitations of language. Likewise,
social and moral understanding and judgment was both demonstrated and
cultivated through conscious awareness of the medium of verbal communication.
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As a result of this awareness it has become apparent over the course of this
thesis that these theorists' assumptions about the nature and limitations of
language, and language use, impacted their conception of man's morality and
sociability. In turn, the nature ofman's moral sentiments was presented by Hume,
Smith and Reid as impacting the development of langauge within the society.
What has also become apparent is the extent to which the character of language and
language use is assumed as much as utilised within the theories ofHume, Reid and
Smith. This is the case because Hume, Smith and Reid seemed to realise that
language and morality are two of the fundamental human characteristics
differentiate from the rest of creation. As such, in the formation ofman's unique
nature as he developed into a social and moral creature, the two would develop side
by side with both their individual attributes and limitations influencing the other.
Thus, while these theorists differed dramatically in their ultimate conclusions,
all three do seem to come to agree on one fundamental point, that the true essence
of man's social and moral character is readily demonstrated and substantiated by
references to language and language use. These Scots judged man's creation and
use of language, and his ability to formulate and act upon a conception ofmorality,
as mirroring each another, sustaining each other and, as a result, inevitably
coalescing in man's constitution. Given these suppositions, the investigation of
man's sociability and morality were greatly aided by a concurrent exploration of
language and language use.
As we have seen, this struggle did not take place simply within the confines
of their own individual theories, but can be seen as also playing an important role
in their efforts to utilise references to language and language use to substantiate
alternative theories of sociability and morality. Nowhere is this fact better
illustrated than in the case of Reid. In order to turn the tide of scepticism and what
he saw as the moral relativism propagated by the likes of Hume and Smith, we see
Reid not only constmct a theory that shows an alternative depiction of the nature of
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language, but also taking his intellectual opponents to task upon the basis of their
mischaracterisation of language and language use. As the last chapter
demonstrated, the theoretical and practical are merged in Reid's writings and, as a
result, his accusations relating to the twisting of language and language use by
Hume and Smith can be justly described not merely as pedantic grammatical
quibbling but rather as a theoretical denunciation.
Due to this fact, one cannot dismiss the continual references to language and
language use within the works ofHume, Smith and Reid as simply colourful asides,
convenient metaphorical tools, or easily accessible illustrations. It is necessary to
go beyond this and realise that the very reason these illustrations and references to
language and language use were deemed valid was that they served the purpose of
substantiating and corroborating much more profound conclusions on the part of
these theorists to gain an understanding of the sociable and moral character of
mankind. As such, it behooves scholars to acknowledge this point and to examine




"As the mutual shocks, in society, and the oppositions of interest and self-love have
constrained mankind to establish the laws of justice, in order to preserve the
advantages of mutual assistance and protection: in like manner, the eternal
contrarieties, in company, ofmen's pride and self-conceit, have introduced the rules
of Good Manners or Politeness, in order to facilitate the intercourse of minds, and
an undisturbed commerce and conversation. Among well-bred people, a mutual
deference is affected; contempt of others disquised; authority concealed; attention
given to each in turn; and an easy stream of conversation maintained, without
vehemence, without interruption, without eagerness for victory, and without any
airs of superiority. These attentions and regards are immediately agreeable to
others, abstracted from any consideration of utility or beneficial tendancies: they
concilitate affection, promote esteem, and extremely enhance the merit of the
person who regulates his behaviour of them."1
1
Hume, Enquiry, p. 139.
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"All this is the effect of the natural and inherent principles and passions of human
nature; and as these passions and principles are inalterable, it may be thought, that
our conduct, which depends on them, must be so too, and that 'twou'd be in vain,
either for moralist or politicians, to tamper with us, or attempt to change the usual
course of our actions, with a view to public interest. And indeed, did the success of
their designs depend upon their success in correcting the selfishness and ingratitude
ofmen, they wou'd never make any progress, unless aided by omnipotence, which
is alone able to new-mould the human mind, and change its character in such
fundamental articles. All they can pretend to, is, to give a new direction to those
natural passions, and teach us that we can better satisfy our appetites in an oblique
and artificial manner, than by headlong and impetuous motion".2
2




"A child has no self-command; but, whatever are its emotions, whether fear, or
grief, or anger, it endeavours always, by the violence of its outcries, to alarm, as
much as it can, the attention of its nurse, or of its parents. While it remains under
the custody of such partial protectors, its anger is the first and, perhaps, the only
passion that it is taught to moderate. By noise and threatening they are, for their
own ease, often obliged to frighten it into good temper; and the passion which
incites it to attack, is restrained by that which teaches it to attend to its own safety,
When it is old enough to go to school, or to mix with its equals, to soon finds that
they have no such indulgent partiality. It naturally wishes to gain their favour, and
to avoid their hatred or contempt. Regard even to its own safety teaches it to do so;
and it soon finds that it can do so in no other way than by moderating, not only its
anger, but all its other passions, to the degree which its play-fellows and
companions are likely to be pleased with. It thus enters into the great school of
self-command, it studies to be more and more master of itself, and begins to
exercise over its own feelings a discipline which the practice of the longest life is
very seldom sufficient to bring to complete perfection".1
1 Smith., Theory ofMoral Sentiments, p. 145.
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"Every thing seems hostile, and he would be glad to fly to some inhospitable
desert, where he might never more behold the face of a human creature, nor read in
the countenance of mankind the condemnation of his crimes. But solitude is still
more dreadful than society. His own thoughts can present him with nothing but
what is black, unfortunate, and disastrous. ... The horror of solitude drives him back
into society, and he comes again into the presence ofmankind, astonished to appear
before them, loaded with shame and distracted with fear, in order to supplicate
some little protection form the countenance of those very judges, who he knows
have already all unanimously condemned him. Such is the nature of that sentiment,
which is properly called remorse; of all the sentiments which can enter the human
breast the most dreadful".2




"In his Professorship of Logic, to which Mr. Smith was appointed on his first
introduction into the University, he soon saw the necessity of departing widely
from the plan that had been followed by his predecessors, and of directing the
attention of his pupils to studies of a more interesting and useful nature than the
logic and metaphysics of the school. Accordingly, after exhibiting a general view
of the powers of the mind, and explaining so much of the ancient logic as was
requisite to gratify curiosity with respect to an artificial method of reasoning, which
had once occupied the universal attention of the learned, he dedicated all the rest of
his time to the delivery of a system of rhetoric and belles lettres. The best method
of explaining and illustrating the various powers of the human mind, the most
useful part of metaphysics, arises from an examination of the several ways of
communicating our thoughts by speech, and from an attention to the principles of
those literary which contribute to persuasion and entertainment. By these arts,
everything we perceive or feel, every operation of our minds, is expressed and
delineated in such a manner, that it may be clearly distinguished and remembered.
There is, at the same time, no branch of literature more suited to youth at their first
entrance upon philosophy than this, which lays hold of their taste and their
feelings".1
1
Dugald Stewart. Account of the Life and Writing ofAdam Smith. L.L.D.. originally published,
(London: T. Cadall and W. Davies, 1795); cited in: Intro., Theory ofMoral Sentiments, p. 2. The editor
also notes in footnote #4 that "Stewart identifies his informant as Millar in a note added to the reprint of the
'Account' included in Works ofAdam Smith (London, 1811), v.412".
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What follows is Smith's characterisation of a 'Prudent Man', from The Theory of
Moral Sentiments, Part VI, 'Of the Character ofVirtue':
"He rarely frequents, and more rarely figures in those convivial societies which are
distinguished for the jollity and gaiety of their conversation .... [new Paragraph]
But though his conversation may not always be very sprightly or diverting, it is
always perfectly inoffensive.... Both in his conduct and conversation, he is an exact
observer of decency, and respects with an almost religious scrupulosity, all the
established decorums and ceremonials of society. And, in this respect, he sets a
much better example than has frequently been done by men of such more splendid
talents and virtues; who, in all ages, from that of Socrates and Aristippus, down to
that of Dr. Swift and Voltaire, and from that of Phillip and Alexander the Great,
down to that of the great Czar Peter of Moscovy, have too often distinguished
themselves by the most improper and even insolent contempt of all the ordinary
decorums of life and conversation, and who thereby set the most pernicious
example to those who wish to resemble them, and who too often content
themselves with imitating their follies, without even attempting to attain their
perfection".2
2
Smith, Ibid., pp. 214 - 215.
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"The different situations of different ages and countries are apt, in the same
manner, to give different characters to the generality of those who live in them, and
their sentiments concerning the particular degree of each quality, that is either
blamable or praise-worthy, vary, according to that degree of politeness, which
could be highly esteemed, perhaps would be thought effeminate adulteration, in
Russia, would be regarded as rudeness and barbarism at the court of France. ...
Every age and country look upon that degree of each quality, which is commonly to
be met with in those who are esteemed among themselves, as the golden mean of
that particular talent or virtue. And as this varies, according as their different
circumstances render different qualities more or less habitual to them, their
sentiments concerning the exact propriety of character and behaviour vary
accordingly".3
3




"To society we owe the ability of communicating our thoughts and sentiments to
each other by language. Though many brutes animals are gregarious, and have a
kind of society with their kind, by which they are very helpful to one another, yet
none of them was ever found to have language, by which one can communicate its
knowledge and experience to another. They have indeed some natural signs of
their wants and of their desires and fears, which Nature teaches them to use and to
understand when used by their companions. ... This and such like natural signs are
all that appears in the most sagacious Brutes that looks like language, never was
any tribe found to have the art of communicating their sentiments to one another by
artificial signs which can call language. On the other hand, I know no well
vouched account of any tribe ofman, however savage, who had lived in society for
some time, who had not language, by which they could communicate to one
another what they know and had observed. The language of savages always keeps
pace with their knowledge, and it can go no farther. They have names for the
objects they are acquired with and can express their various changes of those
objects and events that have fallen [within] their notice. So that language has very
justly been accounting one of the characteristick distinctions of the human
species."1
1
Reid, Birkwood Collection, MS. 4/1/30, 'Lecture Three: Culture ofNature'
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"Perhaps some may think that the want of language will be no impediment to the
exercise of his rational powers. Nay perhaps, some will apprehend that he will
think more accurately and reason more justly by being free from the encumbrances
of language, where imperfections and ambiguities are one great case of error
among mankind. However plausible this observation may seem, I believe it has no
just foundation, and that men would never learn to reason without language. I
grant that without language a man might retain his imagination distinct notion of
objects which nature present to his senses, so as to know it is the same object when
it makes its appearance again. This the more sagacious brutes can do. But to those
notions which are formed by the mind itself, by abstraction and composition; in a
word all general notions, I apprehend that without language we would never form
them or be able to use them in reasoning. A general or abstract notion is the
manufacture of the mind itself, so to speak, it has no archtypical nature, it
comprehends only certain attributes or relations of beings, is distinguished from
other things belonging to the same beings by giving a name to it. The name we
give it, and the known meaning or definition of the name serves as a boundary or
enclosure to distinguish it, from other attributes or relations that are not
comprehended under that name. Take away the name and the enclosure is
removed. Like a field which has no limits to distinguish it form the contiguous
ground."2
2
Reid, Birkwood Collection, MS. 4/1/30, 'Lecture Three: Culture ofNature'.
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"Now it is to be observed that there can be no reasoning, no rational train of
thinking without such general and abstract notions. For reasoning must consist of
propositions and every proposition must include some general notion. We learn to
form such general notions by learning language and if we had no language we
should never have learned to form them. I believe that every man will in his
experience, that when he attempts to any regular train of thinking, though he does it
in silence and without uttering a sound, he will find it impossible to go on without
conceiving more or less the words by which his thought may be expressed and the
more distinctly he cloths his thoughts with words, the more accurately he will
think; thought being a thing too subtle and to spiritual to be retained in the memory
and imagination without being clothed with some sensible image. This appears to
me to be the condition of human nature in our present state. And I see no reason to
think that a man without society and consequently without any kind of language,
would ever acquire so much of the exercises of his rational powers as to be entitled
to the denomination of rational creature."3
3
Reid, Birkwood Collections, MS 4/1/30, 'Lecture Three: Culture ofNature'.
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"Can any stronger proof be desired, that this quality is that to which the vulgar give
the name of colour? If it should be said, that this quality, to which we give the
name of colour, is unknown to the vulgar, and, therefore, can have no name among
them, I answer, it is, indeed, known only by its effects - that is, by its exciting a
certain idea in us; but are there not numberless qualities of bodies which are known
only by their effects, to which, notwithstanding, we find it necessary to give
names? Why, then, should not the vulgar give a name to a quality, whose effects
are every moment perceived by their eyes? We all have the reason, therefore, that
the nature of the thing admits, to think that the vulgar apply the name of colour to
that quality of bodies which excites in us what the philosophers call the idea of
colour. ... Philosophers have thought fit to leave that quality of bodies which the
vulgar call colour, without a name, and to give the name of colour to the idea or
appearance, to which, as we have shewn, the vulgar give no name, because they
never make it an object of thought or reflection. Hence it appears, that, when
philosophers affirm that colour is not in bodies, but in the mind, and the vulgar
affirm that colour is not in the mind, but is a quality of bodies, there is no
difference between them about things, but only about the meaning of a word".4
4
Reid, Enquiry, pp. 68 - 69.
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"I observe that the word Sympathy seems not to have always the same fixed and
determinate meaning in this System, nor to be so accurately defined as is necessary
to make it the foundation of a distinct Theory ofMorals[.] In the beginning of this
work the Author observes that in every passion pleasant as well as painful, the
emotions of the bystander correspond to what, by bringing the case home to
himself, he imagines should be the sentiments of the Sufferer. And that this
disposition of the human mind is what we call Sympathy. I do not find any other
definition of Sympathy throughout the Book. And this I think is not what is
commonly meant by the word Sympathy[.] The etymology of the word plainly
points out the common means of it in the English Language[.] It supposes some
painful or agreeable feeling or passion in the person sympathised with, & implies
causes a correspondent & similar feeling in the spectator [;] this is what we call
Sympathy. But Dr. Smith makes his Sympathy to correspond not to what the
person sympathised with reality & actually suffers or enjoys but what he should
suffer or enjoy. ... I conceive this meaning of the word Sympathy is altogether new
& that if one had not a hypotheses to serve by it he would never have dreamed that
it is Sympathy that makes us blush for the imprudence and rudeness of another. It
might I think more properly be called Antipathy but that we may not dispute about
words, let us suppose that our feeling that Emotion for another which he ought to
feel but does not feel, is to be called Sympathy. It is evident that this Sympathy
supposes a moral Judgement and consequently a moral faculty".5
5
Reid, Birkwood Collection, MS.2131/3/1/28.
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The analysis in Lecture 99 of the Glasgow Lectures also leads off with the
accusation that throughout the Theory ofMoral Sentiments, "[T]hat sympathy has
not always the precisely same meaning thro' out his work nor is his definition of it
so accurate as to be a foundation for a Theory ofMorals":6
"In the beginning of the work the author observes that in every passion pleasant as
well as painful the emotion of the bystander corresponds to what the person
affected feels, he enters by imagination into the sentiments of the sufferer, & it is
this disposition of the Mind which we call Sympathy. I do not find another
definition of this thro' his work & this is not what is commonly meant by that
word. The etymology of the word points out its common meaning in the English
Language. It supposes an agreeable or painful feeling in the person we sympathise
with & occasions a similar feeling in the Spectator, this is what is commonly called
Sympathy, but Dr. Smith makes it consist not in feeling what they actually do feel
or enjoy but what they ought to feel or enjoy. ... Now this is surely is giving a new
meaning to the word sympathy & no one who had not a hypothesis to serve by it,
would ever call the blushing for the imprudence of another, sympathy".7
6
Baird, Lecture 99. It does seem odd that Reid, seems here to want precise definitions, yet he contends
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